DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 323 568	CS 507 258
TITLE	Proceedings of the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (73rd, Minneapolis, Minnesota, August 1-4, 1990). Part VI: Foreign and International Media Studies.
INSTITUTION	Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.
PUB DATE	Aug 90
NOTE	339p.; For other sections of these proceedings, see CS 507 256-263.
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC14 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Advertising; Communication Research; Content Analysis; Cultural Background; *Cultural Influences; Culture Conflict; Economic Factors; *Foreign Countries; Media Research; *News Media; *Periodicals; Political Influences; *Social Change; *Television; Terrorism
IDENTIFIERS	Asia; Europe; Latin America; Media Imperialism; Middle East

ABSTRACT

The foreign and international media studies section of the proceedings includes the following 11 papers: "The Contemporary Pacific Islands Press" (Suzanna Layton); "Cultural Domination and Sovereignty: The Development of European TV Quotas, 1981-89" (Ulf Jonas Bjork); "A Content Analysis of TV News in Saudi Arabia and Oman" (Abdulrahman I. Al-Habib); "Magazines in Latin America, 1990: Changing Economic and Political Environments" (Bruce Garrison and Michael B. Salwen); "Culture or Commerce: The European Community and 'Television without Frontiers'" (Claudette Guzan Artwick); "A Terrorist's Best Friend?: International Terrorism and the U.S. Weekly Newsmagazines" (Brad L. Rawlins); "Confrontation and Change: Reevaluating Soviet Media Theory" (Catherine Cassara); "Polish Media in the Age of Solidarity" (Leila R. Gray); "An Analysis of Cultural Values in Print Advertising in the United States and Great Britain" (Katherine Toland Frith and David Wesson); "Creative Strategies in American and Japanese Television Commercials: A Comparison" (Jyotika Ramaprasad and Kazumi Hasegawa); and "'Mass Line': The 'Living Soul' of 'Mao Zedong Thought' as the Foundation of China's Internal Media Policy" (Liqun Yan and Robert S. Kahan). (SR)

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ED323568

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1990 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR EDUCATION IN JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION (73rd, Minneapolis, MN, August 1-4, 1990). Part VI: Foreign and International Media Studies.

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THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC ISLANDS PRESS

1990 Markham Award Paper

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ABSTRACT

The paper updates the Richstad et al. (1973) survey of the Pacific Islands press and provides what may be the first in-depth longitudinal data on press development in a Third World region. Triangulation was used to explore change in the physical characteristics of print news media and their staffs through several comparisons of data drawn from two studies, Richstad's in 1973 and one conducted by the author in 1988 and 1989 incorporating broader definitional criteria based on UNESCO recommendations. One level of analysis compared the overall data from both studies. Another compared 1973 data with data sampled from the 1989 study according to Richstad's criteria. A third analyses focused on the twenty-two papers from the 1973 study which were still publishing at the time of the 1989 study. Finally, data obtained during field research in Papua New Guinea as part of the 1989 study was compared with 1973 and 1989 data which had been gathered externally.

The comparison of data based on Richstad's criteria shows significant development in Pacific Islands news publishing. The number of titles has increased overall by 90%, and by even greater margins in Guam, the Solomon Islands and Tonga. Total circulation has risen by 85%, and the circulation of the commercial press by 109%. The papers themselves have increased in size by an average of 40%. Data drawn from twenty-two papers which appeared in both surveys showed the government press (which relies less on advertising) has decreased, while the commercial press rose by 90%. The same data set showed an increase in indigenous editors from 48% to 77% of the total, and a rise in the number of professional journalists by 45%.

Finally, one third of all Pacific Island newspaper publishers now use desktop publishing (DTP) systems. This is comparable with the estimated National Newspaper Association member usage in the United States - 30% to 50%, a remarkable finding in light of the fact that this technology was introduced into the region five years ago.

> *"A free and independent media reflecting diversity of opinion is a precondition of democratic societies and an integral part of national development."*
>
> Resolution 1.1, Communique of the 1989 Meeting of Journalists of the South Pacific; Port Moresby.

INTRODUCTION

Seventeen years have passed since the seminal study of print media in the Pacific, *The Pacific Islands Press: A Directory* (Richstad et al.,1973), was published. This paper presents the first comprehensive update of that study and provides a timely description of Pacific news publishing and staffing. It grew out of the author's recognition of the inadequacies of piecemeal and out-of-date material which characterizes more recent literature on the topic[1]. Also, in perhaps the first in-depth longitudinal analysis of press development in a Third World region, the paper demonstrates how Pacific news publishing has changed in a number of ways over two decades. Finally, the findings are discussed within the larger context of such issues as foreign ownership, commercialism, censorship, professionalism and technology; issues which are of increasing importance in the regional press environment.

STUDY CONTEXT

Press

Newspapers have been published in the Pacific Islands for over 250 years. Introduced as a social artifact by adventuring Europeans, they were the products of a number of differing social, economic and political forces during the missionary, colonial and post-colonial periods. They have served as voices for religious orthodoxy, for the interests of planters, administration officers and military commanders, and for nascent independence movements. Most of the island polities have now reassumed sovereign control of their own affairs but within the context of accelerating global integration fueled by new communication technologies. Likewise, just as the print media are gaining control of their own voices, these voices are being subsumed to global press integration by external media monopolies.

Social and Political Change

Decolonization formed the dominant discourse of the 1970s and 1980s. One-third of the seventeen polities surveyed by Richstad et al. have now become self-governing or independent, adding ten new nations to the region[2] (Table 1). This process was characterized by a level of indigenous participation and consensual decision-making unique in the world (Ghai, 1983). There was also the realization by local elites in newly forming nations that true independence was a state of being beyond political self-determination; unattainable unless accompanied by economic self-sufficiency and cultural sovereignty. National goals were drafted to reflect the ideals of democracy, equality and traditional rights. Five-year plans were set in motion to educate, cure and enrich national populations.

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[1] One example from an often-cited paper (Waqavonovono,1981) highlights these problems. The statement "Pacific newspapers are unusual in that they contain both English and vernacular", ignores the existence of French language media in Vanuatu, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia, and excludes such papers with separate English and vernacular editions as Savali in Western Samoa and the Tonga Chronicle in Tonga. Secondly, in the years following publication of the article, successful Korean and Japanese language newspapers have appeared on Guam, containing neither English nor vernacular content.

[2] The Gilbert and Ellice Islands separated at independence to form the sovereign nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands separated during sovereignty negotiations to

Table 1: Pacific Islands Political Status 1973/1990

	1973	**1990**
American Samoa	US Territory	same
Common. No. Marianas	US Trust Territory	self-governing
Cook Islands	independent	same
Fed. States of Micro	US Trust Territory	self-governing
Fiji	independent	same
Fr. Polynesia	Fr. Overseas Terr.	same
Guam	US Territory	same
Johnston Is.	US Territory	same
Kiribati	Br. Crown Colony	independent
Nauru	independent	same
New Caledonia	Fr. Overseas Terr.	same
Niue	NZ Territory	independent
Norfolk Island	Australian Terr.	same
Papua New Guinea	self-governing	independent
Pitcairn Island	Br. Crown Colony	same
Rep. of Marsh Is	US Trust Territory	self-governing
Republic of Palau	US Trust Territory	self-governing
Solomon Islands	Br. Protectorate	independent
Tokelau Islands	NZ Territory	same
Tonga	independent	same
Tuvalu	Br. Crown Colony	independent
Vanuatu	Br./Fr. Condominium	independent
Wallis and Futuna	Fr. Overseas Terr.	same
Western Samoa	independent	same

Implementation of these plans has brought mixed results. The inevitable expansion of social services and employment opportunities in the urban centers has in some ways worked against efforts to develop the agricultural sector. Large numbers of people, primarily the young, are flocking to national and provincial capitals. The latest urbanization figures (Table 2) show that people living in urban or peri-urban areas average 32% of the total population among the independent and freely associated states of the region.

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form the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau.

Table 2: Pacific Islands Urbanization

	Census yr.	Urban pop.
Cook Is.	'81	27%
FSM	'80	26%
Fiji	'76	37%
Kiribati	'85	33%
Nauru	'77	100%
Niue	'84	21%
PNG	'80	13%
RMI	'80	60%
Solomon Is.	'76	9%
Tonga	'76	26%
Tuvalu	'79	30%
Vanuatu	'79	18%
W. Samoa	'81	21%

Average 32%

Source: Hammnett and Kiste, 1988

This trend is having an enormous impact on the evolution of Pacific Island societies. Regional capitals such as Port Moresby, Suva, Agana and Noumea, are becoming characterized by increasing ethnic and class diversity. Many of their residents are being confronted for the first time with varied and often conflicting representations of ideal cultural norms. Some of these representations are constructed by local cultures reinterpreting their own traditions, while others enter from the West via global media systems. A rise in the value placed on individual attainment is seen as one of the more significant social effects of the latter set of images; communalism and extended family residences are, at least in the urban context, declining in economic importance.

Education is seen as a potent force in overcoming the economic obstacles of developing nations. While Pacific Island literacy figures are fragmentary (Table 3), a look at secondary school enrollment in the early 1970s and then again in the late 1980s (Table 4), shows dramatic increases in Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Western Samoa. All at least doubled, and in some cases more than tripled, their intake of secondary students over the period (UNESCO,1973; 1988).

Table 3: Pacific Islands Literacy

	(Census)% Literate	(Census)% Literate
Fiji		('76) 79.0
Fr. Polynesia	('62) 94.5	
Guam		('80) 96.4
New Caledonia	('63) 83.8	('76) 91.3
PNG	('71) 32.1	
Tonga		('76) 99.6
Vanuatu		('79) 52.9
Western Samoa	('71) 97.8	

Table 4: Secondary School Enrollment

	(Year) Total	(Year) Total
American Samoa	('71) 2,305	('85) 3,342
Cook Islands	('71) 1,213	('85) 1,613
Fiji	('71) 20,072	('85) 45,093
Fr. Polynesia	('71) 7,542	('86) 17,878
Guam	('71) 10,602	('83) 13,375
Kiribati		('87) 2,493
Nauru	('71) 364	('85) 482
New Caledonia	('71) 5,238	('87) 19,417
Niue	('71) 392	('86) 280
PNG	('71) 28,121	('82) 50,353
Solomon Islands	('71) 1,587	('83) 5,837
Tokelau		('83) 488
Tonga	('71) 10,455	('86) 13,527
TTPI	('70) 6,005	('81) 6,872
Tuvalu		('81) 265
Vanuatu	('71) 878	('83) 2,904
Western Samoa	('70) 10,147	('86) 20,604

Research

Lerner (1958) and others (Schramm, 1964; Pye 1963) have theorized that these trends, catalyzed by participation in mass media, are part of the 'modernizing' process. It is difficult to evaluate this thesis in the Pacific Island context, for print media there have long been the subject of much rhetoric but little systematic research. Yet the potential of the region to contribute to a greater understanding of the relationship between media and culture change has been particularly noted by leading theorists in both communication (Lerner, 1970; Schramm, 1977) and anthropology (Mead, 1976).

Most of the quantitative literature on the modern press documents work completed between one and two decades ago (Barney, 1971; Barney, 1972; Richstad, McMillan and Barney, 1973; Richstad and McMillan, 1978; Richstad and Nnaemeka, 1979; Walker, 1979; Allen, 1980; Waqavonovono, 1981). One noted exception is Masterton's (1989) survey of attitudes toward the press in eight South Pacific nations.

Relevant qualitative research is also rare. Self-reports by regional editors at Pacific Island News Association conferences have been collected and published throughout the years in the Pacific Island Communication Journal, but there has been no methodical analysis of these 'texts' since the first regional editors' meeting reported on by Richstad (1973). The few historical discussions of the Pacific press are found in Lingenfelter (1967), O'Reilly et al. (1967, 1969, 1971, 1977), Yim (1968), Vusoniwailala (1978, 1979), Teare (1980), Waqavonovono (1981), Matsui et al. (1982), and Coquilhat (1987). These generally take the form of annotated bibliographies specific to one or two island groups.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Data on the physical characteristics of the Pacific Islands press and editorial staff as a whole has not been systematically collected since the 1970s. In order to provide a comprehensive data set upon which further research might be based, currently published periodicals needed to be identified and described.

The research discussed in this paper is an attempt to meet that need. Moreover, the project was designed to generate data comparable to that gathered by Richstad et al. in 1972 and 1973. This made it possible to document changes in the Pacific Islands print media that have taken place since 1973.

DEFINITIONS

Periodical

A publication constituting one issue in a continuous series under the same title, published at regular or irregular intervals, over an indefinite period, individual issues in the series being numbered consecutively or each issue being dated (UNESCO, 1988:674).

Newspaper

Any form of printed matter that contains news, information, stories about events, or any comments, notes or commentary together with news, information or stories about events or of any other matter of public interest" (Section II, Journalism Ordinance of the British Mandatory Government 1933; Caspi, 1986).

Circulation

Circulation figures should show the average daily circulation or the average circulation per issue in the case of non-daily publications. These figures should include the number of copies sold, either directly or by subscription, plus the number of free copies regularly distributed, both inside the country and abroad, except unsold copies. When the circulation data are not available, the number of copies printed should be indicated (UNESCO, 1988:674).

Audited Circulation

Circulation which has been formally certified by the relevant national authority (usually the postal service), for purposes of registration, preferential postage rates, and advertising sales.

Circulation per 1000 Inhabitants

Standard for measuring print media development in a country or region (UNESCO, 1988:674).

Institutional

Pertaining to the structural organization of the three aspects of news publishing; editorial (writing and reporting), mechanical (production and printing) and financial.

METHODOLOGY

The 1973 Study

Data were collected by Richstad et al. through survey questionnaires mailed to editors and publishers in mid-1972, then updated to April 1973. In cases where no response was received, data were collected by consulting other sources or issues of the publication in question (Richstad, 1973). While the emphasis was on "important sources of general news" (ibid:ix), "some publications...[were] included for their potential interest to advertisers and researchers" (ibid). Deliberate omissions included such 'specialized publications' as scholarly and literary journals, the religious press, and annual reports. The stated objective was to include "all of the major publications being issued in the Pacific Islands" (ibid:x) (with the exception of Hawaii for which "information...has been long available in other reference works" [ibid:xi]), but the focus appeared to be on commercial and government produced news periodicals.

The written, English-language survey instrument contained questions regarding the name of the publication and its parent company or sponsoring body, mailing address, founding date, frequency of publication, circulation, subscription rate, format, advertising rate, language of publication, reproduction method and make of press, staff and sources of international and regional news.

Sixty-three publications in seventeen polities were surveyed. The latter included: American Samoa, British Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Guam, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Niue, Norfolk Island, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Island, Tonga, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and Western Samoa. Periodical circulations ranged from 500 to 26,950.

The 1989 Study

The 1989 study integrated a number of research techniques into its overall methodology. Initially, archival research was carried out in Honolulu to identify potential news publishers for survey; 'potential' in that they either had been cited as such, or (as religious, development or other governmental institutions) there was the reasonable expectation of involvement in print news media production[3].

While Richstad focused on the commercial and government publications, UNESCO recommends the monitoring of a range of news media including church, development agency, and other non-profit periodicals[4]. With this in mind, the criteria used by the author of this paper to select publishers for survey expanded the approach used by Richstad to allow a larger number of publishers to be contacted.

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[3] An example here concerns the Catholic Church in Vanuatu. Although there is no mention in the literature of a periodical produced by them, the influence of Catholicism in that country coupled with the press involvement of the Church in other part of the Pacific led them to be included in the survey. A completed questionnaire was returned and in this way the trilingual monthly tabloid, Eklesia, was identified.

[4] "National statistics on this subject [periodicals] should cover printed periodical publications which are published in a particular country and made available to the public, with the exception of publications issued for advertising purposes, those of a transitory character and those in which the text is not the most important part. However, the following types of publications, *inter alia*, should be included in statistics of periodicals: government periodicals, academic and scientific journals, periodicals of professional, trade union, political or sports organizations, etc., publications appearing annually or less frequently, parish magazines, school magazines and school newspapers, "house organs." (UNESCO, 1988:673)

Every attempt was made to include both general interest newspapers and other periodicals of very general interest currently published within the Pacific Islands region (as with Richstad et al., Hawaii was excluded). Periodicals which emphasized text over artwork, photos or advertising, which offered factual information regarding events, and which appealed to a particular identity (e.g. community member, national citizen or member of a particular culture group) were considered more 'newsworthy' than others, and included in the sample. Deliberate ommissions included academic and scientific journals, and gazettes with a purely statutory function.

Periodicals were identified from a wide variety of sources:

(a) published compendiums such as Richstad et al. (1973, 1978), the *World Press Encyclopedia* (1982), the *Press, Radio and TV Handbook: Australia, New Zealand and the South Pacific* (1983), *Global Journalism* (1983), *Pacific News Media* (1986), the *1987 Pacific World Directory* (1986), *Editor and Publishers International Yearbook* (1988), *Political Handbook of the World* (1987);

(b) news articles in the press itself (notably Pacific Islands Monthly, Islands Business, The Times of Papua New Guinea, and The Fiji Times);

(c) regional telephone directories;

(d) association membership and conference attendance lists - Pacific Islands News Association (1985, 1987, 1988, 1989), Pacific Island Broadcast Association (1988), East-West Center (the 1972 Communication Institute South Pacific Editors Conference, the Institute of Culture and Communication 1988 Pacific Island Journalists Training Workshop);

(e) current issues of periodicals available in the University of Hawaii Hamilton Library Pacific Collection newspaper stacks; and

(f) through personal communication with Pacific Island journalists and journalist educators who visited Hawaii in 1988 and 1989.

By August 1988, 120 potential publishers had been identified through these techniques and questionnaires were mailed at that time to each. The single-page questionnaire in written English contained questions regarding the name of the periodical and its publisher, mailing address, founding date, frequency of publication, circulation, subscription rate, format, advertising rate, language of publication, reproduction method and staff. Information was also elicited regarding average number of pages, cover price, typesetting techniques and the use of color and/or photos, plus descriptions of content and readership.

Fifty-nine completed questionnaires were returned (49% of total sample) by January 1989. The majority of publishers in the Melanesian states of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu responded quickly and completely. On the other hand, few replies were received from the larger Polynesian states and French territories - Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa, and French Polynesia and New Caledonia. This data was subsequently collected during interviews conducted throughout 1989 by the author, and by Murray Masterton of the University of the South Pacific Journalism Program on behalf of the author, with media professionals from these areas.

There appeared to be a bias in response from the smaller, more isolated papers with the mail survey. Perhaps their publishers expected increased exposure by contributing to the project. The large foreign-owned papers such as the Fiji Times and its sister publications Na Lalakai and Shanti Dut, the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Post-Courier, Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes and La Depeche de Tahiti, and the Pacific Daily News (PDN) in Guam all failed to return questionnaires. However, these and other well-established papers are available in the University of Hawaii Hamilton Library Pacific Collection, and their latest issues were examined in the data-gathering process for inclusion in the study.

Papua New Guinea Case Study

A final survey of periodicals was conducted during six weeks fieldwork in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in August and September, 1989.

Two hypothesis were tested in the PNG case study:

1. News periodicals in Papua New Guinea were incompletely inventoried through the externally-conducted research stages of the study.

2. Patterns of news periodical omission in published sources will emerge following the compilation of a more complete inventory carried out within the country.

The field study methodology consisted of interviews, archival research and site visits. Forty-five days were spent in seven of Papua New Guinea's nineteen provinces: the National Capital District, Madang, Eastern Highlands, Simbu, Western Highlands, Morobe and North Solomons. Forty-nine site visits were made to news publishers, tertiary journalism departments, archival collections, government information offices, printers, and newsagencies. At each site, names of currently published periodicals were elicited, and each informant was asked to provide names of other news publishing professionals with further information. Eighty-eight news professionals were interviewed, and sample issues of twenty-six periodicals were collected.

1989 Data Collection

Using the mailed survey, personal interview, archival research and fieldwork methods all discussed above as part of the 1989 study, data was collected on a total of 156 periodicals in twenty-four polities: American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Johnston Island, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Island, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna, and Western Samoa. Periodicals circulations ranged from 100 to 30,000. No locally produced periodicals were identified in Easter Island; the press there appears to be restricted to media originating from the Chilean mainland.

In the Papua New Guinea case study, data was collected on titles from seventeen of the nineteen provinces in Papua New Guinea. No periodicals were identified from Milne Bay and Manus provinces.

ANALYSIS

Data from the 1973 and 1989 studies were subjected to differing levels of analysis, and the results were triangulated in order to more accurately describe any identifed change in the organizational structure of news publishers or their 'product'.

The complete sets of sample data from the two studies were initially analyzed through measures of quantity, proportion (percentage or ratio) and central tendency (mean average) to construct a matrix of institutional attributes salient to news publishing in each survey period. Variables included the number of titles being published, circulation, circulation as a function of population size, size of the periodical, frequency of the periodical, ownership, editorial control, newsroom staff size and ethnicity, language usage and production technology. The results of each of these analyses were then compared with each other to chart any change in attributes between the survey periods.

The next level of analysis involved the creation of a subset from the 1989 material for methodological parity with the criteria used by Richstad et al. This was carried out by omitting data from the thirty-seven church-produced titles from a second comparison of the 1973 and 1989 sets along the dimensions of number of titles, circulation, and circulation as a function of population size.

Twenty-two periodicals out of the sixty-three identified in 1973 were still publishing in 1989, with only minor modifications[5]. The characteristics of these surviving papers in 1973 and 1989 formed a third analytical set, presenting the opportunity for a more controlled comparison of change over time.

Finally data on the number and kinds (i.e. ownership and publisher's intent) of titles identified through archival and other distance methodologies was compared with the case study results to explore the relative merits of each, and to provide additional comment on trends described through the preceding analyses[6].

FINDINGS

Number

The total number of periodicals included in the 1989 study (156) is almost two and a half times that of the 1973 study (63). While some periodicals in the 1989 collection may not have been included in the previous study by definition (Richstad, 1973:x), this category (the "religious press") in the 1989 sample only accounts for 24% of the total. The full extent of the increase, then, might be correlated with two factors: a more efficient identification process used in 1989, or the proliferation of Pacific islands periodicals over the last seventeen years.

Richstad et al. had a high degree of first-hand familiarity with the regional press not shared by this author, but it is unclear how much of their data were collected in the field as part of the 1973 study. This is important in that results from the Papua New Guinea case study showed clear benefit in incorporating field research into the data gathering process.

Forty previously undocumented and current publishing titles were identified through fieldwork in PNG. This represents twice the number listed for the survey through the externally conducted research stages of the 1989 study.

The data also reveals patterns of omission in comparison with the externally gathered survey data set: many of the periodicals identified during the case study were religious, development or community-oriented publications. In addition, a number of 'inhouse' newsletters were identified and found to contain general news content. Many of these have circulations ranging from 1,000 to 4,000 copies, which is sizable within the Pacific context. Yet, because the target audiences for these periodicals are more narrowly defined than other mass media forms such as the commercial press, they are less likely to be known outside of their publication areas.

However, the special case of Papua New Guinea must be remembered when considering these implications on the overall comprehensiveness of the 1989 study. PNG has a total population nearly five times that of the second most populous country in the region, Fiji. The population of the capital city, Port Moresby, exceeds that of all other nations in the region except two, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. PNG's GDP is 52% of the region's total. The country it is characterized by cultural, religious and political diversity unparalleled in the region, and it enjoyed a healthy press climate, relatively free from government interference during the study periods. With its wealth, diversity and size it effectively provides the 'worst case scenario' against which the 1988 survey might be tested.

It is unlikely that the survey results were as incomplete in other regional countries as they were in PNG, which saw its tally trebled through fiedwork. It is very improbable, for example, that American

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[5] One previously bilingual paper now issues separate editions for each language, another paper has undergone a change of title from English to vernacular.

[6] A word of caution, however, must be given regarding the circulation figures used in this paper. Except in the cases of the Gannett and Holmes Management Company papers on Guam, and the Fiji Times group, they are unaudited figures supplied by the publishers themselves.

Samoa (with three externally identified periodicals) could support nine papers, or the Marshall Islands (with two) could support six. On the other hand, additional periodicals might be identified through fieldwork in the French Territories, as so little of their media get reported in the English-language sources or are included in library collections outside the Francophone countries. In Fiji, the immediate effects of the 1987 coups on news publishing: censorship, and the exodus of Indo-Fijian journalists (representing a sizable percentage of the news professionals in that country), will have certainly resulted in changes to publishing patterns that have yet to be documented.

Based in part on the PNG case study, it seems likely that even if some titles in other parts of the region are still outstanding, they would be irregular or infrequent, with small circulations. The PNG titles identified for the survey averaged 5,700 circulation while the titles identified during fieldwork averaged half that, or 2,900. While this is sizable compared to some of the coral island polities' (Tokelau, Nauru, Niue) circulation, it only represents 6% of total daily circulation in the much larger market of PNG.

In trying to determine, on the other hand, whether the 1989 study was more comprehensive than that of 1973, an analysis of the 1989 titles was made to identify those publishing during the former period but which were not included in that study. Excluding religious publications (for methodological parity with the 1973 study), a total of twelve periodicals from eight island groups were identified[7]. They include five government periodicals, two university newsheets, two military periodicals, one commercial periodical, one political party newsletter, and one in-house newsletter. Three fourths of the total are from the countries recommended above for field research, half appeal to a limited readership and none currently has a circulation of over 3,700 (the average is 2,100). The gaps are therefore similar to those described for the 1989 survey.

The proposition that the increase in titles noted in the 1989 study indicates regional development of the news publishing industry is supported by a country by country comparison of the two data sets (Table 5). Leaving PNG aside for a moment because of its focus in the case study, remarkable increases in the number of titles circulating can be seen in Guam (from 2 to 15), the Solomon Islands (from 2 to 8), Tonga (from 2 to 7), and Fiji (from 15 to 22). Seven of these fifty-two titles are church-produced, of which four post-date the Richstad survey. Only two countries show a decrease in the number of titles circulating; New Caledonia and Vanuatu.

Table 5: Periodicals by Country

	1973	1989
American Samoa	3	3
Solomon Islands	2	8
Cook Islands	1	2
Fiji	15	22
Fr. Polynesia	4	7
Kiribati/Tuvalu	3	4
Guam	2	15
Johnston Island	-	1
Nauru	1	2
New Caledonia	7	6
Vanuatu	5	3
Niue	1	1
Norfolk Island	1	1
PNG	5	56
Pitcairn Island	1	1
Tokelau Island	-	1
Tonga	2	7
TTPI	6	9
Wallis and Futuna	-	1
Western Samoa	4	6
Total	**63**	**158**

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7. Fiji Republic Gazette (Fiji, 1872), Guam and Micronesia Glimpses (Guam, 1960), Harvest (PNG, 1971), Sunset News (Solomon Islands, 1971) and Journal Officiel (Wallis and Futuna, 1962); Arawa Bulletin (PNG, 1971); USP Bulletin (Fiji, 1967) and The Reporter (PNG, 1972); Pacific Crossroads (Guam, 1956) and The Breeze (Johnston Island, 1948); L'Avenir Caledonien (New Caledonia, 1954); Inside Line (PNG, mid 1960s). One further title was omitted from the 1973 study, but was included in an appendix. Although it first came out in 1930, Pacific Islands Monthly was not actually published in the Pacific Islands until 1988 (Fiji).

PNG may be used as an example in support of the relative longevity of these new titles; 40% began publishing before 1980.

A comparison of the papers published during both studies provides one reason behind the increased number of titles - language. One of these, Savali from Western Samoa, published a single bilingual edition each week in 1973, but was issuing separate English and Samoan editions in 1989.

Circulation

Based on a comparison of overall data from the two studies, total circulation of Pacific Island news periodicals has more than doubled in the last sixteen years, increasing from 321,017 to 682,998, with 10% of figures not available (Table 6). Without the data from the church-produced press, the rise is 85%.

Table 6: Circulation

	1973	1989
Daily	81,637	127,426
Semiweekly	4,800	23,500
Triweekly	5,500	2,200
Weekly	76,630	231,314
Fortnightly	22,750	20,508
Semimonthly	62,950	-
Monthly	56,150	114,200
Bimonthly	2,500	47,200
Quarterly	5,100	65,550
Other	-	51,000
Total	320,017	682,998

Circulation of dailies rose by 56% - 81,637 to 127,426 - indicating healthier profits, more reliable technology, larger urban populations, and/or better distribution-related infrastructure.

Perhaps more interesting, however, is the tripling of weekly circulation figures to a total of 231,314 while titles doubled. In 1973, weeklies lagged behind dailies in circulation by 3,000 copies. Today, weekly circulation is nearly twice that of dailies and represents one out of every three copies of published news in the region. Markets served by the largest dailies - Fiji, Guam and Papua New Guinea - also support a number of weeklies with sizable circulations. Perhaps the weekly is beginning to capitalize on the specialized markets appropriate to it. Waqavonovono (1981), in characterizing dailies as an urban phenomenon, says that weeklies "penetrate the rural areas; they also [get] passed around from one household to another more frequently and readership per issue [is] much higher [than dailies]".

In countries with no daily, such as the Solomon Islands and Western Samoa, a number of weeklies appear to compete on an equal basis with each other, judging by the similar circulation figures. This may be due to differing readerships. In the Solomon Islands, for instance, the lead story in the Solomons Tok Tok (circulation 3,000) on October 20, 1989 concerned the death of Honiara's first Archbishop. The Solomon Star (circulation 3,250), on the other hand, led off with a report on a proposal to extend visas for foreign businessmen from 14 to 30 days, and the third paper - the government-produced Nius (circulation 4,000) - highlighted a speech by the Prime Minister. These three stories appear to appeal to three very different interest groups.

In Western Samoa, the *matai* (chief) of each village are responsible for distributing the government weekly, Savali, to each household. In such a way, "the function of 'information' in terms of power relationships is maintained by those who wield power and authority" (Waqavonovono, 1981). Further research is suggested to explore whether the readership of each of the non-government weeklies in turn reflects the *aiga* (extended family) alliances of their editors and publishers, as these continue to serve as the most basic economic unit in Samoan society.

Semiweekly circulation has also shown comparatively large gains, increasing five times over the 1973 figure. In Western Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands, semiweeklies are the most frequent form of print news.

On Guam the triweekly Guam Tribune (17,500) competes successfully in circulation with the Pacific Daily News (18,076).

Analysis of data from the twenty-two newspapers surveyed in 1973 and 1988 shows that this boom in circulation is due to more than a proliferation of titles. Circulation rose for these papers by 43%, from 114,484 to 163,676, and the greatest gains were experienced by the larger commercial (and the single ecumenical) papers (Table 7). The only exception to this pattern of expansion under economies of scale is found in the relatively small Cook Islands News. In 1979 it "doubled circulation overnight" simply by changing from an evening to a morning paper (Taripo, 1989).

Table 7: 22 Papers Circulation

	1973	1989
Cook Is. Daily News/	600	2,500
Fiji Beach Press	11,000	2,500
Fiji Times	19,600	28,000
Ko E Kalonikali	3,700	5,000
La Depeche	4,500	12,000
Les Nouvelles	1,200	8,000
Marianas Variety	1,400	2,500
Na Lalakai	9,700	13,000
Nauru Bulletin	450	750
Norfolk Islander	1,050	1,250
Pacific Daily News	17,454	18,076
PNG Post-Courier	16,000	30,000
Pitcairn Is. Miscellany/	650	1,100
Samoa News	4,800	2,000
Samoa Times	5,000	3,000
Savali (Samoan)/	6,500*	3,000
Savali (English)/		500
Shanti Dut	7,780	12,000
Te Uekera/	2,500	1,500
Tohi Tala Niue/	1,200	500
Tonga Chronicle/	900	1,500
Wantok (Ecumenical)	5,000	15,000
Total	**114,484**	**163,676**

NOTE: / government paper
** bilingual edition*

Figures from the twenty-two papers surveyed in 1973 and 1988 also indicate that the Samoas are very competitive media markets. The Samoa News, Samoa Times and Savali have all declined in circulation, perhaps due to the entry of new periodicals by vigorous young publishers such as Sano Malifa of the Samoa Observer into their markets. But Malifa, as well as Fata Pito Fa'alogo of the Samoa Times, told 1987 PINA conference participants that they had deliberately discontinued village distribution in order to concentrate on the Apia urban market because English was not seen to be appropriate for the rural areas (Richstad, 1989; personal communication). While this may be so, competition from the Samoan language newspapers there may have also influenced the cutback to some degree.

Tohi Tala Niue (Niue) and Te Uekera (Kiribati) circulation figures are also down, but in Niue's case this is likely related to the extensive out-migration that market.

Population/Circulation Ratios

In 1973 there were an average of 80 copies of news publications produced in the region per 1000 population; in 1989 there are 120, an increase of 50% (Table 8). This is all the more significant in light of the 42% increase in the regional population over the period.

Pitcairn and Johnston Islands stand out for publishing far greater copies of news periodicals than their populations, with many of these copies distributed internationally. The Norfolk Island paper also has a significant distribution off-island to Norfolk Islanders resident in Australia and overseas (Lloyd, 1989; personal communication).

Table 8: Circulation per 1000 1973/1989

American Samoa	418
Br. Solomon Islands	27
Cook Islands	30
Fiji	231
Fr. Polynesia	102
Gibert and Ellice Is.	75
Guam	224
Nauru	146
New Caledonia	265
New Hebrides	69
Niue	226
Norfolk Island	750
Papua New Guinea	27
Pitcairn Island	7,738
Tonga	51
Trust Territory of Pac.Is.	170
Western Samoa	132
1973 Mean	

(Source: Richstad, 1973)

American Samoa	114
Commonwlth No. Marianas	223
Cook Islands	164
Fed. States of Micron.	14
Fiji	274
Fr. Polynesia	220
Guam	1,044
Johnston Is.	2,599
Kiribati	55
Nauru	134
New Caledonia	203
Niue	227
Norfolk Island	694
Papua New Guinea	62
Pitcairn Island	18,644
Rep. of Marshall Is.	71
Republic of Palau	?
Solomon Islands	56
Tokelau Islands	159
Tonga	135
Tuvalu	60
Vanuatu	14
Wallis and Futuna	?
Western Samoa	91
1989 Mean	**120**

(Sources: Knudsen, 1989; Hansen and Riser, 1989)

Guam appears to publish more issues than there are residents but its print media, too, is somewhat of an export industry. The PDN publishes a Saipan supplement every Friday, Focus on the Commonwealth, for readers in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI). Copies of PDN are also flown each day via Continental Air Micronesia to the Republic of the Marshall Islands (ROM), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of Palau (ROP). The triweekly Guam Tribune also plans to introduced zoned editions for each of these when it goes daily, a move set for sometime in 1990 (Graves, 1990; personal communication). The regular distribution of the PDN and other Guam-produced titles throughout this area may be one reason why print media development within the countries is comparatively rudimentary. There are nine titles in the FSM, ROM and ROP with a combined circulation of 8,700, serving 165,879 people.

Since circulation figures for the single title each from Wallis & Futuna and Palau are not available, ratios are not provided for them.

Size

Periodical size was determined by the mean number of pages in the each sample. Figures used for the 1973 sample were those indicated in the Richstad data. Averages for 1989 were arrived at by averaging the page count of between two and four issues of each title (depending on availability), with care taken to exclude holiday or other special issues. Overall, it was found that size increased on average by 40%, from 18 pages per issue (range 4-56 pgs) to 25 (range 2-160 pgs). Size increased even more markedly in the twenty-two papers surveyed in 1973 and 1988: pages increased by 50% (Table 9).

Table 9: 22 Papers Size

	1973	1989
Cook Is. Daily News/	14	12
Fiji Beach Press	28	24
Fiji Times	20	40
Ko E Kalonikali	10	12
La Depeche	16	88
Les Nouvelles	20	44
Marianas Variety	12	44
Na Lalakai	12	16
Nauru Bulletin	12	3
Norfolk Islander	36	56
Pacific Daily News	32	45
PNG Post-Courier	28	64
Pitcairn Is. Miscellany/	4	4
Samoa News	14	28
Samoa Times	12	16
Savali (Samoan)/	25*	16
Savali (English)/		16
Shanti Dut	16	16
Te Uekera/	12	12
Tohi Tala Niue/	10	6
Tonga Chronicle/	10	10
Wantok (Ecumenical)	18	28
Mean	18	27

NOTE: / government paper
** bilingual edition*

Government periodicals (which feature less advertising) *decreased* in size from an average of twelve pages per issue to ten pages per issue (down 17%) while the commercial press (with Wantok included here) increased from an average of twenty pages per issue to thirty-eight pages per issue (up 90%).

Paper costs dominate a production budget. Extra pages mean a more expensive newspaper to produce. Whether these costs have been offset by an increase of advertising content over editorial content, or an increase in advertising rates (or cover price), remains to be determined. Further research is suggested, perhaps involving a content analysis of selected issues from 1973 and 1989 to measure advertising and editorial space respectively. In this way, any change in the amount of news presented (resulting from the increase in pages) may be more accurately established.

Frequency

The total number of dailies being published in the region dropped from twelve to nine between 1973 and 1989 (Table 10). Half of the twelve from the 1973 sample have ceased publication, including two New Caledonian dailies dating from the last century, La France Australe (1889) and Noumea-Soir (1899). In French Polynesia, both the Journal de Tahiti and the English-language Tahiti Bulletin are no longer being published. Gannett's afternoon paper on Guam, Pacific Dateline, is gone, as is the American Samoan government's News Bulletin. The triweekly Samoa News in American Samoa, however, is scheduled to begin daily publication in the near future (Wolman,1989; personal communication). 'New' dailies include Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes in New Caledonia and Niugini

Nius in Papua New Guinea. The Breeze on Johnston Island has been published since 1948, but was not included in the 1973 sample.

Table 10: Frequency

	1973	1989
Daily	12	9
Semiweekly	1	3
Triweekly	1	1
Weekly	20	40
Fortnightly	10	9
Semimonthly	5	0
Monthly	11	55
Bimonthly	2	13
Quarterly	1	20
Other	-	6
Total	63	156

Weekly titles, as was mentioned earlier, have tripled in circulation while only doubling in number. This circulation now surpasses daily circulation (refer Table 6). Although monthly titles have increased five times (comparing the overall 1973/1989 sets), showing an increased diversity of this form, their total circulation has only doubled, indicating smaller markets and/or limited appeal. Many government and church-produced titles are monthlies.

In the twenty-two paper comparison data set, four papers, all commercially run, increased their frequency of publication. Samoa News and Marianas Variety added an extra midweek issue, the PDN added a Sunday edition, and Wantok went from fortnightly to weekly publication. The Fiji Times had also added a Sunday edition but was forced to discontinue it when the Sunday observance restrictions were imposed following the 1987 Fiji coups.

Ownership

In 1973, 59% of periodicals surveyed were privately owned and operated commercially, 33% were government owned, 6% were non-profit/trust owned, and 1% was classed as being church-owned[8] (Table 11).

Table 11: Ownership by Periodicals

	1973 Number (%)	1989 Number (%)
Commercial	37 (59)	59 (38)
Government	21 (33)	42 (26)
Church	1 (1)	37 (24)
Non-Profit	4 (6)	18 (12)
Total	63 (99)	156 (100)

In 1989, ownership was 38% commercial, 26% government, 24% church and 12% non-profit/trust. While the commercial papers still outnumber all others, there has been a significant increase in the church and non-profit presses. Not all of this is due to new titles emerging, however. Six of the thirty-seven church titles identified in 1989 were publishing at the time of the 1973 study, one since 1914 and another starting just after the Second World War. These were excluded from the 1973 sample on definitional grounds.

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[8] By this author; Richstad et al. did not consider Wantok part of the religious press, perhaps because it was, and is, run on a commercial basis. Its ownership, however, cannot be described otherwise, with all assets owned jointly by the Society of the Divine Word, the dioceses of Port Moresby, Wewak and Goroka, and the Lutheran, Anglican and United Churches.

By including the religious press, its role as a news source may be more clearly documented. Today, it represents one in every four titles being issued and is only surpassed in circulation by the commercial press. Whether this has been the case since the first study was completed is impossible to state with accuracy. However, while five titles have begun in the last three years, eight from 1975-1980 have continued to publish. Historically, it was the form that first brought printed news to the islands: Ka Lama Hawaii (1834), Te Faaite Tahiti (1836), O Le Sulu Samoa (1839) were all newssheets published by missionary groups. Though more research is required, it appears that church-produced newspapers continue to offer a significant information source in Pacific Island societies.

Commercial newspapers, however, remain dominant (Table 12). With little more than a third of titles, they are responsible for more than two-thirds of all copies in circulation. Twenty-seven percent of the commercial press circulation, or 18% of the overall circulation, are produced by foreign-owned media corporations such Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd (the PNG Post-Courier, the Fiji Times group and Pacific Islands Monthly), Hersant in France (Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes, Les Nouvelles de Tahiti, La Depeche de Tahiti), and Gannett from the United States (PDN).

Table 12: Ownership by Circulation

	1973 Circ.(%)	1989 Circ.(%)
Commercial	223,567 (70)	468,330 (69)
Government	90,450 (28)	82,858 (12)
Church	5,000 (2)	92,650 (14)
Non-Profit	1,000 (-)	36,450 (5)
Total	320,017 (100)	682,998 (100)

While there were four and a half times the number of non-profit papers in 1989 as in 1973, these still only accounted for 1% of circulation. Given production costs, and the rationale behind such papers, they can be expected to remain a small fraction of total circulation.

The twenty-two periodicals in the 1973-1989 comparison data set consisted of nine government-produced periodicals, twelve commercially produced periodicals and one produced by an ecumenical council of churches (though operated on a commercial basis). There have been several changes in ownership, however. The Samoa News has changed hands twice since 1973. The Cook Islands Daily News was privatized in October 1989, purchased by a group of former staff. Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes became part of the French media magnate, Robert Hersant's holdings in 1987, and he extended his coverage of the Tahiti market from ownership of La Depeche to include its former competitor, Les Nouvelles de Tahiti, in early 1989. The PNG Post-Courier, Fiji Times, Na Lalakai and Shanti Dut came under the control of Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd. in 1986.

Editorial Control

In 1973, most senior editors appeared to be non-Pacific Islanders, on the basis of surname. While this technique invites inaccuracy, the resulting percentages do provide an interesting case for comparison: 60% non-Pacific Islander and 38% Pacific Islander (2% information not available). By 1989, the poles seem to have reversed. In that year 56% of senior editors were Pacific Islanders, and 37% were not (7% information not available)[9].

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9. Caucasian Norfolk Islanders were included as Pacific Islanders in these analyses, as they consider themselves such (Lloyd, 1989; personal communication). The island was uninhabited prior to European settlement.

Six papers in the 1973-1989 twenty-two periodical data set replaced foreign-born senior editors with Pacific Islanders. Two of the papers are small and government-produced, but three are the regional commercial giants; Fiji Times, PNG Post-Courier and Wantok. Circulations for these range between 15,000 and 30,000. These changes bring the number of local-born editors in the sample up from ten in 1973 to seventeen in 1989[10].

Newsroom staff

The number of journalists employed full-time in the region has increased by four times between 1973 and 1989, from 59 to 241. Many of these new positions can be attributed to the proliferation of new titles, but there are indications that a form of institutional development is taking place.

In *Media Decentralization: The Case of Israel's Local Newspapers*, Caspi (1986) classifies community newspapers into six institutional categories or stages. The first two are considered 'prejournalistic'; the shopper comprised entirely of advertising (ie. The Trading Post in Australia), and the information bulletin which includes film showings, church services, and other community listings (ie. The Breeze on Johnston Island). The third category is the first 'journalistic' stage, the one person newspaper which features mostly press releases from government authorities, public institutions and community organizations (ie. JK Report in the FSM). The fourth category, chief reporter, features a division of labor that is often kept within the family (ie. The Norfolk Islander). The fifth category, editor, is characterized by three levels of organization; the publisher, editor and one or more journalists, and a compartmentalization of material made possible by the number of news gatherers (eg.the Samoa News in American Samoa). The final stage features an editorial board, with each member specializing in a particular field, and further specialization is found among the journalists (ie. Fiji Times, The Times of Papua New Guinea, PNG Post-Courier, Pacific Daily News).

Caspi emphasizes that this six-stage model of press institutionalization is not to imply a development process, with each paper beginning at a low stage and progressing upward. He later attributes a paper's stage of institutionalization, however, to two factors: 1) publisher's intent and 2) "prevailing [economic] conditions in its local area".

> *"Available resources in the community largely determine the extent of institutionalization; obviously smaller and/or poor localities can only afford modest and low-level institutionalized papers." (pg. 48)*

Taking this idea a step further, increasing levels of press institutionalization over time could be considered an indicator of progressive media development in Pacific Island region. In 1973, 56% of papers were either at the one person or chief reporter stages (32% and 24% respectively) and 44% were at the editor and editorial board stages (24% and 20% respectively). By 1989, 47% (excluding the religious press for parity with Richstad) were either one-person or chief reporter stage operations (23% and 24% respectively), and 53% were in the editor and editorial board stages (33% and 20% respectively). Furthermore, the most common stage in 1973 was stage three: one-person (32%); in 1989 it was stage five: editor (33%).

These broad indications of overall institutional development are further corroborated by the finding that the number of journalists employed by the twenty-two sample papers has risen by 45%.

Language Usage

The number of languages alone or in combination in news periodical publishing has increased by two-thirds from nineteen to thirty-one. (Tables 13, 14). The 'top five', representing 88% of circulation in 1973, were English, French, Hindi, Neo-Melanesian and Fijian, in that order. In 1989, the top five (86% of circulation) are English, French, Neo-Melanesian, English/Neo-Melanesian in combination, and Fijian.

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[10] However, the phenomenon of the influential expatriate sub-editor persists. Luke Sela, a Papua New Guinean, has edited the PNG Post-Courier since 1977, for example, yet his three expatriate sub-editors play a major role in decision-making during editorial conferences.

Table 13: Language Use 1973

	Circ.(%)	# of Per.
English	173,937 (54)	25
French	37,600 (12)	10
Hindi	25,080 (8)	4
Neo-Melanesian	22,800 (7)	4
Fijian	22,200 (7)	2
Eng/Samoan	19,300 (6)	4
Tongan	3,700 (1)	1
Eng/French	3,600 (1)	2
Eng/Neo-Mel	2,500 (1)	1
Eng/Marshal/Chuuk	1,800 (1)	1
Kiribati	1,800 (1)	1
Eng/Chamorro	1,400	1
Eng/Niuean	1,200	1
Eng/Palauan	1,000	1
Eng/Cl Maori	600	1
Eng/Fr./Neo-Mel	500	1
Eng/Pohnpeian	500	1
Tuvaluan	500	1
Eng/Fijian	?	1
Total	320,017 (99)	63

Source: Richstad, 1973

Table 14: Language Use 1989

	Circ.(%)	# of Per.
English	408,740 (60)	78
French	64,500 (9)	12
Neo-Melanesian	53,150 (8)	12
Eng/Neo-Mel	41,300 (6)	13
Fijian	23,000 (3)	2
Hindi	22,000 (3)	2
Eng/Samoan	15,200 (2)	6
Eng/Neo/Motu	8,000 (1.5)	2
Tongan	7,500 (1.5)	5
Eng/Tongan	6,500 (1.5)	1
Eng/Japanese	5,500 (1.5)	1
Japanese	3,000 (1)	1
Eng/Marshallese	3,000 (1)	2
Samoan	3,000 (1)	1
Eng/Chamorro	2,500	1
Eng/Cl Maori	2,500	1
Kiribati	2,000	1
Eng/Fijian/Rotuman	2,000	1
Motu	2,000	1
Eng/Fr/Neo-Mel	1,800	1
Eng/Kiribati	1,500	1
Korean	1,200	1
Eng/Nauruan	1,150	2
Eng/Niuean	500	1
Kosraean	500	1
Eng/Tuvaluan	258	1
Eng/Tokelauan	250	1
Tuvaluan	250	1
Eng/Motu	200	1
Tahitian	?	1
French/Neo-Mel	?	1
Total	**682,998 (100)**	**156**

English is the most common language of publication, rising from 54% of circulation in 1973 to 60% in 1989. French was the next most common language used, but decreasing from 12% of circulation in 1973 to 9% in 1989. Both Hindi (8%) and Fijian (7%) dropped to 3% of total circulation in 1989.

In the 1989 sample Neo-Melanesian represented 8% of circulation, English/Neo-Melanesian represented 6%, and English/Samoan decreased from 6% in 1973 to 2%. All other languages represented 1% or less in both samples. These included Tongan, Kiribati, Chamorro, Niuean, Cook Island Maori and Tuvaluan. The 1973 sample also featured material published in Trukese, Palauan and Pohnpeian - all Micronesian languages - that was no longer being published in 1989. The 1989 samples included other Micronesian languages, Marshallese and Kosraean, along with Tokelauan, Rotuman and Motu.

In 1989, three new periodicals were identified that used Asian languages, Japanese and Korean, for publication. As far as this author can determine, these are the first periodicals in the region (excluding Hawaii) to be produced in non-European, non-Pacific languages since the Second World War. Guam Shinbun was founded in 1986 and has a circulation of 3,000. Much of its news is translated directly from the English-language Guam Tribune (which holds the printing contract) and broadcast news reports (Okamura, 1989; personal communication). The Korean Weekly News, also on Guam, was founded in 1982 and has a circulation of 1,200. Readership of both papers are primarily residents of Guam, while readers of the English and Japanese T.V. Guam Tourist Edition are mostly short-term visitors.

A trend in the use of English in conjunction with vernacular was noted, up from approximately 10% of total circulation in 1973 to 16% in 1989. In contrast, French used with vernacular formed 1% of circulation. Neo-Melanesian, Samoan and Tongan and Motu were the primary vernaculars used in conjunction with English.

Production Technology

Three-quarters of the periodicals in the 1989 study were computer typeset. Fifty percent of those, or one third the total, are desktop published either in-house or commercially. This compares favorably with the American National Newspaper Association estimate that between thirty and fifty percent of its members use desktop systems (Underwood, 1989).

There has been a similar acceptance of the new typesetting technology shown within the twenty-two paper set. Seven papers - Samoa News, Tonga Chronicle, Ko E Kalonikali Tonga, Cook Island Daily News, Norfolk Islander, and Wantok - are now using Apple hardware (Macintosh, Mac II) and desktop publishing software (Pagemaker, MacDraw, Cricket, Ready Set Go and Word). Tom Lloyd, publisher of the Norfolk Islander, in fact claims to have been the first in the region to recognize the value of desktop publishing systems, having purchased a Macintosh and laser printer in 1985 (Richstad, 1989; personal communication).

Word Publishing, which publishes The Times of Papua New Guinea, Wantok, Rugby League News, PNG Trade Monthly, Travellers Times and Weekend Sport, installed eight Macs in their newsroom and advertising department in late 1986. Since that time newspaper revenue has been augmented through their job printing service (Solomon, 1989; personal communication).

Three of the twenty-two papers continue to use electric typewriters for typesetting, and Kroy lettering machines and/or press-down lettering for headlines.

Sixteen of the papers were at least partially printed by offset in 1973; eighteen of the papers were fully offset in 1989. Only two still use mimeograph (cyclostyle) reproduction, the Pitcairn Island Miscellany and the Nauru Bulletin.

The fact that seven of the twenty-two papers were computerized within four years shows a ready acceptance of this new technology. Along with efficiencies of cost and time, this may relate to the fact that Pacific Island production staff have never been unionized, and therefore are not susceptible to the demarcation-fueled pagination debates which have inhibited the full use of this technology in the United States and Australia.

DISCUSSION

Diversity as defined by the number of titles being published and the differing patterns of ownership is becoming more characteristic of the regional press than it has been in the past. Whether this indicates improvement in the economic conditions relevant to publishing (expanded advertising revenue bases, decreased company and/or import taxes, decreased postal rates or freight charges), or is somehow correlated with increased literacy and urbanization is yet to be determined.

Trends identified from the data do indicate a greater involvement by Pacific Islanders in print news publishing. More journalists (overwhelmingly indigenous) are being employed, more locals are taking over editorial slots once reserved for expatriates and more news is appearing in the first languages of the region's citizens. There are bound to be some changes as a result of this; accommodation of the introduced institution of the press more completely into Melanesian, Micronesian and Polynesian societies; a redefinition of news and news practice; a shift in the public discourse. Changes will also appear in the societies themselves. The Tonga delegate to the recent International Federation of Journalists meeting in Port Moresby credited his country's "fast rising" commercial press with a significant role in providing the public with political news and commentaries;

> "*...especially revelations which put Govt [sic] in a bad picture, but which may help in efficiency and accountability. With such exposes [sic], the private media is lessening the influences of cultural factors such as not publicly criticising the leaders and authorities.*" (IFJ Country Report for Tonga, 1989).

With all these signals of media democratization becoming apparent, it is ironic that forces of media centralization have also recently begun to operate in the region. Rupert Murdoch and Robert Hersant have joined Gannett, Inc. in Pacific island operations and together they are now responsible for 18% percent of print news output. Their arrival signals "the potential for political and commercial interests to diminish the diversity and independence of the media," (IFJ, 1989). Both Murdoch and Hersant have international reputations for dictating editorial policy and, while conventional wisdom has it that their Pacific holdings are too insignificant to warrant such personal attention, there has been evidence to the contrary. Murdoch has already drawn the ire of one Papua New Guinean government for the fierce protection of his business interests in that country, and the Hersant papers in Tahiti have been accused of playing a "partisan role" during the recent constitutional crisis (Robie, 1989).

However, governments have been stymied by the lack of interest on the part of indigenous investors in their campaigns to localize media ownership. Newspaper publishing in the Pacific is not noted for a high return on investment, yet as the commercial press continues to develop, profitability will become increasingly important. This was made clear at the October 1989 Pacific Island News Association meeting in Honiara, where a workshop titled "Making Money From Newspapers" was attended by the majority of publishers at the meeting, including those from the government papers. Small advertising markets, a reliance on imported (ie. expensive) equipment and supplies, and limited discretionary income on the part of consumers have always worked to constrain the profitability of print media. One infers through the increase in the commercial press evident in the 1989 study that this situation is changing, yet it is still difficult to collect data on the business of newspapers in the close-knit but fiercely competitive environment of the Pacific.

The already wide acceptance of desktop publishing technology, however, will most likely intensify this trend toward profitability. Most desktop users now are established publishers seeking greater production efficiency and a 'more professional' product. The technology packages a wide number of publishing-related skills and makes them available to a single publisher/editor. Low capital and maintenance costs reduce the level of investment required to launch a title and keep it on a regular production schedule while building up circulation and advertising revenue. These factors combine to overcome many of the obstacles inherent in publishing in the Pacific Island context, making it more attractive as a business, as well as a medium for education, information and entertainment. It is therefore likely that the coming years will see a blossoming of viable new titles to serve a variety of cultural, language or other special interest groups.

The evidence that 54% of periodicals in 1989 were produced by organizations with editor or editorial board structures, when a similar percentage (56%) were at the one person or chief reporter stages in 1973, indicates that progressive institutional change (according to Caspi's typology) has taken place over the past seventeen years. Other evidence indicates that this change has been accompanied by increased linkages between news professionals in the various Pacific island states.

The most significant development in these linkages has been the rise in professional associations. The Pacific Island News Association grew out of the Fiji Press Club in 1972, and held its inaugural meeting in 1974 through the organizational support of the East-West Center Communication Institute. PINA was the vanguard for a sense of shared professionalism within the region, with national journalists associations and press councils soon following. The links were strengthened when PACNEWS, the regional news service coordinated through the Pacific Islands Broadcasters Association (PIBA) was launched in September 1987 as a PACBROAD training exercise. It currently gathers and disseminates news from thirteen countries.

Journalism training has been a dominant concern in PINA over the years, and more recently with PIBA, but the emphasis is now shifting to production and management issues, In May 1989, participants in a 'Top Management Symposium' organized through PACBROAD cited 'revenue', 'equipment', 'staff relations' and 'training'- in that order - as the major problems they face (PIBA, 1989:48). Further research is necessary to determine whether this is yet another phenomenon of the maturing organizational structures indicated in the 1989 study. However, there is a growing perception on the part of rank and file journalists in the region that these bodies now represent primarily management interests. The bulk of PINA membership, for example, consists of national and regional institutions, and such expatriate individuals as the retired editor-in-chief of the Honolulu Advertiser, George Chaplin and former editor-in-chief of the now-defunct Fiji Sun, David Lomas.

The International Federation of Journalists conference in Port Moresby was attended by working journalists from seven Pacific nations, and specifically identified the need to address newsroom staff working conditions through the development of trade unions in the region (Resolutions 3.0-3.4, 5.0-5.4) and training opportunities (Resolutions 4.0-4.4) (IFJ, 1989). At the October 1989 PINA Conference in Honiara, a statement calling for support of those recommendations and the establishment of a region-wide 'Pacific Journalists Association', was read out during the general session by a working journalist fom Fiji.

Press freedom in the Pacific has faced some serious assaults in the last few years. The more notable of these include the 1987 Fiji coups, the 1987 proposed PNG Media Tribunal Bill, PNG Foreign Minister Michael Somare's call for a government-imposed code of ethics for journalists incorporating punitive sanctions at the 1989 South Pacific Forum meeting in Kiribati, Vanuatu Prime Minister Fr. Walter Lini's 1989 call for the licensing of "foreign" journalists (with non-ni-Vanuatu Pacific islanders included in this definition), and the January 1990 decision announced by the Fijian Minister for Information to subject print media in that country to a yearly licence renewal process. The professional associations, regardless of their respective institutional agendas, have reacted with increasing sophistication and solidarity to political intimidation and the extension of censorship.

Diversity, democratization and the foreign ownership of media are all issues relating both to the freedom of speech and to perceptions of regional and national identity. These identities are legitimized, according to Lindstrom (1989), through the sense of shared culture constructed by elites from 'precariously sanitized' traditions. What happens to this sense of shared culture when inundated by media messages constructed according to outside (Western) value systems? In his discussion of the relationship between cultural traditions and national identity in Papua New Guinea, Lindstrom argues that journalism literally becomes a subversive activity:

> *"...journalism offer[s] alternative pictures of PNG culture that may threaten its function and place within the nationalist discourse, and undermine the claims of local elite."* (Lindstrom, 1988:2)

The sharpest calls for press controls have come from those governments grappling with both national and international questioning of their political (Fiji) and economic (PNG) legitimacy. They seek to return the powers associated with political communication to indigenous control, to the local elite. While notable, regrettable and unnecessary blunders have been perpetrated by expatriate journalism in the Pacific, more and more of the critical commentary in the Pacific Island press springs from the keyboards of indigenous journalists and the copy desks of indigenous editors, reflecting the perspectives of citizen voters.

It is important that these varied voices remain free to comment responsibly. The Pacific islands press, with its inadequacies, continues to provide greater democratic access to public opinion than either the government-controlled radio or capital-intensive television. As Siosiua Fonua said in *The Pacific Way*,

> *"The press, due largely to its utilization of a medium that is plastic in nature, may still be the best for South Pacific public enlightenment and cultural dissemination - because of its durability and referential value, and moreover, the peoples of the South Pacific will, for a long time yet, still associate education and enlightenment with black marks on white paper." (Fonua, 1980)*

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Cultural Domination and Sovereignty:
The Development of European TV Quotas, 1981-89

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Debate on international communication issues tends to come to a head when political decisions seem imminent. As Third World countries sought to use UNESCO to implement a New World Information and Communication order in the 1970s and early 1980s, topics such as the flow of international news were widely debated and studied, for instance; when extensive U.N. action in the international media sphere seemed unlikely, the debate waned.[1]

Similarly, the prospect of European legislation to limit imports flow of television programs in the late 1980s has given rise to a debate over another concept in international communication, the threat of cultural domination through mass media imports. The twofold purpose of this paper is, first, to give a history of the television program quotas established by the European Community in 1989, and, second, to show how the debate over the quotas treated concepts such as cultural domination and sovereignty.

Rather than trying to achieve a scholarly definition of "cultural imperialism," the aim is to show how the term was defined by the actors passing and trying to influence legislation. Nonetheless, it is valid to begin with a review of scholarly research examining the assumptions of the political debate.

International TV Flows and Cultural Imperialism: Recent Research

The debate over cultural imperialism or media imperialism has defined it as the theory that a few countries, the United States in particular, "impose their cultures, values and ideologies" through their dominance of national and international media.[2] Depending on the ideological perspective of the discussants, the dominance is either the result of market forces or a deliberate policy on the part of governments and multinational corporations.[3] Assumed in this theory is that indigenous culture and domestic production, both regarded as desirable, suffer from the influx of foreign media products.[4]

In the area of international television trade, the first comprehensive study of global program flows, made under the auspices of UNESCO in the early 1970s, seemed to confirm at least part of the cultural imperialism theory by documenting a notable dominance by the United States of world television trade.[5] An updated UNESCO study showed no substantial change in the 1980s, and its findings were largely reflected in a similarly comprehensive study of the European market.[6]

Based on the studies above and noting the European political debate in their wake, researchers in the 1980s have sought to explain the reasons for the American dominance and predict its effects.[7] In general, the studies implicitly dismiss the idea of a deliberate policy as the force behind the existing flows and attribute them instead to market forces. As an example, studies by Canadian researchers have used economic models in an effort to explain the prominence of imports from the United States, noting that American producers are able to cover most of their costs in their huge domestic market.[8]

Focusing on effects, some studies have questioned one of the assumptions of the cultural imperialism theory, that a large influx of American programming undermines the culture and values of individual nations. Sepstrup points out that American programs make up less than 15 percent of European schedules and stresses that the American share of *imports*, most often used as a measurement, is less relevant than the American proportion of total programming.[9]

Looking at audience preferences, studies by Tracey, Waterman, and Wildman and Siwek stress that almost everywhere, domestic productions are far more popular with viewers than imports, whether American or not.[10] Studies of international programming on satellite channels tend to confirm that finding, citing language as a substantial barrier to popularity.[11] Generally, these researchers argue that the dominance of American imports is a temporary phenomenon and that programs from the United States will eventually be replaced by domestic productions simply because the audiences prefer the latter. The market laws favoring American programs at the moment will eventually work against them.[12]

Most of the studies above assume a system where television is commercial and audience preference determines programming.[13] Others have seen the dominance of American programs as a sign of a larger problem, the ascendancy of commercial television at the expense of public-service broadcasting. Leaving the decisions over programming entirely to audiences and private broadcasters would undermine the cultural goals of public broadcasters (created to be guardians of the public interest), such as providing diversity of opinion and representing minorities.[14] Programs resulting from a commercialization of television may eventually be domestic, is the argument, but they will be modeled on the original American imports, which cater to the largest possible audience in order to attract advertisers.

Whatever their views on the eventual outcome of today's trade flows, none of the studies above question the figures suggesting that, at present, American programs dominate imports. That has also been the conclusion of reports issued by the European Communities, reports which have been consulted in making policy.[15]

Before tracing the history of that policy, it is necessary to account for the market that gave rise to it.

Expansion of the European Television Market

When Lee discussed American exports of television programs in a 1980 book, he quoted industry sources who thought the expansive years of American television abroad were over and that the industry was simply doing its best to hold on to a "commanding lead."[16] It did more than that, however, for during the decade, American exporters were able to triple their foreign revenues, with projections pointing to another threefold increase by 1992.[17]

About two thirds of the revenues were from sales to Western Europe, and that region's share was projected to increase to three quarters by 1992.[18] Behind the expansive European market is deregulation. Faced with new technologies that threaten the traditional public-service monopolies, Western European governments have decided to allow more competition from commercial channels. As a result, the number of channels have increased by almost two thirds since the early 1980s.[19]

Although cable television and satellite broadcasting provided the impetus for change and were widely championed as the wave of the future early in the decade, the progress of these new technologies has been slower than was expected. In early 1989, only one European home in eight had cable, although the numbers were slowly increasing.[20] Satellite broadcasting has also not yet lived up to early expectations, although a boom in satellite channels is expected in the early 1990s. According to EC publications, some 20 channels delivered programs to cable subscribers in 1988.[21] Satellite broadcasters seeking a pan-European audience have had a particularly hard time. Advertisers doubt their effectiveness, and audiences have not responded to the kind of programming they offer.[22] Deregulation has proceeded nonetheless, and a large portion of the expansion has been in traditional over-the-air channels.

A direct result of the new channels has been a veritable explosion of broadcasting hours needing programming. According to some estimates, Western Europe will eventually need between 300,000 and 500,000 hours of programming every year, and domestic production can fill less than one fifth of that demand, at least initially.[23] The remainder will have to be made up with imports, primarily from the United States. That was one of the facts that were evident as the European Communities pondered restrictions after 1985.

EC Policy before "Television Without Frontiers"

In its final form, the quota requirements were only one part of a comprehensive program for a broadcasting policy for the European Communities. As its name implies, "Television Without Frontiers" was concerned with homogenizing standards and legislation among member states in order to create a community-wide broadcasting market.[24]

One of the goals of the program is to enhance EC integration by fostering a sense of European identity, and it was with that aim that broadcasting was first discussed in the EC in the early 1980s. Motions and questions in the European Parliament in 1980 and 1981 had brought up the possibility of a broadcasting organization or channel devoted to Community matters, and in

1982, the Parliament passed a resolution calling for a report to that effect.[25]

Included in the working document that formed a basis for the resolution was a 1980 motion that had a slightly different direction, however, one that foreshadowed some of the arguments in the debate over quotas. It was concerned about media being commercialized and stressed "each country's right to national identity, specifically in matters of media policy"; not surprisingly, the phrase stemmed from a UNESCO declaration.[26] The direction of that motion would coexist with the drive to establish a Community channel for the next few years, resulting in two different resolutions with similar content in 1984.[27]

The report, prepared by the Commission of the European Communities for the European Parliament in the spring of 1983, went beyond discussing a possible European channel and noted that a European television and film market needed to be created and that action must be taken to maintain the "pluralism of national identities that go to make up the cultural unity of Europe," because the new broadcasting technologies would make national borders irrelevant and possibly pose a threat of "'invasion' by a foreign culture."[28]

Delivering a later version of the report to the Parliament, its rapporteur stressed that a policy enhancing European programs was needed to "defend European independence" from the United States and Japan.[29] While the subsequent resolution expressed concern about the future of European programs, it considered financial incentives the best solution; nothing was said about restrictions on imports.[30] Quotas had been brought up in another context, however.

The Role of France and Jack Lang

In the final debate over the quotas, restrictions were supported by several countries, but they had appeared originally as an idea from France.[31] The French had a history of campaigning against the influx of American mass culture, and the campaign gained new momentum in a 1982 speech by Jack Lang, minister of culture in the newly elected Socialist government. Addressing a UNESCO conference in Mexico City, Lang saw the international success of American media products as "intellectual imperialism" and called for "steps to preserve national identities."[32]

He soon proceeded to take one such step by instituting quotas for French television, requiring 60 percent of network television to be of Community origin and putting a ceiling of 30 percent on foreign programs on cable channels.[33] In July 1984, Lang called a meeting of EC culture ministers, where he tried to make similar quotas against non-European programming a Community-wide policy, but the proposal was voted down, and a subsequent meeting focused on financial aid from the Community to the television and film industry--another of Lang's plans-- rather than import restrictions.[34] The French minister of culture had not abandoned the idea of quotas, however, and in 1985 he was involved in a debate whether they should be applied to music played on French radio stations.[35] By that time, they had been suggested by the European Parliament as a way to support European-made television programs.[36]

From the Green Paper to the Final Directive

In 1984, as Lang was about to try to persuade fellow cultural affairs ministers to adopt import quotas, the EC Commission presented its Green Paper on a common market for television, the comprehensive study that Parliament resolutions had called for since the first years of the 1980s. "Television Without Frontiers" went beyond the idea of simply starting a European television channel and recommended that channels of individual member states be broadcast to all Community members and described how legal barriers to such an exchange could be overcome.[37] From a cultural standpoint, exchanges between member states would promote European productions, the report noted, while productions from non-Community countries would be at a disadvantage. Which countries this referred to was evident; discussing programming, the Green Paper had noted that most television films on European came from the United States, and it thought "the dominance of the big American media corporations" should be "counterbalanced."[38]

Still, the Green Paper said nothing about quotas. They appeared as the European Parliament started debating "Television Without Frontiers." A report to the Parliament in 1985 thought that the Green Paper had not paid sufficient attention to protecting public broadcasting corporations from the effects of international commercial competition. Traditionally, the public corporations had been the guardians of national culture, according to the report, and one way to maintain that tradition was to specify a minimum level of European programming content.[39] As the Parliament passed two resolutions calling for a comprehensive media policy in the fall of 1985, the quota requirement had been specified; at least 50 percent of the programs should be of European origin.[40]

The policy directive that the European Parliament had asked for was presented by the EC Commission in April 1986, and it both specified and raised the European-content requirement. Claiming that requirements to air a stipulated amount of European programming would make broadcasters reflect "the Community's cultural diversity and richness" and not search for the lowest common denominator, the directive set the share of Community programs at 30 percent, to be increased to 60 percent within three years.[41] Moreover, 5 percent of each broadcaster's programming budget was to be set aside for Community works by independent producers, rising to 10 percent within three years of the directive taking effect. The 60 percent requirement was, of course, identical with that of France.

Over the next three years, the quotas were the subject of extended debate within the Community. The European Parliament amended the directive in early 1988, extending "European origin" to include members of the Council of Europe and EFTA. It also made the transition period toward the final quota more flexible and eased the rules for classifying programs as coproductions between European and non-European producers.[42]

Outside of Parliament actions, the establishment of quotas was far from guaranteed, however, with European governments opposing or supporting restrictions according to political lines. Socialist France was joined by Italy and Belgium in advocating quotas, while the conservative governments of Britain and West Germany were against them, and a meeting of the EC Council of Ministers in March 1988 was unable to reach an agreement.[43] On the other hand, support was building in some non-governmental circles. British television entrepreneur Robert Maxwell declared his support of them, and a non-governmental report by politicians and broadcast officials from all over Europe was also in favor.[44]

In November, France and the other advocates of quotas modified their stand to reach an agreement within another body, the Council of Europe, which includes 10 nations in addition to the 12 EC members. Approving a proposal for convention on transborder television, the Council agreed to "a majority" of programming being reserved for European works "where practicable," a solution that markedly diluted the restrictions suggested by the European Community directive.[45] It was stressed, however, that the quota stipulation of the proposal was subject to change and that a Council of Europe convention did not have the legal force of an EC directive.

Nevertheless, EC ministers adopted exactly the same formulation after three meetings in the spring of 1989. The original French quota proposal had the backing of only four other countries, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg; firm opposition from Britain, West Germany and Holland made a compromise necessary.[46] In exchange for dropping the strict original quotas, the ministers accepted a Spanish proposal that broadcasters be monitored to see whether European-made programming dominated; if not, the quota discussion might be revived.

The legislative battle was far from over, however. Representatives of the European film industry began an intensive lobbying effort in May to reinstate the original quotas, and Jack Lang indicated that his government was likely to revive its old demand.[47] Debating the directive in late May, the European Parliament wanted to delete the "where practicable" formulation to make the requirement stricter, but that was rejected by the EC Commission.[48] As a concession, the Commission included the Spanish proposal to monitor broadcasters for compliance in its directive, complete with the understanding that stricter quotas if the rule was not met.[49]

The directive hit a final snag in June, when France, Holland and Greece unexpectedly withdrew their support from the version agreed on in April. Since West Germany, Denmark and Belgium had opposed the April agreement for reasons other than the quota requirement, the required majority of two thirds collapsed. The French action, it was implied, was a last attempt to change the quota requirement back to the original, stricter standard.[50] After further negotiations, the directive was finally passed in October, opposed only by Belgium and Denmark.[51] As a final compromise, the Commission declared that the directive was a "political commitment" rather than a legal obligation. In concrete terms, that meant that the EC would not take broadcasters to court over not fulfilling quotas.[52]

In its final form, then, the directive stipulates that a majority of the programming broadcast in member states is to be reserved for European works. Ten percent of the broadcasting budget or of transmission time is to be set aside for independent European producers. News, sports, quiz shows, advertising and teletext services are not part of total programming time. The programming requirements are to be met "where practicable and by appropriate means."[53] The last provision, so disputed in 1989, has been seen as giving a great deal of leeway to member states if not to individual broadcasters.[54] EC members have until October 1991 to make their laws and regulations conform to the directive; if their requirements are stricter than the Community's, national laws are allowed to remain in force.

Due to market realities, the debate leading up to passing the quotas had been conducted with the understanding that possible restrictions would be directed overwhelmingly at the United States. Before relating how the idea of cultural imperialism and cultural sovereignty was used in the debate, the American reaction merits a brief look.

American Reaction

American response to the EC program quotas was slow to build but eventually grew quite strong, even involving President Bush.[55] Several reasons accounted for the United States protesting strongly against what was eventually a rather weak restriction. First, while American television producers paid relatively scant attention to foreign sales in the past, the international market has risen in importance as production costs have gone up and the U.S. networks have lost viewers to cable. Also, the European market has become far more lucrative as the traditional public broadcasting corporations have lost their monopsony position and now have to compete with private channels in their bids for American programming.[56]

Second, in international trade, the television and motion picture industry has been one of the few American industries that showed a consistent export surplus. Third and final, for American officials and businesses worried about the impact of a unified Europe, the EC broadcasting directive appeared to be one of the first signals of increased protectionism.[57]

American action began in earnest after the directive had been approved by EC ministers in April 1989. Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, met with Jack Lang to stress American opposition to the quotas, and U.S. trade representative Carla Hills sent a letter to European Parliament President Lord Plumb, outlining objections of the Bush administration and threatening trade retaliation.[58]

In July, the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held a hearing on the EC directive, where American industry representatives and U.S. government officials voiced their opposition.[59] Shortly after the directive was passed in October, a delegation led by Rep. Richard Gephardt expressed American concern in talks with EC officials in Brussels, and the United States formally challenged the Community action under rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[60] At the end of October, the House of Representatives unanimously passed a resolution from the Ways and Means Committee denouncing the directive as "unreasonable" and "unjustified" and urged the administration to consider retaliatory action.[61]

While the U.S. government sought to change the EC policy, the film and television industry more or less seemed to accept it after some initial protest. Noting that half of European schedules was more than what American programs were filling before the quotas, many U.S. producers were confident about the future, although they objected to restrictions on principle. Others doubted that the quotas would work, given the enormous needs for programming to fill the increasing number of European channels. If the restrictions would have any impact, analysts thought, it would be to increase coproduction with Europeans, something the industry was beginning to seek anyway, to hold down its own costs.[62]

The Quotas in Perspective

The idea of using quotas to protect national culture and domestic production of cultural products is not new. As the EC directive was passed, five community member nations already had some form of national restriction on imported TV programming, and two more were considering such quotas.[63] In fact, long before the advent of television, several European countries had experimented with import quotas against American motion pictures, using arguments strikingly similar to those in the discussion of TV restrictions.[64]

Still, the communitywide quotas are likely to have little effect because of their flexibility and the realities of a rapidly expanding European television market that will make it difficult to supply enough domestic or European programming to fill schedules. They are thus unlikely to be the support for European culture that their European proponents expected and the threat to American exports that the United States feared.

The concern about the prominence of American programs that gave rise to the quotas is still on the minds of European policymakers, however. What the outcome of the quota debate signaled is a shift in methods to remedy the situation. Rather than restricting imports, the emphasis has shifted to boosting European production with government incentives.[65] As to legislation, the attention has increasingly shifted from imported programs to the structure of the domestic and European television industries, looking for, among other things, means to retain some measure of the traditional European model of public-service television.[66] In that context, the "threat" from the United States is not in the form of exported television programs but a purely commercial system of broadcasting.[67]

Cultural Imperialism and Sovereignty Debated

The last part of this paper discusses how participants in the debate over quotas used the ideas of cultural imperialism and cultural sovereignty. As a lead-in to those arguments, two things should be noted. First, as will be seen, a common American counterargument was that the quota requirements were not a matter of culture but of economics: they were put forward to protect the European film and television industry from competition.[68] That economic considerations were a major part of the EC directive is undeniable and was never concealed by Community representatives.[69] The economic argument was almost always tied to the cultural one in the minds of European proponents of restrictions, however; they argued that cultural products were in need of particular protection because they constitute the very fabric of nations.

Second, there was far from a unified European stand on the matter, as is evident from the tortuous road of the quotas from 1985 to 1989. Although they agreed, for the most parts, that a possible dominance by American imports posed a problem, EC member nations differed on the need for and efficacy of restrictions, as did political parties. Since quotas were part of the final directive, however, this study focuses on arguments in their favor.[70]

The European Perception: General Viewpoints

Not surprisingly, the European debate over restrictions provided no comprehensive definition of cultural domination. The phrase "cultural imperialism" was often used by the American press to describe how Europeans saw the influx of American programs, but it was seldom used by the Europeans themselves.[71] Instead, symbols and metaphors were used. A BBC spokesman expressed fears of Europe becoming "like Canada," for instance, and a French musician and an Italian film director were afraid of his country being "a cultural colony of Hollywood."[72]

Other viewpoints were concerned about TV programs as a basis for knowledge about one's own culture. Jack Lang talked about "standardized images manufactured elsewhere," and one of the EC Commissioners saw a danger of Europeans "only absorbing--sitting in front of a Japanese TV set being fed by American imagination." Even British media baron Robert Maxwell talked about European culture "being replaced by images made in Hollywood."[73] As concrete examples, a German Community representative talked about European viewers already being "conditioned" to American settings "without really understanding everything." A French studio head worried about children in France losing "all relationship with the culture of their parents and grandparents" and thinking that "sheriffs and cowboy hats are as French as gendarmes and berets."[74]

Among politicians, one of the most extensive debates on the matter was carried out in the European Parliament. The Parliament is relatively limited in its powers--as seen above, its fervent insistence on quotas was rejected by the more powerful EC Commission, for instance--but for the purposes of this paper, it provided the best source of the political views of the European Community on the reasons for establishing quotas. Moreover, since European

Parliament members are elected representatives, their viewpoints provide one measurement of public opinion in EC countries.

In the Parliament, "European culture" turned out to have several meanings. As indicated from the early policy proposals discussed above, an early definition saw European "cultural identity" as a sense of belonging to a larger community than the individual nation, and in that perspective, the danger of American programming was mainly that it would take airtime away from pan-European productions trying to foster European consciousness.[75]

Another viewpoint appearing in the debates before the directive was formulated and increasing in importance afterwards was that European culture was defined more as the differences between and within nations. Here, American programming had several faults: it came from another national culture, it was made for mass audiences, and, unlike European public broadcasters, it was under no mandate to promote "quality, pluralism and public service."[76] As defined by some Socialist Parliament members, the public-service concept in fact made television "a vehicle for culture," implying that programs produced by any commercial broadcasting system--pan-European satellite channels included--constituted a danger.

Because market forces such as a huge domestic market made American programs inexpensive, private channels would fill their schedules with these imports and expose European viewers to "an international steamroller of commercialism which would leave European broadcasting a uniform and featureless mush," as a German Social Democrat put it.[77] Goals like education through television would suffer as a result. To avoid this, public broadcasters needed protection both from imports and overwhelming commercial competition; in protecting them, the Community would protect European culture.

Part of the mandate of public broadcasters was to provide an exchange of cultural and social ideas and to convey cultural and moral values.[78] Touching on what those values were, one representative thought European television should reflect a Europe based on "the multiplicity and diversity of our sociocultural heritages, which all derive from the same Greco-Roman and Judaeo-Christian roots and tend towards the same thing: humanism and compassion under the triple banner of fraternity, solidarity and liberty." Another speaker through programs must promote peace and democracy.[79]

Some American programs went against those values with their heavy emphasis on violence and by promoting a "hamburger and ketchup culture" through "pseudo-cultural sub-products."[80] More mildly, other speakers considered them "inane" and not living up to traditional European quality standards.[81]

The colonization metaphor quoted above was also taken up in the Parliament, where a Communist deputy claimed that American dominance could not be justified in terms of free flow of information and cultural exchange because it was so overwhelming.[82] Indeed, another Communist asserted, it was part of an effort at "total domination" of European television.[83] Less militantly, other Parliament members were concerned with Europe being a passive recipient of programs made elsewhere.[84] The idea of exchange was questioned because so little European programming went on American screens.[85]

In conclusion, then, the cultural argument for program quotas had several aspects. It was a matter of public versus commercial programming, of fear that homogenized programming from the outside would drown out European cultural diversity and provide no reflection of separate national cultures, and of concern that alien values would dominate television schedules. With few exceptions, market forces rather than deliberate American policies were seen as the cause of the imbalance, and quotas were considered an effective remedy.

The American Counterargument

As noted above, the main American argument, used by the U.S. government, the industry, and the press, was that quotas were economic in nature and restricted free trade. The idea of cultural protection was dismissed in an offhand and strikingly similar way by most writers and speakers. John Eger, a CBS official with a special interest in international television trade, asked whether a "healthy culture" could be "wiped out by *Leave It to Beaver* or *Kojak*" and answered no. Nor could *Dallas* Americanize France "anymore than French menus in American restaurants have destroyed the American heritage."[86] MPAA President Jack Valenti could not see how "an American television program is going to collapse 2500 years of culture or somehow stunt and atrophy all of the great legends, myths, and truths and triumphs of French culture."[87]

Newspapers commenting on the directive in their editorials used much the same reasoning, although they sounded a little less incredulous. The *New York Times* reflected that the quotas came a little late for a continent that had "survived alien incursions for centuries." The *Boston Globe* thought that cultural identities of individual nations would change anyway as European integration started, and the paper also pointed out that American culture was "heavily based on its European antecedents."[88] The trade and business press took a slightly wider perspective. *Business Week* noted that the debate was as much over different systems of broadcasting as over programs, and a *Channels* column acknowledged that TV programs were different from products like shoes because of their moral and intellectual content. Its author recognized that Europeans feared the effects of too much American programming but doubted that shows from the United States would have any effect other than making Europeans understand the United States better.[89]

The debate over the EC directive in Congress showed some confusion about its goal and assumptions. Disregarding the goal of European cultural integration, one speaker could not understand why Italians should be protected from American but not from British television. Another could see no connection between culture and national origin of programs, and a third interpreted values to mean production values such as technical skill. In addition, the doubt that *Dallas* would have an effect on "countries in Europe that have written history for the rest of the world" was again voiced.[90]

In summary, most of the American respondents to the cultural argument of the Europeans simply refused to discuss the idea of cultural imperialism or sovereignty, seeing the quotas only as an economic measure. When cultural concerns were discussed, the effects of television on national culture were dismissed.

The Quota Debate Reflecting International Discussion

Limited as the impact of the TV quotas may be, the restrictions deserve attention as a focal point for debate on international mass communication. Just as the debate over the New World

Information Order revealed differences between First and Third World nations when it came to basic assumptions about the role of the press, the American-European maneuvering around the quotas showed a conflict between two different concepts of television.

Among European quota supporters, there was often a hostility to commercial television and the programs it produced, and American imports were attacked as a convenient symbol of changing realities in domestic television. The dominance of American programs was exaggerated and viewer choice--domestic over imported programming--not sufficiently taken into account.

American opponents did, for the most part, not acknowledge the different traditions and goals of European television with its public-service emphasis. With television schedules that have only a few percent of imported programming, industry and government representatives of the United States also seemed unable to empathize with European fears of being overwhelmed by American programming.

As to future debates on international communication, the quota debate is somewhat disconcerting. The United States and Western Europe have basically the same social and economic systems and share the same cultural heritage. If understanding of one another is difficult among such close relatives, the chances of productive debate between nations with different cultures and socioeconomic systems seem small.

NOTES

[1] William Hachten, *The World News Prism: Changing Media, Clashing Ideologies* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987, second ed.), 141-44; Andrew Radolf, "Unesco Approves Communications Plan," *Editor & Publisher* Nov. 25, 1989, 11-12.

[2] Preben Sepstrup, "Research into International Television Flows: A Methodological Contribution," *European Journal of Communication* 4(1989):393-407.

[3] See Sepstrup, "Research into International Television Flows," and Chin-Chuan Lee, *Media Imperialism Reconsidered: The Homogenizing of Television Culture* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 29-65, for reviews of the debate.

[4] Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, "Television Traffic--a One-Way Street?" *Unesco Reports and Papers on Mass Communication* 70 (1974), comment by Elihu Katz, 47-48.

[5] Nordenstreng and Varis; as the following review shows, the reports have been read in different ways.

[6] Tapio Varis, "International Flow of Television Programs,"*Unesco Reports and Papers on Mass Communication* 100 (1985); Anthony Pragnell, "Television in Europe: Quality and Values in a Time of Change," *Media Monograph* 5 (Manchester: European Institute for the Media, University of Manchester, 1985); *cf.* the comments by Pragnell in European Institute for the Media, "Broadcasting Policies in the E.E.C., Manchester, 24-25 January, 1985, Proceedings of the Colloquia), 133-40.

[7] Several researchers have noted the conceptual problems associated with studying the international flow of television programs, see, for instance, Graham Chapman, "Towards a Geography of the Tube: TV Flows in Western Europe," *InterMedia* 15 (1, Jan. 1987):10-21; and Sepstrup, "Research into International Television Flows"; a recent work attempting to test the concept of cultural imperialism is William Meyer, *Transnational Media and Third World Development* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 64-93.

[8] Colin Hoskins, Rolf Mirus, and William Rozeboom, "U.S. Television Programs in the International Market: Unfair Pricing?" *Journal of Communication* 39 (2, Spring 1989):55-75; Colin Hoskins and Rolf Mirus, "Reasons for the US Dominance of the International Trade in Television Programmes," *Media, Culture and Society* 10 (1988):499-515.

[9] Preben Sepstrup, "Implications of Current Developments in West European Broadcasting," *Media, Culture and Society* 11(1989):29-54; Sepstrup notes, however, that American programs rival domestic ones in certain categories, such as drama, which tends to be the most popular. A French study done in the wake of the quota debate put the average share of imported programming on European screens at 68 percent, see Edward Cody, "EC Adopts European TV Program Quota: Decision Calls for Fewer U.S. Reruns, More Self-Produced Shows," *Washington Post*, Oct. 4, 1989, F1.

[10] Michael Tracey, "Popular Culture and the Economics of Global Television," *InterMedia* 16(2, March 1988):9-25; Tracey, "European Viewers: What Will They Really Watch?" *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Fall 1987, 77-85; Tracey, "The Poisoned Chalice: International Television and the Idea of Dominance," *Daedalus* 114 (Fall 1985):17-56; David Waterman, "World Television Trade: The Economic Effects of Privatization and New Technology," *Telecommunications Policy*, June 1988, 141-51; Steven S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, *International Trade in Films and Television Programs*(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988); Wildman and Siwek, "The Privatization of European Television: Effects on International Markets for Programs," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Fall 1987, 71-76; *cf.* the arguments in "The Emperor's New Imperialism," *Economist*, Dec. 20, 1986, Survey, 14-16.

[11] Pam Mills, "An International Audience?" *Media, Culture and Society* 7(1985):487-501; Richard Collins, "The Language of Advantage: Satellite Television in Western Europe," *Media, Culture and Society*

11(1989):351-71; *cf.* the "cultural discount" introduced by Hoskins and Mirus as a variable in international trade.

[12] *Cf.* the "product life cycle" theory in Lee, 47-55, 80-83.

[13] Sepstrup, "Implications of Current Developments in West European Broadcasting," is an exception.

[14] Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, "National Identity and Cultural Values: Broadcasting Safeguards," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 31(1, Winter 1987):57-72; Helmut Schafer, "A European View of Competition and Control in a Multimedia Society," in *Video Media Competition: Regulation, Economics, and Technology*, ed. by Eli Noam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Pierre Kopp, "The Supply of Programmes by Public Television in Europe: An Econometric Analysis," *European Journal of Communication* 4(1989):481-97; *cf.* Lee, 88-95.

[15] Gareth Locksley, "TV Broadcasting in Europe and the New Technologies," document, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1988, 210-25; Jean-Paul Jeandon, "Impact des nouvelles technologies sur la concurrence dans l'industrie de la television en Europe," document, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1988, 177-87; it is also mentioned in one of the key political documents in EC broadcasting policy, "Television without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable," Commission of the European Communities, COM(84) 300 final, Brussels, 1984, 33.

[16] Lee, 75-76.

[17] Richard Mahler, "The boom abroad: global market takes off in the '80s," *Electronic Media*, Jan. 15, 1990, 78; Jack Loftus, "U.S. TV program sales to Western Europe expected to reach $2.7 million in 1992; 1988 exports pass $800 mark," *Television/Radio Age*, Oct. 3, 1988, 26; Loftus, "U.S. TV sky-high over Europe," *Television/Radio Age*, Nov. 14, 1988, 53-54; Richard Stevenson, "Hollywood Takes to the Global Stage," *New York Times*, April 16, 1989, 3:1. Increased revenues do not mean a proportional rise in the number of programming hours sold, however, since one of the major effect of increased competition in Europe has been a bidding war which has raised prices, see John Marcom, Jr., "Le Defi Disney," *Forbes*, Feb. 20, 1989; Shawn Tully, "U.S.-Style TV Turns on Europe," *Fortune*, April 13, 1987, 96-98.

[18] Loftus, "U.S. TV program sales to Western Europe"; as others have pointed out, trade press figures are not altogether reliable, but they tend to be the only ones available, because to conceal the dominance of the United States in world trade, American exporters want to keep their figures secret, see "As MCA deals in Germany, Italy, Davis Hits 'harmful' export figures," *Television/Radio Age*, March 6, 1989, 21; "International Report," *Television/Radio Age*, April 3, 1989, 18.

[19] Andrew C. Browne, "Europe Braces for Free-Market TV," *Fortune*, Feb. 24, 1984, 74; Laurel Wentz, "TV rivals challenging Murdoch in Europe," *Advertising Age*, Dec. 2, 1985, 59-60; "The Privatization of Europe," *Broadcasting*, March 31, 1986, 60; Les Brown, "The Path Once Taken," *Channels* Field Guide, 1988, 20; for a country-by-country report as of 1988, see Adam Snyder, "Beyond the American Screen," *Channels* Field Guide, 1988, 24-28; for details on two major examples, see Don R. Le Duc, "French and German New Media Policies: Variations on a Familiar Theme," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 31(4, Fall 1987):427-47.

[20] Jacques Neher, "A Revolution Brews in European Television: Competition Will Bring Viewers New Choices," *Washington Post*, March 5, 1989, H2; Raymond Snoddy, "The Changing Face of European T.V.," *Europe* April 1988, 26-28, 46;John Tydeman and Ellen Jakes Kelm, *New Media in Europe: Satellites, Cable, VCRs and Videotex* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 131-58; for enthusiastic predictions, see Judith Reitman, "Europe's High Tech Glamour," *Marketing and Media Decisions*, Dec. 1984, 62-66, 84-86; "U.S. Cable Operators Eye a Bonanza Overseas," *Business Week*, Nov. 21, 1983; David Lewis, "Cable and DBS Offer Unready Europe Almost Limitless TV," *Reuters North European Service*, Feb. 27, 1984.

[21] Snoddy, 46; Neher; Tydeman and Kelm, 86-130; Brown, "The Path Once Taken"; for predictions, see Isabel Bass, "The Sky's the Limit," *Marketing & Media Decisions*, May 1986, 58.

[22] Lisa Winkler, "Murdoch's Sky Channel beams strong signal across Europe," *International Management*, March 1985, 48-5; Laurel Wentz, "TV nationalism clouds Sky's gains," *Advertising Age*, Dec. 14, 1987, 56; "European Satellite TV: Just So Much Pie in the Sky?" *Business Week*, Oct. 24, 1988, 39; Irv Margolis, "International Report," *Television/Radio Age*, March 20, 1989; "Beaming soap to Babel," *Economist*, Oct. 22, 1988,

20; Tyler Marshall, "Satellite, cable at last: For Europe, more to touch on that dial," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 8, 1989, 1.

[23] Steven Koltai, "Coming Attractions in European TV: Problems and Prospects for Cable and Satellite Television," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Fall 1987, 57-63; Tully, 98; the figure stems from an early EC document and another EC publication lowered it to 300,000 in 1989, see Commission of the European Communities, "Realities and Tendencies in European Television: Perspectives and Options," interim report, COM(83) 229, final, Brussels, 1983, 9; Gerard de Selys, "Europe's Audiovisual Challenge," *Europe*, April 1989, 28-29.

[24] "Television Without Frontiers"; Commission of the European Communities, "The Community's broadcasting policy: Proposal for a Council Directive concerning broadcasting activities," *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement, 5, 1986.

[25] "Report on radio and television broadcasting in the European Community," European Parliament, Working Documents, 1-1013/81; *Official Journal of the European Communities, Annex: Debates of the European Parliament*, Sitting of Wednesday, 6 May 1981, 139-40; *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 3, 1982, 71-72; *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 5.4.82, C87/111-12.

[26] "Motion for a resolution on the threat of opinion posed by the commercialization of new media," in "Report on radio and television broadcasting," 19-20.

[27] *Official Journal of the European Communities, Annex: Debates of the European Parliament*, 29.3.84, 1-312/224; *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 30.4.84, C117/198-205.

[28] "Realities and Tendencies in European Television," 5, 10-11.

[29] *Debates of the European Parliament*, No. 1-312-225.

[30] *Official Journal*, 30.4.84, C117/203-04.

[31] Jacqueline Frank, "European Television Without Borders or Without Americans?" *Reuter Business Report*, July 26, 1989.

[32] *Reuters North European Service*, July 29, 1982; for an optimistic review of French attitudes toward America, see Jordan Bonfante, "The New Refrain: 'Vive l'Amerique,'" *Time*, Jan. 14, 1985, 40.

[33] "Chauvinism, French-style," *Advertising Age*, March 12, 1984, M-14; *Reuters*, Feb. 8, 1986, AM cycle.

[34] Jack Monet, "Common Mkt. Hoists TV Warning Flags," *Variety*, June 27, 1984, 49; the ministers concerned themselves mainly with the film industry, where American dominance had been stressed by a report from the European Parliament; Rose Doyle, "U.S. Films Capture European Market," *Europe*, May/June 1984, 44-45; Mary Ellen Bortin, "France Launches American-style Drive to Save European Cinema," *Reuters North European Service*, June 21, 1984; Lang had called a similar meeting two years earlier, see "Target: America," *Economist*, Sept. 18, 1982, 54; the aid fund was discussed by the ministers again in November; Peter Conradi, "European Community to Try to Save Europe from 'Dallas,'" *Reuters North European Service*, Nov. 22, 1984; "European Commission Gives Boost to European Film Plan," *Reuters North European Service*, April 17, 1985; "The Europeans strike back," *TV World*, May/June 1985, 15-16.

[35] "Taking up arms for art in France," *Advertising Age*, Dec. 2, 1985, 58; *Reuters*, Nov. 14, 1985, AM cycle.

[36] "Ad, Copyright Rules for Euro-TV to be Drawn up by End of December," *Bureau of National Affairs Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report*, 49 (1233, Sept. 26, 1985):546.

[37] "Television Without Frontiers," 4.

[38] "Television Without Frontiers," 33.

[39] "Report on a framework for a European media policy based on the Commission's Green Paper on the

establishment of the common market for broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable," European Parliament, Working Documents, A2-75/85, 5 July 1985, 28-30.

[40] "Resolution on a framework for a European media policy based on the Commission's Green Paper on the establishment of the common market for broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 11.11.85, C288/115, 117; "Resolution on the economic aspects of the common market for broadcasting in the European Community," 11.11.85, C288/120.

[41] "The Community's Broadcasting Policy," 10, 13-15; *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 17.7.86, C179/7-8; meanwhile, the European TV channel, the original idea, faced an uncertain future, see *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 11-1986, 53.

[42] "Provisions governing broadcasting activities, I" *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 22.2.88, C49/56-58; "EC Deputies Call for "Television Without Frontiers," *Reuter Library Report*, Jan. 19, 1988, AM cycle; "European Parliament Votes for Europe-wide Television," *Reuter Library Report*, Jan. 20, 1988, AM cycle. Earlier, the EC Economic and Social Committee had expressed uncertainty about the efficacy of quotas, see "Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of broadcasting activities," *Official Journal of the European Communities* 31.8.87, C232/30-31.

[43] Lutz Kuche, "Europe takes a breath as it steps into the age of international TV," (translation of an article in *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, July 1, 1988) *The German Tribune*, No. 1332, July 24, 1988, 6; Laurel Wentz, "EC Considers TV Restrictions," *Advertising Age*, Nov. 3, 1986, 69; "No quotas on U.S. programs: Europe gets closer to television without frontiers," *Television/Radio Age*, May 2, 1988; for other reasons, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands had reservations about the entire directive, see Bruce Alderman, "Rules Shaped for New Euro TV World," *Variety*, June 22, 1988, 49, 61; Hank Werba, "EEC Television Edicts Awaited on Transnational Broadcasts," *Variety*, July 6, 1988, 38.

[44] Bruce Alderman, "U.S. Television Program Exports: Europe Cries Whoa!" *Variety*, June 15, 1988, 133; Deborah Caulfield, "Morning Report: TV & Video," *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 27, 1987, VI:2; John Marcom Jr., "Maxwell Advocates Quota on Imports of U.S. TV Shows," *Wall Street Journal*, May 2, 1988, 30; Alderman, "U.K.'s Maxwell Sez Quotas Due On European TV Networks," *Variety*, May 4, 1988, 1, 46; Kuche, "Europe takes a breath as it steps into the age of international TV."

[45] Bruce Alderman, "Euro Council Compromises on TV Regs," *Variety* Nov. 30, 1988, 1, 68; Alderman, "Cross-Border TV Rules," 68; "Strong Quota Stand in Europe Dimmer As France Shifts," 68, 72; "European countries meet to discuss coordination of transnational TV," *Broadcasting*, Dec. 5, 1988, 73; "Western Europe Drafts TV Rules," *New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1988, D2. The Stockholm meeting of the Council of Europe had been preced by other meetings of ministers throughout the fall, see Leyla Ertrugul, "European Ministers Air Problems of 'TV Without Frontiers,'" *Reuter Library Report*, Sept. 13, 1985, AM cycle; and "EC Ministers Push Harder for TV Without Frontiers," *Reuter Library Report*, Nov. 18, 1988, AM cycle; the Council of Europe convention was finally approved in March, see "Western Europe Agrees on Rules for 'TV Without Frontiers,'" *Reuter Library Report*, March 15, 1989, AM cycle.

[46] "EC Ministers Reject Calls to Limit Imports of TV Programmes," *Reuter Library Report*, Feb. 27, 1989, AM cycle; when final agreement was reached in March, West Germany, Denmark and Belgium objected on other grounds, see Leyla Ertrugul, "EC Agress Rules for 'TV Without Frontiers,'" *Reuter Library Report*, March 14, 1989, AM cycle; Paul Montgomery, "Europe Sets Standards for TV Programs," *New York Times*, March 15, 1988, D1, 15; "Ministers Agree EC Rules for Cross-border TV," *Reuter Business Report*, April 13, 1989, BC cycle; Denmark declared in April that it would refuse to abide by the restrictions.

[47] Bruce Alderman, "France's Lang sez quotas for tv not protective, but competitive," *Variety*, May 3-9, 1989, 1, 2; Rone Tempest, "France wants to slam Europe's open door to U.S. TV," *Los Angeles Times*, April 12, 1989, VI:1; Alderman, "European pic powers pushing to lift tv quotas past 50%," *Variety*, May 17-23, 1989, 5.

[48] Leyla Ertrugul, "European Parliament Clears 'TV Without Frontiers,'" *Reuter Library Report*, May 24, 1989, AM cycle; "Television broadcasting activities II," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 26.6.89, C148/139-40; the suggested change applied to both programming and programming budgets.

[49] Bruce Alderman, "Euro Commission is fighting against 'obligatory and enforceable' program quotas,"

Variety, May 31-June 7, 1989, 58.

[50] "Plan for Pan-European Television Falls Apart," *Reuter Business Report*, June 14, 1989, BC cycle; Boris Johnson, "British hopes fade for end to Euro TV curb," *Daily Telegraph*, June 15, 1989, 9; Lenny Borger, "EC quotas shot down in surprise move; deal with Yanks could be reason," *Variety*, June 21-27, 1989, 1, 8; "European TV proposal stalled," *Broadcasting*, June 26, 1989, 54. The French government was divided on the issue, however, with Lang increasingly more interested in incentives than restrictions, see Bruce Alderman, "Lang sounds deathknell for Euro tv quotas; France mulls options," *Variety*, July 5-11, 1989, 1, 2; "EC Ministers Seek More Time for Cross-Border TV Rules," *Reuters*, July 17, 1989.

[51] Simon Alterman, "EC, Risking U.S. Anger, Sets Rules to Promote European TV," *Reuter Business Report*, Oct. 3, 1988, BC cycle; Edward Cody, "EC Adopts European TV Program Quota; Decision Calls for Fewer U.S. Reruns, More Self-Produced Shows," *Washington Post*, Oct. 4, 1989, F1; Tyler Marshall, "European Community Sets Quota for Television Imports," Oct. 4, 1989, VI:1; Steven Greenhouse, "Europe Reaches TV Compromise; U.S. Officials Fear Protectionism," *New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1989, A1, D20; the EC Commission had even threatened legal action against France, Belgium and the Netherlands to break the deadlock, see "EC Attacks French, Dutch and Belgian TV Restrictions," *Reuter Library Report*, July 19, AM cycle.

[52] Bruce Alderman, "Europe Bucks U.S., Backs Quotas," *Daily Variety*, Oct. 4, 1989, 1, 12; Alderman, "EC adopts quota directive; to take effect in 18 mos.," *Variety*, Oct. 4-10, 1989, 1, 2; Cody, "EC Adopts European TV Program Quota"; *TV Digest*, Oct. 9, 1989, 5; how that statement should be interpreted is uncertain, however; after making it, Commission Vice-President Martin Bangemann added that broadcasters would be monitored and reported to the EC Council and the European Parliament, see Alderman, "EC adopts directive," 2.

[53] "Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 17.10.89, L298/23-30.

[54] See the analysis in Bruce Alderman, "Quid Pro Quota?" *Variety*, Oct. 11-17, 51-51-52, 63.

[55] Michael Cieply, "Jack Valenti's Balancing Act; MPAA'S Chief Walks the Line as Studios Expand Interest," *Los Angeles Times*, Aug. 3, 1989, VI:1.

[56] Marcom, "Le Defi Disney"; James Forkan, "Big 3 strategies differ abroad," *Television/Radio Age*, May 15, 1989, 44; John Eger, "Tv program producers in need of global outlook," *Advertising Age*, Sept. 9, 1985, 26; Richard W. Stevenson, "Hollywood Takes to the Global Stage," *New York Times*, April 16, 1989, III:1.

[57] "Fifth Estate's foreign trade: more than fair," *Broadcasting*, Aug. 1, 1988, 61-62; Marcom; "Will American Business Be Welcome in a Unified Europe?" transcript, American Interests series, PBS, Oct. 28, 1989, Federal News Service; Peter Brimelow, "The dark side of 1992," *Forbes*, Jan. 22, 1990, 85.

[58] Fred Hift, "European tv quotas; angry Yanks and a community divided," *Variety*, May 24-30, 1989, 1; "Europeans Move to Limit Number of U.S. TV Shows Shown Abroad," *Los Angeles Times*, May 25, 1989, IV:5; the MPEA was the organization that had prompted official action, see Irwin Margolis and Erica Hanson, "Americans worry about collective Euro quota action," *Television/Radio Age*, July 24, 1989; Cieply, "Jack Valenti's Balancing Act." Once the directive had been adopted, Europeans claimed that the efforts of Hills and Valenti had been counterproductive and pushed adoption, "Aggressive U.S. stance on quotas may have hurt more than helped," *Variety*, Oct. 4-10, 1989, 2.

[59] "'European OPEC'; Maxwell Seeks to Assuage U.S. Concerns on Proposed EC TV Import Curbs," *Communication Daily*, July 27, 1989, 1; "U.S. Officials, Industry Take Hard Line on EC Television Broadcasting Directive," *Bureau of National Affairs International Trade Reporter*, 6(31, Aug. 2, 1989):1020.

[60] Paul Farhi, "U.S. to Fight EC Directive Limiting Foreign TV Shows," *Washington Post*, Oct. 11, 1989, F1,2; "U.S. Challenges European Television Rules," *Reuter Business Report*, Oct. 11, 1989, BC cycle; the move to use GATT failed, see *Bureau of National Affairs International Trade Reporter*, 6(41, Oct. 18, 1989):1347.

[61] "House Seeks Action On EC TV Rules," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Oct. 28, 1989, 2851; "European TV Rules Draw Rebuke," Oct. 21, 1989, 2778.

[62] Morrie Gelman, "Yanks Brush Off Euro Quotas," *Variety*, Oct. 11-17, 1989, 1, 6; Dennis McDougal,

"Europe TV Quota Doesn't Rattle Hollywood," *Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 10, 1989, VI:1; "The boom abroad; Global market takes off in the '80s," *Electronic Media*, Jan. 15, 1990, 78; "European TV Quotas Could Help U.S. Producers, NATPE Speakers say," *Communications Daily*, Jan. 1990, 5; Wayne Walley, "TV nets making European moves," *Advertising Age*, Oct. 16, 1989, 35; Elizabeth Guilder, "Monte Carlo's agenda is shifting as the new European order unfolds," *Variety*, Feb. 7, 1990, 95; "Yank Tubers Plotting to Step Up Euro Ties," 104.

[63] In addition to France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Britain had restrictions in force; Portugal and Ireland were considering them, see "Quotas: What Can Europeans Watch?" *Electronic Media*, Oct. 16, 1989, 43.

[64] Victoria de Grazia, "Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920-1960," *Journal of Modern History* 61(March 1989):53-87; for the flavor of the argument, see "The Los Angelisation of Britain," *Literary Digest*, May 7, 1927, 28-29.

[65] de Selys, "Europe's Audiovisual Challenge"; "Action Programme for the European Audiovisual Media Products Industry," Commission of the European Communities, COM(86) 255 final, Brussels, 1986; "Euro-unity's strength in numbers," *TV World*, Oct. 1988, 90; Peter Norman, "The E.C. and Culture," *Europe*, March 1989, 26-28, 45; Jeanine Johnson, "In Search of... the European T.V. Show," *Europe*, Nov. 1989, 22, 47.

[66] That trend in evident in two EC-commissioned reports that say little about import restrictions; see Locksley and Jeandon.

[67] See the discussion in Winand Gellner and Jochen Zimmer, "Fernsehmedien zwischen 'Amerikanisierung' und 'Europäisierung,'" *Rundfunk und Fernsehen* 36 (4, 1988):514-20; Thomas Hasnke, "European Television prepares to hit back at the Dallas syndrome" (translation of an article in *Die Zeit*) *German Tribune* July 16, 1989, 10.

[68] This was the common argument of Motion Picture Association President Jack Valenti, for instance, see Jacqueline Frank, "European Television Without Borders or Without Americans?" *Reuter Business Report*, July 6, 1989, BC cycle.

[69] See, for instance, Lord Cockfield, "E.C. Proposes Common Standards for Television," *Europe*, Dec. 1986, 160-17.

[70] For a forceful argument against, see "Fortress TV," *Economist*, Sept. 10, 1988, 19-20; as to the American side, there really was no arguments favoring quotas.

[71] Lang's policies was often seen as driven by a fear of cultural imperialism, see, for instance, Bonfante, "The New Refrain."

[72] Mark Nelson and Peter Truell, "Some Support In EC Is Seen for TV Quotas," *Wall Street Journal*, July 10, 1989, B1; William Echikson, "Cable TV: Europe Worries that American Programming Will Dominate," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 8, 1984, 25; "Europeans Agree Need to Boost TV Programme Production," *Reuter Library Report*, Oct. 2, 1989, BC cycle.

[73] Mark Trevelyan, "Europe Rallies Against Invasion of Foreign Pop Culture," *Reuter Library Report*, July 24, 1988, BC cycle; "America's Stake in Battle Over European Television," *U.S. News & World Report*, Sept. 24, 1984; *TV Digest*, July 31, 1989, 6.

[74] Steven Greenhouse, "The Television Europeans Love, And Love to Hate," *New York Times*, Aug. 13, 1989, IV:24; R.C. Longwort, "Common TV market: Europe mobilizes as America's 'Cosby,' 'Cannon' & Co. invade the tube," *Chicago Tribune* Nov. 13, 1989, Tempo, 1.

[75] *Official Journal of the European Communities, Annex: Debates of the European Parliament*, 25.5.84, 1-314/306, 311; 29.384, 1-312/226, 256; 12.9.85, 2-329/257; 19.1.88, 2-360/32-33; 20.1.88, 2-360/181; later on, some deputies saw national cultures in need of protection from this very idea, and it was subsequently played down, see *Debates of the European Parliament*, 19.1.88, 2-360/41-44; 24.5.88, 2-378/111-12.

[76] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 12.9.85, 256-57, 266, 272.

[77] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 19.1.88, 2-360/33-34.

[78] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 20.1.88, 2-360/184; 24.5.88, 2-378/114.

[79] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 12.9.85, 2-329/270; 20.1.88, 2-360/184; 24.5.89, 2-378/122.

[80] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 12.9.85, 2-329/270; the last two quotes are from Communist and Green deputies, 24.5.89, 2-378-120.

[81] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 24.5.89, 2-378-121.

[82] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 12.9.85, 2-329/260; 24.5.89, 2-378/117, 123; perhaps in the spirit of rhetoric, Parliament members almost always used wildly exaggerated figures when denouncing American dominance, as did Robert Maxwell testifying in the U.S. Congress; for more accurate statistics, see *Variety*, Oct. 11-17, 1989, 52, 63; also, many deputies saw "Americanization" more as a matter of commercials on TV than programming, see *Debates of the European Parliament*, 19.1.88, 2-360/36-37.

[83] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 24.5.89, 2-378/124.

[84] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 24.5.89, 2-378/110.

[85] *Debates of the European Parliament*, 19.88, 2-360/31; 24.5.89, 2-378/111-12.

[86] Eger, "Viewpoints," *Television/Radio Age*, April 15, 1985, 137; *Kojak* and *Beaver* are repeated in "World TV market: a promising but unpredictable future," *Broadcasting*, Aug. 18, 1988, 65; Eger, "Personal Privilege," *Advertising Age*, Sept. 9, 1985, 26.

[87] "U.S. Lobbying on Broadcasting Measure 'Counterproductive,' EC Official Says," *Bureau of National Affairs International Trade Reporter* 6(43, Nov. 1, 1989):1420; repeated in Valenti, "Television with Manacles," *Washington Post*, Dec. 1, 1989, A27.

[88] "Cultural protectionism," *Boston Globe*, Oct. 24, 1989, 14; "Rationing 'Dallas' in Europe," *New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1989, A26; two other editorials disregarded or dismissed the cultural argument, as did the *New Repuplic*; see "Protecting Europe's Culture From American TV," *Newsday*, March 17, 1989, 92; "Pure Protectionism," *Kansas City Star* editorial reprinted in *Chicago Tribune*, Oct. 19, 1989, 25; "Notebook," *New Republic*, April 17, 1989, 10. It should be stressed that the *New York Times*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and other papers had related the concern over cultural protection in news articles.

[89] Les Brown, "Can Europe Be Canadianized?" *Channels*, Oct. 1988, 26; "Why satellite TV worries European socialists," *Business Week*, Sept. 20, 1985, 51-52.

[90] "Denouncing European Community Broadcast Directive," 135 Congressional Record H 7326, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., Vol. 135, No. 144, Oct. 23, 1989. Most of the speakers dismissed the cultural argument altogether, but in a different context, the possible Japanese purchase of Hollywlood studios, Congress perceptively talked about foreigners being the "arbiter of our dreams," see "America's Bedtime Story," *Congressional Record-House* 101th Cong. 1 sess. 135 Cog Rec H 1822.

A Content Analysis of TV News
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1990

Research has shown that the content of a particular country's or medium's news can be influenced by many different factors. The regional coverage of news may be tied to geographic proximity, cultural affinities, or eliteness of nations.[1] Sources of news may also be relevant, as common sources might result in similar coverage by different media, and heavy reliance on a particular source may limit the range of news coverage.[2] General definitions of what is newsworthy may favor such subject categories as Conflict and Defense or Politics, particularly in the case of foreign news.[3]

In the case of TV news, the factors of news drama and timeliness may be especially important for the selection of news.[4] One must also recognize the factor of government influence of TV news, since television is government sponsored in many Third-World countries. Some critics have contended that government sponsorship of television results in its becoming a propaganda vehicle, emphasizing positive domestic news.[5]

This study seeks to explore the nature of TV news and possible influences on that news by comparing the content of Arabic-Language evening newscasts in two neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia and Oman, both of which have government-sponsored television. Both countries also have culturally homogeneous populations that are almost wholly Muslim. However, Oman is not as economically developed as Saudi Arabia and is not as religiously conservative (not having, for example, all schools segregated by sex).

This study examines, for a period of five days, the evening news TV broadcasts in both countries in regard to the following: 1) amount of domestic and foreign news, 2) content direction (positive, negative, neutral) of domestic and foreign news, 3) subject matter categories, 4) geographic regions, and 5) placement of news stories (first, second, or final segment).

The results of this study may help one understand whether government-sponsored television in two culturally similar countries tends to have the same content and emphases. Perhaps factors other than government influence are more important in explaining TV news content. The results of the study might also contribute to research about basic differences between foreign and domestic TV news.

Review of Literature

Television in Third-World countries is often government sponsored, but Paul Ansah (1984) has claimed that such sponsorship does not necessarily make television a tool of government. Rather, he sees government-influenced media as part of a tradition in which media have strong social service obligations.[6]

But even though developing countries might have the same general concept of media as servants of national development, they may have different communication policies. In a comparison of the media systems of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, Al-Usmani (1984) found that different political, religious, and social structures influenced the different ways that media systems were organized and operated.[7] For example, in religiously conservative Saudi Arabia, the media system was rigidly organized and strongly censored, while in somewhat democratic Kuwait the system was more flexible and tolerant.

Many Third-World countries continue to rely on developed countries for technology and programming. Because of the expenses of producing news video, there is a limited amount of video available and heavy news borrowing by developing countries.[8]

Studies by Straubhaar et al.[9] and Cooper-Chen[10] have indicated that about 40% of TV newscasts consist of foreign news. However, the 1985 UNESCO report on international news reporting found that television channels in developing countries tended to give a substantial proportion of their total news time to foreign news; for example, Lebanon, 65%; Algeria, 68%; Ivory Coast 82%; Thailand, 58%.[11] Hudson and

Swindel's study of English-language newscasts in Saudi Arabia found foreign news to comprise 62% of total time.[12]

Cooper-Chen concluded from her 1989 study of TV newscasts in five countries that size, economic strength, and homogeneity of population were important factors in determining the proportions of foreign and domestic news.[13]

Patterns of regional coverage have often been attributed to geographical proximity of countries, as in Warren's study of Chinese TV newscasts, which found that nearby countries accounted for almost half of frequent foreign datelines.[14] However, Canino and Hudson found a large proportion of Puerto Rican TV news to be about the United States, but little about Latin America.[15] For Puerto Rican news coverage, the relative eliteness of nations seemed of more importance than geographical proximity. Along with relative eliteness, economic power and cultural affinities has often been recognized as important predictors of regional foreign news coverage.[16]

Larson, McAnany, and Storey pointed to the absence of full-fledged U.S. news bureaus in Latin America as the reason for very low U.S. TV news coverage of that region in the early seventies. They suggested that government and business interests accounted for the heavy coverage of Western Europe and the Middle East.[17]

Several studies have found Politics to be the highest ranking subject category for both foreign and domestic news.[18] Foreign Relations was the chief foreign news category in Warren's study of Chinese television news, while Economics and Industry was the chief domestic category. Crime and Justice news was much more prevalent in foreign than in domestic stories.[19]

Saudi Arabian TV in general continues to devote a large amount of programming to religious subjects, though the percentage of religious programming has decreased from the early seventies (Boyd, 1982).[20] Religious programming has been a way of defusing the conservative religious opposition to TV (on the grounds that TV makes a graven image). There was intense religious opposition to TV upon its introduction in the early sixties, and such opposition has only gradually ebbed. Al-Usmani (1984) reported that Saudi TV officials, in parallel with government emphases, viewed television as an instrument of national unity and a platform for expressing Saudi Arabia's religious position as the center of Islam.[21]

Some studies have indicated that government-controlled TV news tends to give domestic stories prominent placement. Warren found a strong tendency for foreign news to be placed late in the broadcast--evidence that helped support his conclusion that Chinese TV news was ethnocentric.[22] Hudson and Swindel also reported that news of the Saudi royal family came first in the Saudi TV newscast.[23]

In some cases, analysis of the content direction of news has found a large percentage of foreign news to be negative. Hudson and Swindel found more than half of Saudi TV's Middle Eastern stories fitting the military or violence category. Warren reported that Chinese domestic news emphasized achievements while foreign news had more unrest, crime, and disaster.[24] Larson, McAnany and Storey found that crime themes predominated in U.S. TV news coverage of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.[25] However, Canino and Huston found crime and violence to comprise a relatively small percentage of Puerto Rican TV news.[26]

Hypotheses

Because Saudi Arabia is a larger country than Oman, one would expect it to devote more of its news coverage to domestic news (Cooper-Chen, 1989). Thus, Hypothesis 1 states: "Saudi Arabia will devote a greater percentage of total news time to domestic news than will Oman."

Hudson and Swindel (1988) noted that news of the Saudi monarchy came first in the broadcast; and other studies (Warren, 1988) have also noted a tendency to put domestic news first. Thus, Hypothesis 2 states: "Domestic news will have a higher priority of placement than will foreign news in both Saudi and Omani TV newscasts."

There is no reason to expect that the regional coverage of Saudi and Omani TV newscasts will differ. Hypothesis 3 states: "Saudi and Omani TV newscasts will be similar in regard to regional coverage of news."

Oman and Saudi Arabia are culturally similar countries, and there is no reason to a expect differences in subject category distributions. Hypothesis 4 states: "Saudi Arabia and Oman will be similar in regard to the percentage of time devoted to various subject categories."

A number of studies have found Politics to be the primary subject category of TV news (Stempel, 1988; Canino and Huston, 1986). Hypothesis 5 states: "In both Saudi Arabia and Oman, Politics will be the chief domestic news category and the chief foreign news category as measured by amount of time devoted to the subject."

Some studies (especially Warren, 1988, and Hudson and Swindel, 1988) have indicated a difference between the subject matter of domestic and foreign TV news. Thus, Hypothesis 6 states: "In the case of both Omani and Saudi TV news, there will be a significant difference between foreign and domestic news in regard to subject category distributions."

Some studies (Warren, 1981; Hudson and Swindel, 1988) have found domestic news to have a more positive content direction than foreign news. Hypothesis 7 states: "In both the Saudi and Omani TV newscasts, domestic news will have a more positive content direction than will foreign news."

Methodology

The sample was selected by randomly taking five days from November 24 throughout December 8, 1988, to form one week of Saturday through Wednesday. Limited availability of TV news tape caused the sampling period to be short. Stempel noted that "in many instances the researcher must accept less than the ideal sample because of limitations of availability."[27] The length of the sample period and the number of days chosen were consistent with other studies (Elliott, 1981; Canino and Huston, 1982; Stempel, 1988; Cooper-Chen, 1989). The main nine o'clock Arabic-language newscast from each country was analyzed for each sample day. Thursday and Friday were excluded from the sample because they are weekend days in Saudi Arabia and Friday is a weekend day in Oman.

The following definitions of domestic and international news were used:

A) Domestic news: all news about or originating in Saudi Arabia or Oman locales. Such news would include a foreign plane's crashing in Saudi Arabia or Oman, but would exclude the activities of Saudis or Omanis in foreign countries.

B) International news: all news about or originating in locales outside Saudi Arabia or Omani; also all news originating outside Saudi Arabia or Oman but involving the home country (e.g., a Saudi or Omani exhibit is shown in the United States).

Classification by content direction used three categories:[28]

A) Positive news stories reflect or emphasize unity, stability, cooperation, peace, success, morality, progress, and/or wisdom.

B) Negative news stories reflect or emphasize disunity, unrest, instability, weakness, unlawfulness, immorality, backwardness, lack of leadership, and/or strike.

C) Neutral stories emphasize or reflect neither positive nor negative directions. They include content lacking direction, such as facts, as well as stories with a balance of positive and negative aspects.

The following subject categories were used for both foreign and domestic news:

A) Politics includes diplomacy and relations, elections, government changes, legislation, and political campaigns.

B) **Economics** includes news of business, industry and finance, aid, labor relations, economic statistics, etc.

C) **War and Defense** includes armed conflict, threat, weapons, and military.

D) **Crime and Disaster** includes accidents, police investigations, arrests, executions, floods, droughts, earthquakes, and famines.

E) **Science, Technology, Agriculture, and Health** includes all news about science, technology, invention, the environment, farming, dams, fishing, medicine, nutrition, and any other news with medical aspects. Agriculture news presented in a context of economic output is excluded.

F) **Social News, Education, Communication, and Arts** includes daily life and customs, travel, social services other than health, schools and educational programs, mass media, fine arts, and popular arts.

G) **Religion** includes religious activities, prayers, mosques, the Quran, charity, holy cities, and pilgrimages.

H) **Sports** includes all news about sports.

I) **Miscellaneous** includes any news items that do not fit the above categories.

For story placement classification, the news was divided into three segments, each comprising about a third of the total news time. If a story began in one of the thirds and continued in another third, it was placed in the segment where most of the story appeared. Thus, the data for the three segments are slightly uneven in regard to total seconds. A first-segment placement indicated high priority; second placement, medium priority; and third placement, low priority.

Regions were classified according to the following categories:

A) Saudi Arabia or Oman (domestic news)

B) Other Arab countries and Israel, including North African and Asian Arab countries

C) Asia excluding the Arab countries

D) Africa excluding the Arab countries

E) United States and Canada

F) Latin America

G) Western Europe

H) Eastern Europe

I) Others.

To test the reliability of the measurement, a second trained coder reexamined 50 stories in terms of content direction of news and subject matter categories. The results were compared with the researcher's own classifications of the same items using Scott's formula.

The results of this calculation were 79% agreement in content direction of news and 84% in subject matter categories.

Results and Discussion

The Saudi news telecast devoted about 60% of total news time to domestic news, while only 36% of the Omani telecast was devoted to domestic news. Of the Saudi telecast's 10535 news seconds, 6304 were domestic, 4231 international. Of the Omani telecast's 8766 seconds, 3135 were domestic, 5631 international. Application of a z-test, with results significant at a probability of <.001, showed that domestic news accounted for a much greater percentage of Saudi than of Omani TV news. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was strongly supported.

These results give support to the importance of size and economic strength as factors in determining the relative amounts of foreign and domestic news in a country's telecast. Oman, a much smaller and economically less developed country than Saudi Arabia, has a much stronger global outreach in its TV news. However, one must note that Saudi Arabia's percentage of foreign news--about 40%--fits the average percentage found by both Straubhaar et al. and Cooper-Chen.

Table 1 shows the placement of domestic and international news for both the Saudi and Omani newscasts. In both countries, the majority of domestic news was placed in the first segment of the newscast, 56% in the case of Saudi Arabia, 64% in the case of Oman. Both countries, and especially Saudi Arabia, also tended to place international news in the last segment; 78% of Saudi international news was in the last segment, 45% of Omani international news. In the first and third segments, the percentage differences between domestic and international news for both countries were significant at a probability of <.001. Thus Hypothesis 2 was strongly supported.

Table 2 presents the regional coverage of Saudi and Omani international news. Both countries devoted about 41% of their international news time to other Arab countries. The United States and Canada ranked second for both countries, followed by Western Europe. Eastern Europe and Latin America were the lowest-ranking regions for both countries, and Asia received less than 4% of total international news in the case of both countries. When analyzed by Spearman's rank-order correlation, the data yielded a coefficient of .88, which is significant at p <.01. This high correlation strongly supported the third hypothesis, which stated that regional coverage in the two countries would be similar.

The striking similarity in regional coverage could be explained in various ways. Certainly, one likely explanation is that both countries had common sources. A limited amount of video and lack of foreign correspondents cause many developing countries to be heavy news borrowers. Another possible explanation is that similarities in culture and in economic concerns were responsible for the strong similarities. However, since this similarity did not extend to domestic content, such an explanation is dubious. Perhaps the similarities result from common definitions of what is newsworthy; it is possible that countries readily agree on what foreign news is important.

Table 3 presents the subject category distributions for both domestic and international news in both countries. Coverage of international news was significantly positively correlated, with a Spearman's rank correlation of .90 at a probability of <.01. On the other hand, there was no significant correlation between the two countries in the rank emphases of domestic categories (r_s=.50, p>.05). Hypothesis 4 then was supported in regard to international news, not supported in regard to domestic news. The similarity in international news subjects might again be explained by possible common sources or by similar definitions of what is newsworthy in the area of international news.

The different emphases of Saudi and Omani domestic news were rather surprising. Two categories of Saudi domestic news--Politics and Religion--accounted for 80% of total domestic news. In contrast, Omani TV gave no time to domestic religious news, gave a lower percentage to politics, and gave a much higher percentage to the two categories covering subjects such as technology, health, social news, and the arts (altogether comprising 64% of total Omani domestic news). The much greater emphasis on religion by Saudi TV may reflect the more conservative religious nature of the country, as well as its position as the center of Islam. Moreover, Oman's greater attention to social development subjects may reflect its lower stage of economic development.

Politics was the highest-ranking category for Saudi domestic news (39%), Saudi international news (45%), and Omani international news (47%); Politics ranked third in Omani domestic news, with 21% of total domestic news. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported for both countries, except in the case of Omani domestic news.

A comparison of the domestic and foreign news subject matter in each country showed a significant difference between domestic and foreign subject categories in Saudi

Arabia (r_s=.17, p>.05) and between domestic and foreign subjects in Oman (r_s=.11, p>.05). Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported for both countries.

In Saudi Arabia there was more international than domestic news devoted to economics (18% versus only 5% of the domestic news total). Religion accounted for more than a third of Saudi domestic news, but less than 1% of Saudi international news. In Oman, there was considerably more emphasis on politics in international news (47% versus 21% domestic) and somewhat more emphasis on international economic news. Oman's highest-ranking category--Science, Technology, Agriculture, and Health--comprised 37% of domestic news, but accounted for only 4% of international news. The same disparity can be found in Oman's second-highest domestic category--Social News, Education, Communication, and the Arts--which comprised 27% of domestic news, 1% of international news.

In both countries, there was no domestic news in the War and Defense and Crime and Disaster categories, though these categories together comprised roughly 20% of total international news in both countries. With the exception of the Sports category, the international news of both countries leaned heavily to hard news. In the case of Oman, domestic news strongly tended to be soft news, with an emphasis on social service subjects.

Table 4 presents the content direction of domestic and international news for both Oman and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Oman, domestic news was clearly more positive than international news, as 85% of domestic news was positive versus 54% of international news, and only 2% of domestic news was negative versus 22% of international news. In the case of Saudi Arabia, a greater percentage of international news was positive (52% versus only 36% of domestic news), but more international news was negative (26% versus only 6% of domestic news). A t-test showed that Hypothesis 7 was strongly supported in the case of Oman ($p<.001$) and supported in the case of Saudi Arabia ($p<.01$). The large amount of factual (neutral) domestic news in Saudi TV news was the main reason for the difference between the two countries.

Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research

The results of this study suggested that a variety of factors influence the content of TV news and that even neighboring, culturally similar countries can have striking differences between their TV newscasts. The study also indicated a basic difference between the subject matter of domestic and international news.

Although one can only speculate as to the underlying reasons for the data found, this study does suggest two factors as explanations for the amount and kind of domestic news: 1) the relative size and economic strength of a country may be correlated with the proportion of domestic news in a telecast, and 2) government sponsorship of media may influence the placement, content direction, and subject categories of domestic news. Government-sponsored television in both countries tended to place domestic news early in the newscast, and neither country had much negative domestic news.

The data gave some support to Paul Ansah's contention that government-sponsored media have strong social service obligations, both in the case of Oman (where much of the domestic news dealt with social services and development) and in Saudi Arabia (where religion was an important domestic subject). However, government sponsorship did not result in the two countries' having similar subject category distributions. Perhaps the Saudi television system is more conservative and less friendly to social development subjects; perhaps also Saudi television feels less need to address social development subjects since Saudi Arabia is relatively more developed than Oman.

In regard to international news, the striking similarities between Oman and Saudi Arabia in subject matter and regional coverage suggest a common source, a common interests, or a common definition of what is newsworthy. In these two developing countries, international news tended to be hard news, while a large percentage of domestic news was soft news.

Future studies should examine the media of other developing countries to determine the nature of government-sponsored TV news. Comparative studies should also further examine the content of international news in both developing and developed countries--especially in regard to the possible influence of common sources or common definitions of what is newsworthy.

This study then confirms the necessity of considering many different factors when analyzing TV news. Government sponsorship seemed to be an important factor in the results of this study, but such factors as common sources and different definitions of newsworthiness for domestic and foreign news may also have been influential. Moreover, since government sponsorship did not result in similar domestic subject categories or similar domestic content direction, one must look for other factors to explain differences.

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TABLE 1

Placement of Domestic and International News

	Saudi Arabia				Oman			
Segment	Domestic		International		Domestic		International	
	Seconds	%	Seconds	%	Seconds	%	Seconds	%
First	3533	56	55	1	1994	64	1109	20
Medium	2624	42	893	21	825	26	1990	35
Final	147	2	3283	78	316	10	2532	45
Total	6304	100	4231	100	3135	100	5631	100

p (z>191) <.001

Table 2

Emphasis Ranks and Percentages of Total International News Time by Regions

	Saudi		Oman	
	Rank	%	Rank	%
Other Arab Countries	1	40.8	1	40.7
Africa	5	6.5	4	11.8
Asia	7	3.7	6	3.5
United States and Canada	2	20.3	2	16.5
Latin America	9	0.0	8	1.8
Western Europe	3	12.9	3	12.9
Eastern Europe	8	1.5	9	1.0
Soviet Union	6	6.3	5	8.9
Others	4	8.0	7	2.8
n=total time in seconds	(n=4231)		(n=5631)	

$r_s = .88$, $p < .01$

TABLE 3

Emphasis Rank and Time Percentages by Subject Categories

	International News				Domestic News			
	Saudi		Oman		Saudi		Oman	
	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	%
Politics	1	38.8	1	47.0	1	45.4	3	20.6
Economics	2	18.2	2	16.4	5	4.7	4	9.5
War and Defense	4	12.2	3	13.7	7t	0.0	6t	0.0
Crime and Disaster	5	10.7	5	4.8	7t	0.0	6t	0.0
Science, Technology, Agriculture, and Health	7	1.7	6	4.0	4	6.8	1	37.1
Social News, Education, Communication, and Arts	6	2.3	8	1.0	3	6.8	2	26.9
Religion	8	0.7	9	0.0	2	34.5	6t	0.0
Sports	3	15.5	4	12.1	6	1.8	5	5.9
Miscellaneous	9	0.0	7	1.1	7t	0.0	6t	0.0
N=total time in seconds	n=4231		n=5631		n=6304		n=3135	

International news: r_s=.90, p<.01

Domestic News: r_s=.513, p>.05

Saudi News (Domestic and International): r_s=.17, p>.05

Omani News (Domestic and International): r_s=.11, p>.05

TABLE 4

Content Direction of Domestic and International News

	International				Domestic			
	Saudi		Oman		Saudi		Oman	
Content	Seconds	%	Seconds	%	Seconds	%	Seconds	%
Positive	2214	52	3051	54	2260	36	2676	85
Negative	1104	26	1239	22	373	6	65	2
Neutral	913	22	1341	24	3671	58	394	13
Total	4231	100	5631	100	6304	100	3135	100

Saudi: t=2.68, df=10533, p<.01

Oman : t=32.84, df=8764, p<.001

Content Analysis of TV News in Saudi Arabia and Oman

ABSTRACT

The study analyzed the volume, content direction, news placement, subject categories, and regional coverage of domestic and international news in Saudi and Omani TV newscasts. The comparative analysis sought to clarify the factors that influence TV news in neighboring countries with government-sponsored television.

There were strong similarities in international news coverage, as both countries emphasized politics and other Arab countries. Latin America and Eastern Europe received very little coverage. There were striking differences in domestic subjects, as Oman emphasized technology and social services, while Saudi TV stressed politics and religion.

Both countries placed domestic news early in the newscast, and the international news of both countries was more negative than domestic news. Saudi Arabia devoted a greater percentage of total time to domestic news--60% versus Oman's 40%. Saudi domestic news also was more neutral and factual.

The study's results suggested several factors as important influences: the size and economic strength of countries influence the proportions of domestic and international news; government sponsorship may influence placement and content direction of news, and it may also encourage social and cultural domestic news; the definition of newsworthy is different for domestic and international news; and common sources may be responsible for similarities in international news.

It was not clear what accounted for domestic content differences between Saudi and Omani TV, but differences in culture and stage of development might be important. Thus, the study concluded that one must consider a variety of factors in analyzing TV news content.

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MAGAZINES IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990:
CHANGING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

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A paper submitted to the Magazine Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, for review for presentation at the annual meeting in Minneapolis, August 1990.

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The authors would like to thank the School of Communication for its assistance in this project.

This paper is a part of a larger research study on journalism in Latin America.

Magazine Division

MAGAZINES IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990:
CHANGING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

Short Abstract

This paper summarizes recent developments for magazines in Latin America and the Caribbean in an environment of democratic reforms and growing press freedoms throughout the region. This paper discusses changing magazine journalism at the beginning of a new decade by describing (a) production and distribution, (b) legal and political environments, (c) language and editing complexities, (d) editorial manipulation by advertisers, (e) magazine pricing, (f) news and political commentary magazines, (g) national magazines, (h) women's magazines, *fotonovelas*, and comic books, and (i) leading Latin American magazine publishing companies.

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Magazine Division

MAGAZINES IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990:
CHANGING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

Long Abstract

This paper summarizes recent developments for major magazines in Latin America and the Caribbean in an environment of democratic reforms and growing press freedoms throughout the region. This paper discusses the changing world of Latin American and Caribbean magazine journalism at the beginning of a new decade by describing (a) production and distribution, (b) legal and political environments, (c) language and editing complexities, (d) editorial manipulation by advertisers, (f) magazine pricing, (g) news and political commentary magazines, (h) national magazines, (i) women's magazines, fotonovelas, and comic books, and (j) leading Latin American magazine publishing companies. The industry enters the 1990s with mixed concerns about its future. On one hand, sobering economic conditions looms large in the minds of publishers in a number of countries. And on the other hand, with changing political environments, the opportunities to publish magazines without government intervention in most of the region's countries are their best in years.

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MAGAZINES IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990: CHANGING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS

Latin American and the Caribbean nations witnessed a frenzy of free national elections as the 1980s drew to a close. Fifteen countries in the region held nation-wide elections during 1989 and eleven more countries scheduled or promised national elections for 1990. In Chile, long regarded as one of the region's last bastions of 1970s-style military dictatorships, Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin received 55 percent of the vote among three major candidates during a December 1989 election. He was sworn in during March the following year before 80,000 Chileans in a stadium which served as a torture and detention center during the rule of the former dictatorship.

These changes have great impact on the press, especially magazines and newspapers. New magazines are appearing. Opposition publications are reappearing. This paper discusses the changing world of Latin American and Caribbean magazine journalism at the beginning of a new decade by describing (a) production and distribution, (b) legal and political environments, (c) language and editing complexities, (d) editorial manipulation by advertisers, (e) magazine pricing, (f) news and political commentary magazines, (g) national magazines, (h) women's magazines, fotonovelas, and comic books, and (i) leading Latin American magazine publishing companies.

LATIN AMERICA'S MAGAZINES ENTERING THE 1990S

In every city in Latin America and the Caribbean, tiny kiosks dot the street corners. Hanging from the outside walls and inside shelves of these micro-businesses are dozens of Latin American and Caribbean magazines, newspapers, and books. This European-style sales system that is reminiscent of the news stalls of Paris or Madrid takes advantage of the fact that Latin American and Caribbean residents tend to go into the streets more often than do North Americans.

In addition, much of the region's sometimes unreliable mail service and higher per copy mail/private delivery costs also account for the success of kiosk sales (Hinds, 1980). While kiosks are the major sales points for Latin American and Caribbean magazines, readers also find their favorite magazines sold in large numbers in bookstores, card shops, drug stores, department stores, hotel lobby news stands, and grocery store check-out counters.

Mail-delivered magazines and newspapers, as well as home-delivered newspapers, are the exception rather than the rule in most of Latin America. For instance, Editorial America, one of the Latin America's major international magazine publishers, circulates its magazines only by newsstand sales in Latin America. The organization, which is headquartered in Miami, only offers mail subscription service in Puerto Rico and in the mainland United States Delivery time and frequent strikes are the major problems, says Cosmopolitan en Espanol magazine editor Sara Maria Castany (1990), who is based in Miami. Because magazine publishers cannot be certain when their latest issue will be delivered, subscriptions are not sold by many magazines. "It can take three days or three weeks. We just don't know. For instance, we get mail [in Miami] postmarked from Mexico two or three weeks earlier than when we received it. That's just not reliable for magazines by mail. Even if our magazines are mailed from within the country [where they are delivered], we still have problems," Castany (1990) explained.

There are more than 5,000 periodicals in Latin America and the Caribbean today. In the United States, by comparison, there are at least 9,000 magazines available to the public and as many as 22,000 total public and private (e.g., in-house) magazines, depending on how you count them (Garrison, 1989). Like magazine marketing in the United States, most Latin American magazines are highly specialized publications serving specific information needs and audiences. There are, of course, growing numbers of popular mass circulation magazines that are originally written, edited, and published and distributed urban centers. Among the top-selling magazines, Tables 1 and 2 list the leading transnational magazines and the total number of periodicals in selected Latin American nations.

* Buenos Aires' Siete Dias (110,000 circulation).

* Rio de Janeiro's Manchete Esportiva (210,000) and Fatos (115,000).

* Sao Paulo's Veja (793,000), Veja em Sao Paulo (210,000), and Visao (151,000).

* Mexico City's Almas (250,000), Contenido (163,000), Tu (150,000), TV y Novelas (610,000).

* Lima's Revista Gente (120,000).

* Caracas' Dominical (331,000).

PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Part of the reason for the complex form of production and distribution is related to high cost and complexity of distributing magazines in many nations. Despite the shared language and culture among nations in the region, transnational magazine producers and distributors must be sensitive to sometimes subtle differences among various nations and cultures in the region. The main areas of concern for producers and distributors of Latin American and Caribbean magazines are the legal and political environments, language complexities, editorial manipulation by advertisers, and individual issue pricing.

Legal and Political Environments

Laws affecting news and advertising content may force publishers into elaborate production planning for transnational magazines. Some transnational magazines must prepare different versions of some articles and advertisements to get past government reviewers--- sometimes called censors--- who can prevent distribution of an issue if its content violates laws regarding acceptable taste. If an article in a women's magazine discusses sexual behavior too explicitly, that month's edition may not be permitted to enter some countries. These reviewers check magazines as they are shipped into the country. Because these guidelines vary greatly from nation to nation, it is legally and logistically complicated to publish magazines from outside a country and to import them each week or month. More complicated matters include political differences in countries. Some highly conservative governments will not permit certain articles and advertising, forcing producers of international magazines to be sensitive to these potential problems. Brazil and Jamaica are generally more liberal, while nations such as Mexico and Peru are strongly influenced by the Catholic Church and are, therefore, more conservative (Castany, 1990).

For the Mexican edition of Cosmopolitan en Espanol, for instance, editor Sara Maria Castany (1989) must send facsimile copies of some articles to her company's representative in Mexico City for review prior to publication. The Editorial America representative in Mexico serves as a liaison and often helps Castany in advance to avoid costly judgment errors later, after the magazine is published.

In 1989 alone, Castany has had difficulty with subjects such as female sexuality. Articles that describe a sexual act or sexual organs in detail are often unacceptable and must be "softened" before publication. These national restrictions can be either legal or by custom. Some countries are quite conservative when the subject is sex, while others, such as Brazil and Jamaica, are more liberal in this regard. Because different standards exist from country to country, editors and publishers must keep up with current policies in each nation and they depend on their representatives in each country.

Language Complexities

The cultural tie that binds much of the southern hemisphere is language. But even the shared language is no guarentee against linguistic difficulties. Seemingly simple things, such as the names of foods, vary from country to country making food and dining feature articles difficult to select, write, edit, and produce. Articles of this type must be edited for the particular national edition of a given transnational magazine.

Editors of Latin American magazines directed toward several Latin American markets are often trained to find common language. Since there are some different Spanish phrases for subjects such as fashion or food that are unique to a specific country or region and others common to certain nations, editors must find the lowest common language denominator. For instance, the Cuban version of the Spanish word for "pig" is puerco, while Salvadorans and Nicaraguans call it choncho and the more general term for pork is serdo. Editors would use serdo because it is more commonly understood. This search for the lowest common denominator does not only pertain to phrases. Successful publishers and editors must also find the lowest common editorial denominators to produce transnational, or "pan American," editorials. Leading transnational magazines include Selecciones del Reader's Digest, TV y novelas, Business Week, Ideas para su hogar, Cogneta, Time, Geomundo, and Tu.

Editorial Manipulation by Advertisers

In addition to the need for different articles and versions of the same article to satisfy national laws and appease government reviewers/censors, advertisers also have to be appeased. Certain advertisers do not want to be associated with controversial political content, suggestive sexual content, and other potentially offensive editorial and advertising material (Castany, 1989). Two Cosmopolitan en Espanol advertisers from Mexico, one which sold bread and another which sold carpets, once pulled advertising because they were offended by a fashion photograph showing a popular Brazilian singer, Xuxa, in a skimpy bathing suit, cupping one of her bared breasts with her hand. Incidents such as this one do not happen often, but occur frequently enough to cause concern by editors and publishers (Castany, 1990).

As a result, advertisers make demands on publishers to edit or eliminate certain content planned for an issue. Editors and advertising managers, aware of these concerns through experience, become sensitive to potential lost revenue and at times will "negotiate" with a potentially troublesome advertiser before an article, photograph, or advertisement is published. With threats to withdraw their business, publishers, editors, and advertising managers are forced to listen.

Magazine Pricing

Often magazine prices are lower in Latin America than in North America. For instance, Vanidades Continental, the first international Spanish-language women's magazine sold for $2.95 in the U.S. and Puerto Rico in 1989, but only for $1.50 in Mexico and $1.75 in Colombia (U.S.) during the same period. The magazine is published in Miami. This is because publishers are charging what the market will bear. Recent poor economic conditions in Latin America, made difficult by inflation, makes pricing almost an art form. Publishers must regularly review cover prices and decide what a reader will pay for a copy of the magazine (Due, 1988).

As inflation takes more away from the consumer, and as the price of the magazine remains the same, fewer customers will be willing to purchase the magazine. Wise publishers will adjust their prices--- even downward--- when possible to keep circulation figures from declining. This boosts other revenue, in the form of advertising dollars, since advertising rates are determined by circulation. Much of the cover price problem is related to readers' personal incomes. As spendable income improves, sales improve. As income is stung by inflation, sales suffer. If incomes were higher in Latin America, magazines could be priced higher (Castany, 1989; Due, 1988).

Reliable periodical circulation figures for magazines are quite difficult to obtain from Latin America because there is inadequate independent auditing conducted in the region. At present, there is no central auditing house in Latin America for magazines. Some publications, however, use the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC), a U.S.-based company.

NEWS MAGAZINES

The most successful news magazines and commentary magazines are national in scope and are supported by national political parties or national advertising bases as well as news stand sales revenue. For the most part, Latin American news magazines are national publications. The focus is on national and local politics, foreign affairs, economic and finance news, business, industry, entertainment, and other regularly featured departments. Many news magazines imitate the successful formats of Time and Newsweek in the United States.

The two largest news magazines in Brazil are Veja, in Sao Paulo, and Manchete Esportiva, in Rio de Janeiro. Resumen, published each Monday in Caracas, Venezuela, is also one of the leading news magazines in Latin America. Influential at all levels of the nation, Resumen is widely read and quoted by politicians and journalists. One of the magazine's goals is to investigate government corruption. Founded in 1973, Resumen publishes about 65,000 copies a week (Alisky, 1983; Gill & Smith, 1989).

Resumen has been in fights with the government to defend its right to comment on public affairs. In a celebrated case in 1978-79, Resumen was partially confiscated after an issue reported charges of corruption in the government of the out-going president. The issue was published prior to the election and a libel suit was filed by the president against the publisher and the magazine. The attorney general impounded about 6,000 copies before the election, but another 100,000 copies had reached subscribers. The publisher and the magazine were eventually cleared of the libel charges (Alisky, 1981).

During the height of the Brazilian military dictatorship of Gen. Joao Baptista Figueiredo (1979-85), one political satire and humor magazine, Pasquim, developed an ingenious ploy for publishing criticisms of the military that got by the censors. Whenever the magazine meant to criticize the Brazilian dictatorship, it simply substituted the word "Greek" for "Brazilian." At the time, Greece also had a military government. Pasquim published numerous articles of gross human rights abuses by the Greek military government. It took government authorities a year to figure out that the magazine was publishing criticisms of the Brazilian government to a select segment of the audience who understood the ploy (Altschull, 1984).

Revista de Revistas is a Mexican weekly news magazine published by the prestigious Mexico City daily Excelsior. Its focus is pro-government with articles on government, public projects, business, and the urban life-style (Alisky, 1983). Another long-established general interest news magazine in Mexico is Hoy. A monthly, it was founded in 1937 in Mexico City (Gill & Smith, 1989).

Somos, founded in 1976 in Buenos Aires, is typical of many of the region's weekly news magazines today. Printed in Buenos Aires in full color by Editorial Atlantida, S.A., the magazine is sold in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Peru. Its graphic design and organization are similar to Newsweek, with numerous major stories, regular departments each week, and a multitude of short items and boxed sidebar articles. Its contents regularly cover world and national politics, world and national leaders, national entertainment such as television and film, the arts, society and social issues, international and national sports, big business, banking and finance, and even the media.

POLITICAL COMMENTARY MAGAZINES

Like many of Latin America's major daily newspapers, politically oriented magazines often represent decidely political views. Some publications are funded either in part or entirely by political parties. And like their U.S. counterparts--- William F. Buckley's conservative, pro-Republican National Review, for instance--- these magazines depend on commentaries and criticisms by seasoned journalists and political observers, interviews with prominent politicians and analysts, and discussions of the latest political news by the nation's intellectuals and philosophers. Most are supported by advertising. While the theme is politics, the focus of these magazines can be either public or private sector activities involving the economy, finance, business, social problems, graft and corruption, and other current events affecting the course of the nation.

One popular commentary magazine in Mexico is the weekly Proceso. Proceso represents the leading voices of Mexico's political left (Bussey, 1989). The magazine was founded in 1977 by publisher Julio Scherer Garcia, who was once publisher of the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior. Proceso follows the format of Time magazine, including some of its regular news departments. Its writers, including some who came with Scherer Garcia from Excelsior, include recognized experts in a wide range of fields who produce regular analyses and interpretations of recent domestic and foreign events and policies (Alisky, 1981; Alisky, 1983). Siempre is another popular weekly commentary magazine produced by the Popular Socialist Party (PPS). It has been known as a voice of the Marxist left and it is primarily read by PPS and Communist Party members (Alisky, 1983). Although Proceso and Siempre are associated with the political left, they have changed with the times as Communism and leftist politics changed throughout the world during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The magazines, once known for their lack of criticism and almost reverence toward Castro, have become more critical of Castro's policies and his rejectance of democratic change.

Analisis-Confirmado is another Latin American magazine that follows the Time format. Published in Argentina, Analisis-Confirmado was created in 1961 (Alisky, 1983).

Gente y la Actualidad, called Gente, is Argentina's leading news magazine with a circulation of about 250,000 copies (Windhausen, 1982). Humor, founded in 1978, focuses on political satire in its twice-a-month issues that are published in Buenos Aires. Gente and Humor are the best-selling political commentary magazines in Argentina.

Caretas, Opinion Libre, Marka, and Oiga are major publications in Peru. Caretas, a national weekly, was started in 1950 and concentrates content on the economy, social problems, and crime. Opinion Libre, Marka, and Oiga are frequently filled with political criticism, but representing various points of view. Opinion Libre represents conservative thinking, Marka and Oiga are leftist and liberal (Alisky, 1983; Gill & Smith, 1989).

Que Pasa?, Revista Hoy, and Mensaje in Chile served as "escape valves for political frustration" during the strict media control under Gen. Augusto Pinochet (1973-90) (Alisky, 1983). Published in Santiago, these magazines offer various perspectives on government policies, including those from foreign countries. Generally anti-government, these magazines provide politics and economics news and criticism. Que Pasa? (founded in 1971) and Revista Hoy (1977) are weeklies and Mensaje (1951) is published 10 times a year. All three publications average 50 to 60 pages per issue (Gill & Smith, 1989). Peru's Si, founded in 1986, is published weekly in Lima, offering criticism and news about politics, the economy, and the national leadership of the country. Si even includes cartoon strips as part of its package of commentary and criticism.

In Cuba, political commentary magazines, like all media, are under the auspices of the Communist Party. Over 100 periodicals are published by various departments of the national and regional governments. Cuba offers citizens comment and humor through the weekly Palante (Forward!). This publication usually centers its satire, criticism, and attacks on political opponents of Cuba--- such as the United States, Western Europe, and leading Cuban exiles in South Florida (Alisky, 1981).

Although Cuba's periodicals are each controlled by divisions of the national government, Cuba media scholar John S. Nichols (1982b) says that different views may be reported by the various divisions:

> "The sponsoring group has sole responsibility for the organization, editorial policy and operation of its publication, although party ideological planners and central government officials have coordinating powers and considerable influence on matters of policy" (Nichols, 1982b, p. 261).

As the Chilean government relaxed its censorship of the media during the late 1980s, many Chilean journalists, who for years lived in fear against retribution for what the government might regard as even mildly anti-government expressions, were unable to deal with the new openness. As Deputy Editor Fernando Paulson, of the aggressive magazine Analisis, said of his staff: "Imagine reporters who for years lived in terror that (Attorney General) Ambrosio

Rodriguez was going to have them jailed or beaten. Now we tell them 'You have to go interview him to get his response.' Many can't take it. They shout, 'You want me to go to that son of a bitch? No way!'" (Marsh, 1989b).

During this period of relaxation, the anti-Pinochet publications learned that simply being anti-Pinochet did not sell newspapers and magazines in the competitive marketplace. Paulson said his magazine must also be well written, entertaining, and visually appealing: "We've streamlined our copy. Articles have been shortened. We now do far more sports, personality stories, features. And our reporting standards are now much higher" (Marsh, 1989a).

Chile's Analisis: Testing the limits

Analisis is a small weekly magazine by international circulation standards (about 30,000 each Monday). It tested the limits of press freedom in Pinochet's Chile during the 1980s. The clash between the government and Analisis came to a head when writer Monica Gonzalez won the Louis M. Lyon Prize from the Nieman Foundation in the United States for her critical reporting of the regime (Noblet, 1989). She endured periodic arrests, two stints in prison, and daily death threats over a four-year period, 1984-88. As Chileans described it, she boldly took on the "holy trinity" --- Pinochet, his family, and the military (Noblet, 1989).

In late 1984, she wrote the first of a series of investigative articles alleging corruption by Pinochet and his family, noting brutal human rights abuse by the military. She served six days in prison before being released. Two of her key sources were found murdered a few months afterward. Gonzalez was jailed again for 22 days in 1987 after publishing an interview with an opposition leader who sharply criticized Pinochet.

In 1988, Juan Pablo Cardenas, Analisis's publisher, was convicted of defaming the president and offending the military. He served a sentence of 541 nights (he was released from prison during the day) in jail. He was arrested and convicted by a military tribunal in connection with a series of articles that appeared in Analsis that the government found offensive. Although Cardenas had the decision successfully overturned by another court, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the military tribunal (Anon., "In the Americas," The Miami Herald, May 27, 1988; Noblet, 1988; Anon., "Chile press limits," November 15, 1987).

In June 1988, a military court indicted Fernando Paulsen, editor of Analisis, and Ivan Badilla, one of the magazine's reporters, for slandering the navy. The article discussed the navy's purchase of eight helicopters, suggesting that the government overpaid for the equipment. Cardenas was also held in jail for five days without charges being filed (Anon., "In the Americas: Chile," The Miami Herald, June 4, 1988).

In late 1985, Analisis was shut down for four months by

Pinochet during a nationwide state of siege along with five other opposition publications. Analisis re-opened in January 1986. Perhaps the worst of the entire series of events involving Analisis was the murder of international section editor Jose "Pepe" Carrasco in September 1986. Carrasco, 46, a director of the journalists union, was found shot 13 times in Santiago after two armed men in civilian clothes forced their way into his house, grabbed him, and took him away. (Whitefield, 1986a; Whitefield, 1986b).

LEADING NATIONAL MAGAZINES

Mexico is the leading magazine publishing nation in Latin America. There are approximately two thousand periodicals published in Mexico, the vast majority privately owned and distributed. TV y novelas, Tu, and Almas are among the largest magazines in Mexico. TV y novelas is a television listings book; Tu is a beauty and fashion magazine; and Almas is a Catholic Church publication covering the church in Mexico and other countries of the region (Gill & Smith, 1989).

Panama and Honduras are also leading periodical publishing nations in Central America. Panama is home to about 140 periodicals. With liberalization of publishing after the departure of Gen. Manuel Noreiga in December 1989, the environment was good for additional growth. With the United States military and civilian presence after the December 1989 invasion and occupation and the on-going long-term involvement with the Canal Zone and large U.S. military bases, periodicals are commonly available in either Spanish or English. Panama's *Analisis*--- different from the publication in Chile--- is perhaps the best regarded, offering political commentary magazine (Pierce, 1982). Honduras produces about forty periodicals. Perhaps the most influential is *Revista Militar*, a magazine published by the army. American news magazines and other general publications are widely available in major Honduran cities (Nichols, 1982a).

Chile's dominant magazine is *Hoy*. Some would argue that its national political political influence rivals that of the prestigious conservative *El Mercurio*, the nation's leading daily newspaper. *Hoy* was founded in 1977 and has a circulation of about 32,000. In contrast to *El Mercurio*, *Hoy* was seen as an opposition publication during the rule of Gen. Augusto Pinochet (1973-90). Church-related publications are also important in Chile. The major Catholic Church publication is *Mensaje*, published 10 times a year.

In the Caribbean, most magazines are regularly imported from North America, South America, and Europe. Local periodical publishing is centered in the urban areas of Barbados, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica. A majority of Caribbean periodicals are special interest publications such as weekly television listings directories or monthly tourism magazines distributed at airports, hotels, restaurants, attractions, and other high-traffic centers. Puerto Rico's largest magazine is Vea TV Guide, but Bohemia and Avance are also popular (Kurian, 1982). Another large magazine in Puerto Rico is Caribbean Business, a regional published each Wednesday with circulation near 50,000 each week. This publication highlights business news and features. Trinidad and Tobago publish about two dozen periodicals, with the leading publications weeklies such as Sunday Punch and The Bomb. These publications are really part newspaper and part magazine, focusing on exposes, gossip, and scandals (Kurian, 1982).

The oldest national magazine in Cuba is the weekly Revista Bohemia, founded in 1908. It is also one of the largest circulation periodicals, with 311,000 copies printed per issue (Gill & Smith, 1989). Cuba's Verde Olivo is another national magazine, a weekly publication of the Revolutionary Armed Forces that has a circulation of about 100,000 (Lent, 1985).

Sports and sports magazines have always been popular in Cuba, even before the Revolution. Cuba's major sports magazines not report sports news, they also encourage Cubans to exercise for improved health. The major sports magazines are Semanario Deportivo LPV (Sport Weekly Listos Para Vencer) and El Deporte - Derecho del Pueblo (Sport - Right of the People) (Wagner, 1987).

BRAZIL'S EDITORA ABRIL AND BLOCH EDITORES

Brazil has the largest population and magazine readership in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sao Paulo's Editora Abril, S.A., and Rio de Janeiro's Bloch Editores, S.A., are the leading magazine publishers in Brazil and among the leaders in Latin America.

Editora Abril publishes about one hundred technical and professional magazines. It also produces one of South America's largest news magazines, Veja. The company also publishes 19 other magazines including Veja em Sao Paulo, a localized edition of 209,000 circulation. Editora Abril publishes eight different categories of magazines, including Placar, a weekly sports magazine; Exame, a business magazine; the Portugese edition of Playboy, the American men's magazine; Nova, the Portugese edition of Cosmopolitan; Elle, the fashion magazine; and O Pato Donald and Mickey, both bi-monthly comic books.

Veja, which averages 132 pages an issue, is Editora Abril's flagship publication. It is the largest weekly in Brazil (circulation 793,000) and one of the most popular news magazines in Latin America. Veja publishes current events articles and criticism on politics, business and industry, and the arts (Alisky, 1983; Gill & Smith, 1989).

Veja was founded in 1968 by Mino Carta, an Italian immigrant who came to Brazil after World War II, is one of Brazil's leading editors and publishers. Carta is patterned Veja in the style of Time and Newsweek that were so successful in the United States. The magazine gained popularity during the period of the military dictatorship that ran Brazil from 1964-85 after it reported a number of exposes about government torture and and corruption. After the Brazilian military decided to liberalize the dictatorship in 1977, another publication co-founded by Carta called Isto E, exposed stories about clandestine grave sites of Brazil's "disappeared" (Rocha, 1988).

Bloch Editores' best-known magazine is Manchete Esportiva, founded in 1952 as Manchete. It has a long-established reputation for its news content. Bloch Editores also publishes:

* Fatos, a general interest weekly magazine with circulation at 115,000 that was founded in 1961.

* Desfile, a monthly general interest magazine began in 1969.

* Amiga, a weekly women's interest magazine started in 1970.

ANAYA AND EDITORIAL AMERICA

The leading publisher of transnational magazines is the Spanish conglomerate, Anaya. Anaya, based in Madrid, Spain, is one of Spain's largest publishers. The corporation was founded in 1959 by German Sanchez-Ruiperez, Anaya's president. In 1989, Anaya purchased Editorial America from the Venezuelan-based Bloque de Armas Publishing Group. As a result, Anaya now controls 40 different book and magazine publishing companies.

Anaya's subsidiary, Editorial America S.A., is headquartered in Miami and employs 1,900 persons--- 300 in Miami alone. Major distribution centers for its magazines are located in Guayaquil, Panama City, Lima, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Bogota, and Santiago. The combined circulation of Editorial America's magazines is over 100 million copies and each year (America Publishing Group, 1989). Editorial America also has offices in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela. Editorial America was founded in 1961 in New York by Cuban exiles (Hereter, 1989).

Miami is an ideal base for Editorial America. Geographically close to Latin America, Editorial America takes advantage of extensive international flight schedules for its South and Central American distribution. Furthermore, the influences of the Spanish culture on Miami make the area appealing for employees. Editorial America sales were about $67 million in 1988 (American Publishing Group, 1989; Hereter, 1989). Under its new ownership, Editorial America is also known as the America Publishing Group. Gustavo Gonzales-Lewis is president of America Publishing Group, following 25 years with Selecciones del Reader's Digest.

Editorial America publishes a group of seven women's magazines: Vanidades Continental (established in 1961), Cosmopolitan en Espanol (1973), Buenhogar (1967), Tu (1981), Harper's Bazaar en Espanol (1980), Ideas para su hogar (1978), and TV y novelas (1982). The firm's group of men's magazines includes Hombre de Mundo (1976), Geomundo (1977), and Mecanica Popular (1947).

The company also publishes Coqueta (for teens, 1978), De todo un poco (general-family, 1988), Padres e Hijos (general-family, 1980), Muy Interesante (science, 1984), Ritmo (music, 1982), PC Magazine en Espanol (computers), PC Week en Espanol (computers), and Almanaque Mundial (world almanac, 1955). In addition to these magazines and almanac, Editorial America produces numerous special publications such as once-a-year editions, dictionaries, cookbooks, romance novels, and comic books.

Distribution magazines are distributed throughout Spanish-speaking Latin America, but mainly in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Puerto Rico. Table 3 shows how the monthly Cosmopolitan en Espanol single copy and subscription sales are distributed throughout Latin America. Editorial America produces a total of 40 magazines that are read in 23 countries. Its Spanish-language magazines reach all Latin American countries except Portugese-speaking Brazil.

WOMEN'S MAGAZINES

One of the largest categories of Latin American magazine publishing is women's magazines. Sold at news stands and in groceries, these publications focus on family life, fashion, careers, consumer goods, entertainment and the arts, television soap operas (telenovelas), love and romance, food, and serialized fiction.

Cosmopolitan is one of the largest selling women's magazines in Latin America. Sold in a number of different countries and two languages, the magazine follows the model of the English-language version published in New York. *Cosmopolitan en Espanol* circulates about 300,000 copies a month throughout Latin America and the United States. *Nova*, *Cosmopolitan* in Portugese, is published by Editora Abril in Sao Paulo, Brazil. It was founded in 1973.

Cosmopolitan en Espanol takes a slightly different philosophical approach to its New York counter-part. It attempts to be a "how-to" guidebook for women joining the work force instead of the sexual revolution leader that is edited by Helen Gurley Brown in the United States. The Spanish edition is edited, however, for young, modern, self-oriented women. Readers focus attention on relationships with men, fashion, travel, entertainment, and career advancement (Castany, 1989; Due, 1988; Gill & Smith, 1989).

Amiga, a weekly, is one of Brazil's most popular women's magazines. *Vogue Brazil* is also widely read. *Perfil* is popular among women in Costa Rica. In Mexico and Venezuela, women frequently read *Kena* and *Tu*. *Paginas* is also popular in Venezuela. Cuba's major women's magazine is *Mujeres*, the monthly organ of the Cuban Women's Federation. Founded in Havana in 1961, it averages 66 pages per issue with a circulation of about 273,000. *Muchachas* is a Cuban magazine devoted to young women started in 1980 (Lent, 1985; Gill & Smith, 1989).

Give their overt focus on the roles of women and men in Latin American cultures, it is not surprising that popular women's magazines in Latin America have been criticized by scholars from Latin America's dependency school as well as feminists. Santa Cruz (1988) analyzed 27 popular "women's magazines" in five large Latin American nations (Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela) and argued that the magazines promote a "transnational feminine model" of women and promote consumption of consumer goods. She saw women's magazines as a means by which foreign cultures penetrate Latin American culture. Santa Cruz added that a particular danger of cultural intrusion of the womens' magazines was to be found in the advertising. The majority advertisements originated from foreign advertisers. She claimed that the advertising promoted foreign values and portrayed stereotyped views of women.

FOTONOVELAS AND COMIC BOOKS

Fotonovelas, live-action comic-type strip publications, are especially popular among semi-literate, lower-class women in Latin America. These publications are really multi-media oriented, capitalizing on the success of *telenovelas*, Latin American-style soap operas on television (Flora, 1980). *Fotonovelas* enjoy wide popularity, and are not viewed as a children's medium. Many copies are exported from Colombia, a major center for the publication of *fotonovelas*, to Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, and Central America (Pierce, 1982).

Fotonovelas have been analyzed by popular culture and feminism scholars (Volsky, 1989; Flora, 1980; Carty, 1989; Michaels, 1987; Carillo & Lyson, 1983) because of the important gender, class, and socio-political roles they play in Latin America. One recent study concluded that the leading Mexican fotonovela industry is growing less responsible to its readers' social and cultural needs as it as it expands into a multinational industry. Small Colombian producers, by contrast, who work closely with their writers, may be more aware of the socio-cultural role played by fotonovelas in Latin American societies (Flora, 1980).

Since the impact of fotonovelas on the lower classes is well known, they have been used in campaigns to promote important social functions, as well as entertainment. A newly established Mexican fotonovela called Esporadica (Sporadic), established by two female editors, uses the medium to espouse feminist ideology (Carty, 1989).

Telenovelas and their radio counterpart, the radionovelas, are closely followed. A number of magazines keep readers up to date with the latest telenovelas and radionovelas. Story lines typically follow the Romeo and Juliet story line. A rich person falls in love with a poor person and the families of the couple fight against the love affair (Volsky, 1989). With great emotional content, these programs offer escapism for viewers. When one of the famed TV Globo telenovelas in Brazil comes to a climax, streets, stores, movie theaters, and offices empty out (Michaels, 1987). "Brazilians are so gripped by the novela, or nightly soap opera, that the death of a major character is reported on the front page of the country's largest daily, the Folha de Sao Paulo, as if it were real news" (Michaels, 1987, p.

66).

Going hand-in-glove with telenovelas are highly successful and popular publications about the programs. Publishers are selling millions of magazines, such as TV y novelas, which focus on novelas' characters, their relationships, the plot summaries from previously broadcast programs, feature articles on the actors and actresses, and expected new programs.

The biweekly TV y novelas circulates in Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, and the United States. The magazine is published in separate national editions reflecting television and motion pictures available in the country. Its success is built on articles and photographs about television programs and the actors and actresses of the programs. Also important to the magazine's readers is the film industry, with photographs about new movies and their stars are common.

TV y novelas does not provide television listings such as found in TV Guide in the United States. TV y novelas' editors have chosen to focus the majority of content on features, photographs, and other articles rather than listings that are commonly available in newspapers and elsewhere. While its circulation is about 120,000 in the U.S., TV y novelas sells about 1.1 million in Mexico and Peru (Castany, 1989; Due, 1988; Gill & Smith, 1989).

Comic books are also extremely popular periodicals in Latin America and the Caribbean. Hinds and Tatum (1984) estimate that as many as 70 million copies of comics are published each month in Mexico alone. Romance comic books are on top of the list. For decades, Lagrimas, risas y amor, has been the leading romance comic book. Lagrimas, risas y amor sells as many as 1.5 million copies a week (Tatum, 1980).

Mafalda is one of the most popular comic strips in Latin America. Named after a little girl, the strip is well known to Argentine readers. The strip was created by Joaquin Salvador Lavado, who is known as Quino. It depicts working-class daily life in Argentina and provides commentary on the "national foibles and pretensions (Foster, 1980, p. 497). Mafalda has been reprinted in at least ten different books and collections (Foster, 1980; Lindstrom, 1980). In Brazil, Editora Abril's Mickey and Pata Donald each circulate in excess of 100,000 copies every other week. Both publications began in the early 1950s (Gill & Smith, 1989).

CONCLUSIONS

The magazine industry in Latin America remains plagued by several regional conditions out of its control. First, the industry is hampered by economic conditions which affect circulation sales and distribution as well as advertising sales. Unsteady, and sometimes wild, "hyperinflation" produces unpredictable advertising sales and demand on the part of the consumer.

Second, improved press-government relations throughout the 1980s promisesto continue during the 1990s. Battles with anti-press governments seem to be ebbing as democracies replace military dictatorships throughout the region. Yet influences of social institutions such as the church have led to unyielding conservatism in terms of content for some magazines.

Third, unreliable government services such as postal systems continue to be major hurdles for distribution of magazines in the region. Subscriptions are still rare and quite expensive for dependable, timely delivery.

Fourth, transnational magazines seem to be flourishing in the region. Their popularity is due, in part at least, to large publishing concerns with the resources to print and distribute their products in several countries.

Thus, the industry enters the 1990s with mixed sentiments about the future. On the one hand, sobering economic conditions that could bring bankruptcy looms large in the minds of publishers in a number of countries. On the other, with changing political environments, the opportunities to publish magazines without government intervention in most of the region's countries are their best in years.

TABLE 1

LATIN AMERICA'S LEADING TRANSNATIONAL MAGAZINES

Magazine Name	Content	Publication Frequency	1988 Circulation
Buenhogar	Women	Monthly	205,938
BusinessWeek	Business	Fortnight	820,000
Coqueta	Teen girls	Monthly	297,000
Cosmopolitan en Espanol	Women	Monthly	300,000
Electronics	Electronics	Alt. wks.	95,277
Engineering News-Record	Engineering	---	102,000
Geomundo	Geography	Monthly	184,840
Harper's Bazaar en Espanol	Women	Monthly	101,652
Ideas para su hogar	Home	Monthly	250,000
Mecanica Popular	Men, science	Monthly	184,567
Playboy	Men	Monthly	283,700
Popular Photography	Photography	Monthly	675,000
Ring en Espanol	Boxing	Monthly	125,000
Rotarian	Rotary Club	Monthly	502,000
Scientific American International	Science	Monthly	112,780
Selecciones	Reader's Digest	Monthly	---
Time	News	Weekly	125,000
Time Euroexecutive	News	Fortnight	85,000
Tu	Young women	Monthly	325,000
TV y novelas	TV		1.1 million
Vanidades Continental	Women	Monthly	---

Sources: Anon., Willings Press Guide 1989 (115th Ed.), British Media Publications, West Sussex, England; Tananarive Due, "Hispanic magazines growing," The Miami Herald, September 29, 1988 (Neighbors Northwest Ed.), pp. 15-16; William Montalbano, The Miami Herald, May 22, 1987, "New newspaper tests the limits of Chile regime," p. 21D; Sara Maria Castany, personal interview, December 27, 1989.

TABLE 2

PERIODICALS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	Number of periodicals
Antigua	3
Argentina	1360
Barbados	130
Belize	5
Bolivia	18
Brazil	N.A.*
Colombia	300
Chile	N.A.*
Cuba	100
Dominican Republic	17
Ecuador	284
Honduras	40
Jamaica	5
Mexico	1964
Panama	143
Paraguay	20
Peru	595
Puerto Rico	14
Trinidad and Tobago	24
Uruguay	335
Venezuela	147

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* Not available at present. Authors hope to update before presentation of this paper.

Source: George T. Kurian (1982). (Ed.), World Press Encyclopedia, Vols. 1 and 2, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

TABLE 3
CIRCULATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF COSMOPOLITAN EN ESPANOL

Country of Distribution	Circulation on December 31, 1986
Bolivia	2,702
Colombia	32,616
Costa Rica	864
Dominican Republic	1,634
Ecuador	8,532
El Salvador	537
Guatemala	1,080
Honduras	922
Mexico	97,844
Panama	3,483
Peru	16,274
Puerto Rico	12,045
United States	31,595
Venezuela	31,709
Total	241,837

Source: Editorial America, S.A., Virginia Gardens, Florida, December 31, 1986.

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Culture or Commerce: The European Community and "Television without Frontiers"

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Paper presented August 9, 1990
AEJMC Annual Convention
International Communication Division

CULTURE OR COMMERCE: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND "TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS"

European television may soon be revolutionized. The number of available channels is expected to skyrocket during the 1990s, creating a need for thousands of hours of programming. Satellites, cable transmission, and deregulation are driving the change, fueled by an even greater transformation in Europe which is on the horizon for 1992. That is the year when the 12 nations of the European Community (EC) will drop their trade barriers to form a unified economic force. Internal borders dividing nations will dissolve, opening up a market of 320 million people with a common currency and the potential to compete with the United States and Japan.

To address this surge of expansion in the broadcasting arena, the EC recently enacted a formal directive to regulate its television industry. The ruling includes a limitation on program imports, requiring a majority of transmission time in EC member countries be reserved for European works. This action was guided, say EC officials, by cultural as well as economic considerations. The United States, however, views the restriction as purely economic, accusing the EC of erecting a trade barrier to protect Europe's television industry. To defend its own trade interests in television program exports, the United States is threatening retaliatory action against the EC. The true battle, however, extends beyond trade, as an examination of the cultural and economic issues of the EC directive reveals.

Cultural Considerations of the EC Television Directive

The EC regulation which specifies the conditions for television broadcasting within the Community is commonly regarded as "Television Without Frontiers." This official directive of the Council of the European Communities was adopted on October 3, 1989, after years of debate among EC member countries on minimal standards for television programming and advertising. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this directive pertains to the proportion of European programming it requires.

> Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext services. (No. L 298/26)

By requiring a majority of European works, the Community argues it is protecting its cultural sovereignty, to develop a union among EC countries which will foster a European identity (Commission of the European Communities, 1984).

A green paper, Television Without Frontiers, served as a working document in developing the EC directive, reviewing in detail the cultural and social aspects of television in the Community. The document maintains that as television plays a role in conveying information about social, cultural, and political events among member countries, it may thus be considered a source of cultural enrichment. "Television will play an important part in developing and nurturing awareness of the rich variety of Europe's common cultural and historical heritage" (p. 28). European integration is a common theme throughout the text, and the importance of offsetting dominant U.S. programming is emphasized.

> ...most of the films shown come from one single non-member country--the U.S.A. As a result there is already a certain uniformity in the range of films screened on television in the Community. Programmes such as "Dallas" are carried by almost every television channel in the Member States. The creation of a common market for television production is thus one essential step if the dominance of the big American media corporations is to be counterbalanced. (p. 33)

A War Against Media Imperialism?

EC officials see the U.S. dominance of television programming in Europe as "'cultural imperialism' that should be violently resisted by the newly confident, united Europe" (Revzin, 1989, p. B3). Jean-Michel Gaillard, the head of France's Antenne 2 state-owned TV network, says, "We can't any longer be invaded by programs from abroad, which threaten to submerge us" (Revzin, 1989, p. B3).

These sentiments echo arguments against media imperialism made by communications scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to Herbert Schiller (1969):

> Mass communications are now a pillar of the emergent imperial society. Messages "made in America" radiate across the globe and serve as the ganglia of national power and expansionism. The ideological images of "have-not" states are increasingly in the custody of American informational media. (pp. 147-148)

While Schiller primarily criticizes American exports to underdeveloped countries, his arguments need not be restricted to the Third World. Henry Comer (1967, in Schiller, 1969) comments on American television and its influence on Canada.

> ...by the process of osmosis America is destroying not only our television, but our values and our very culture...American television has made the development of a Canadian cultural identity almost impossible" (pp. 50-51).

This concern has been prevalent in Canadian broadcasting for many years, and has been addressed through policy statements and regulations. In 1983, the Canadian Radio and Television Commission affirmed a commitment to Canadian content.

> Canadian television programming must attract, engage and entertain. It must also inform, educate and enrich our cultural experience. For if Canadians do not use what is one of the world's most extensive and sophisticated communications systems to speak to themselves--if it serves only for the importation of foreign programs--there is a real and legitimate concern that the country will ultimately lose the means of expressing its identity. Developing a strong Canadian program production capability is no longer a matter of desirability but of necessity. (CRTC Policy Statement, in Hagelin and Janisch, 1984, p. 60)

Later in the 1980s, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement was enacted, which included an exemption for cultural industries. In other words, Canada protected its right to regulate trade on cultural products, such as film, recording tape, and records (Free Trade Agreement, 1988).

Another example of measures taken to protect against media imperialism may be found in Japanese broadcast law, which stipulates that "efforts shall be made to preserve outstanding cultural assets of the past" (Adam, 1966, p. 943). Even the Soviet Union has seen Hollywood imports in cultural terms, devoting substantial economic resources to maintaining a major domestic film industry (Tunstall, 1977).

Quoted in an EC press release, Commission President Jacques Delors offers commentary on cultural issues and the television directive, "I must say to the United States, we have the right to exist and to maintain our traditions. There is no one European culture, but several. Each country should be able to defend its own" (1989, No. 33/89, p. 2).

In addition to safeguarding European cultural tradition, EC officials are counting on the television directive to create greater dependency of Europe's audiovisual industry. In building its own industry, the EC may itself fill increasing programming demands and grow to vigorously compete with U.S. and other foreign programming.

Economic Considerations of the EC Television Directive

Europe's View

With the advent of satellite transmission and an increased number of frequencies available for broadcasting, the EC predicts that by 1992, there may be up to 200 television channels available in Europe. EC officials estimate an increase in programming needs from 250,000 hours in 1987 to 400,000 hours in the 1990s (Farnsworth, 1989). While this presents opportunity it also could pose a danger if the EC audiovisual industry is unable to meet that increasing demand. Competition from the United States, Brazil, and Japan could well fill the programming gap (Commission of the European Communities, 1988).

The United States now sells programming to European television stations at a price European producers can't compete with. In fact, rights to an hour-long U.S. show can generally be bought for less than one-tenth the cost of the same length

European production (Greenhouse, 1989). This gives the Americans an unfair advantage, according to a British producer interviewed on U.S. National Public Radio's "Morning Edition."

> I'm not in favor of pushing the Americans out. I think if the Americans are better they deserve the market and they're entitled to it. What I'm saying is, that all American product can pay for itself in the United States broadly. And therefore, it can be sold here at a price which is cruelly competitive to European work. So, unless we tackle that problem--unless we reinterest people in Europe, in European product, we won't solve that problem. (Terry, 1989)

One approach to becoming competitive calls for government subsidies to European audiovisual producers and a plan for training personnel for the film and television industry. French President Francois Mitterrand has pledged $150 million in French aid for 1990, while EC Commission President Jacques Delors has committed $275 million over the next five years (Revzin, 1989). While Europeans hope the plan will make them competitive with Hollywood, the United States fears the competition may become too stiff.

The U.S. View

U.S. television executives argue that they depend on programming exports to Europe to defray their production costs. While a half-hour episode of a situation comedy often costs about $450,000 to make, networks might only pay $350,000 for the rights, leaving a $100,000 deficit. Exports can bring in the additional revenues needed to cover those production costs and turn a profit. The price British stations will pay for an hour-long episode of an American series runs between $15,000 and $50,000. Thus, selling a 26-episode series could garner more than $500,000 a year in additional revenues (Greenhouse, 1989).

The EC directive, which calls for a majority of European programming, could reduce U.S. exports to Europe by 40 to 60 percent, resulting in lost revenues of at least $300 million per year (Kaplan, 1989). In 1988, the United States sold $1.8 billion of television shows and movies to the EC (Revzin, 1989). During the same year, the Motion Picture Association of America alone exported $630 million of television programs to EC countries, more than six times the amount sold in 1980 (Nelson and Truell, 1989).

With such high income at stake, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills finds the quota clause an unfair trade practice, and has threatened to take action against the EC. In a letter to the European Parliament, Hills writes, "This directive sends a message to Americans that the EC 1992 initiative is indeed being used to construct a Fortress Europe" (Dawkins, 1989, p. 2G). Unless quotas are abandoned, the letter continues, Hills threatens to sue the EC under the intellectual property provisions of the 1988 US Trade Act, and to demand compensation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In an appearance before the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, Hills voiced strong opposition to the quotas, and criticized them as "...censorship of fine programs that are developed in this country..." (Hearing of the House Ways and Means Committee, 1989). During the same hearing, Committee Chairman Sam Gibbons raised concerns that if the United States does not object to the EC television Directive, the Europeans will analogize "Television Without Frontiers" to "everything else."

> ...I worry about the whole principle of freedom. We're talking about free trade, the free flow of products. And certainly you can't have a free flow of products if you're going to have control of intellectual material that flows across the borders into the public.

Gibbons brought the issue before the U.S. House of Representatives with a resolution stating that the EC Directive violates GATT trade rules, and would damage the U.S. broadcasting and film industries. In a discussion of the EC directive, U.S. House members overwhelmingly denounced the initiative. Congressman Robert Lagomarsino told the House that the directive reeks of protectionism and discriminatory trade practices. "While the European Community ambassadors claimed this was an issue of 'cultural sovereignty,' all the facts indicate it is an economically motivated protectionist measure" (Congressional Record - House, October 23, 1989, H7328).

Congressman Samuel Gejdenson elaborated:

> I am somewhat amazed that the Europeans feel that American television might affect the European culture. However, Italians watching British television would not affect the Italian culture. What we see are the walls beginning to close the European market. That advantage will then be used to compete and to beat America in other markets around the world, in Africa, in Asia, and in Central America. (Congressional Record - House, October 23, 1989, H7328-29)

Congressman Bill Richardson threatened to take retaliatory action against the EC:

> As a result of this blatantly anti-U.S. action I am preparing legislation which would bar public television stations from purchasing television programming from any

> foreign country which limits U.S.-made programming. Any support from taxpayer supported institutions in furthering the European entertainment industry is unacceptable as long as the European Community broadcast initiative is in effect. (Congressional Record, October 23, 1989, H7326).

In a vote of 342-0 with 90 not voting, the U.S. House approved a resolution to denounce the EC directive and urge President Bush and the U.S. Trade Representative to take every action feasible to maintain U.S. access to the EC broadcasting market (Congressional Record, October 23, 1989). In addition, the United States has formally demanded discussion within GATT on the EC content restrictions (U.S. charges..., 1989).

On the surface, the economic and cultural issues surrounding "Television Without Frontiers" may appear fairly straightforward: 1) Europe is responding to increased programming needs and a concern for its cultural integrity with a plan to limit foreign programming while boosting its own production industry. 2) The United States is critical of Europe's plan because it threatens the American television and film industry. However, much deeper issues lie in the adoption of the EC television directive, which deserve careful review and consideration.

Competition and the Demise of Public Service Television

Broadcasting in Europe developed largely under a public service ideal; to enlighten people by bringing high culture and serious information to the masses (Lund, 1988). Over the years, many European broadcasting systems have operated with little or no commercial support. But with the new media coming of age in Europe, the traditional systems may be challenged. The growing number of channels expected to come available in European television will generally be commercial ventures. Can European public service television survive increasing commercialization and the ensuing competition?

Since its birth after World War II, television broadcasting in Europe has grappled with the pressures of commercialization in various ways. From the establishment of commercial stations, such as ITV in Britain, to the acceptance of advertising on public service channels, European broadcasting has responded to the influence of the market model. The pressure continues to build with competition from increasing numbers of commercial stations. Between 1983 and 1986, 21 private and three public service channels were added in Western Europe. The total number of stations during that time nearly doubled to reach 61, with programming jumping from 110,000 hours in 1983 to 234,000 hours in 1986 (Schrape, 1987, in Sepstrup, 1989).

Public and commercial broadcasting companies differ in a number of ways. A major aim of public broadcasting companies over the years has been to provide high quality programming to viewers. In contrast, commercial stations strive to give people what they want in the hopes of gaining high audience ratings. Instead of taking a chance airing a cultural program which may appeal only to an elite audience, commercial stations prefer to offer a program menu that will appeal to the greatest numbers of viewers. More viewers mean higher ratings. And the higher the ratings the higher the fee that may be charged to advertisers.

Public service channels generally do not rely on advertising to support their operations and are funded in other ways. License fees, taxes on receiving sets, and government subsidies are the most common means of support.

In the past there have been relatively few commercial channels to compete with public service channels in Europe. However, with growing numbers of commercial stations and a variety of programming from which to select, viewers may opt to turn their dials away from the public channels. In turn, their willingness to support the public stations with license fees or taxes may diminish as they shift their preferences to commercial programming. The future of European broadcasting may hinge on whether politicians view a diverse public service supply as valued and necessary, even if fewer people are watching. If their response to diminished viewing is reduced license fees, the monetary base to support attractive programs would be reduced. This, in turn may result in fewer viewers, which would then lead to even less willingness to support the license fee (Sepstrup, 1989).

Another scenario which may appear if viewership of public service programming declines is a programming shift on the public channels. They may begin competing for viewers by offering less diversity, dropping costly in-house productions, and including more shows which appeal to the lowest common denominator (Varis, 1985). Competition among private and public stations impels them to feature programs which are acceptable to most people rather than those which are appealing to certain individuals or groups, meaning they avoid challenging the cultural and political mainstream (Sepstrup, 1989). Public broadcasters competing with commercial stations feel compelled to offer more foreign productions (largely U.S. shows) with greater audience rating potential (Euromedia Research Group, 1986).

In addition to competition from general commercial channels, new technology has introduced thematic channels which target their programs to specific audience groups. Some examples of these specialized channels include The Children's Channel, CNN (news), Lifestyle (targeted to housewives with children), Arts Channel, and movie channels (i.e. Tele-Club and Premiere). By reaching out to the entire European Community through satellite and cable transmission, these thematic channels will find that even small segments of the national markets are large enough to support their existence. Taken as a whole, the thematic channels offer a direct threat to the national public service broadcasters (Lund, 1988).

An example may be found in the impact of Sky Channel on the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK). Audience surveys show that among ten- to fifteen-year-olds who have access to satellite programming, Sky gets the upper hand. As a result, NRK's Children and Youth Department is now demanding more programming time to compete with Sky (Lund, 1988). Sissel Lund, a researcher in the Media Research Department of NRK, predicts a downward spiral effect of departments competing with thematic channels.

> Having lost audience shares the department will soon be 'expelled' from the best transmission time, with the result that the ratings will fall even lower. The best programme-makers will then start looking for better jobs, with further consequences for programme quality, the budgets will be cut, and so forth--until the department is no longer able to justify its existence. (1988, pp. 349-350)

By challenging the various programming departments one after another, the different thematic channels pose a direct threat to the public service broadcasting system as a whole.

On the other hand, commercialization may lead to homogenization of program content. The philosophy of public service broadcasting which is still alive in many European countries focuses on the accessibility of pluralistic information. It traditionally regards programming as a cultural service and not a commercial product. Yet, as pointed out earlier, commercial broadcasters tend to prefer programs with mass appeal. Productions focusing on local or regional issues, or those dealing with minorities, may be difficult to market. Programs featuring actors with distinct regional accents and speech idioms may be rejected as too culture-specific or difficult to translate.

A preference for entertainment programming leads to homogenization of program content. Some of the recipes for success include dropping controversial issues and omitting cultural differentiation, which may result in programs that bear little resemblance to reality. Given this programming fare is provided to and consumed by the majority of the people, it will be difficult to preserve their specific traditions, moral concepts, or social self-awareness (Hoffmann-Riem, 1987).

Commercialization of European media may be accelerated, some fear, if the EC does not control U.S. programming imports. By requiring a majority of European programming, they believe, the fabric of public television may remain intact in the wake of growing commercialization. However, controlling U.S. programming offers no guarantee the EC will not adopt commercial systems on it own.

Satellites and Cable: A Revolution in European Television

Satellite broadcasting and cable television in the EC constitute a major force behind the EC directive "Television Without Frontiers." Within this scope, four key elements relate to the development and implementation of a successful transnational television industry: 1) technology; 2) market; 3) programming; and 4) politics and regulations (Koltai, 1987).

1) Technology

Satellite broadcasting often functions in concert with cable television. A transmitting station beams signals to a satellite, which in turn relays them to receiving dishes, either directly to the home, or more often, to cable companies which then distribute the programs via their cable networks. For compatible systems throughout Europe, the EC is working toward harmonizing the technical standards for television transmission and reception by adopting the MAC-packet standards. These signals will offer improved vision and sound as well as up to four sound channels which will allow viewers to receive multilingual programs in the language of their choice (Commission of the European Communities, 1988).

Company reports of Booz Allen and Hamilton (Lohr, 1989) predict technology will result in increased channels in West Germany, France, and Britain. Presently in Britain only 300,000 households have cable television, and there are two private and two public conventional television channels. For the future, the government has proposed two additional channels. Sky Television will add two channels in 1989, and British Satellite Broadcasting, a consortium of British, French, and Australian companies, will establish a European network thorough a new satellite. In Germany, several new channels including a pay television service are expected to be added to the three public and private channels now in operation. Cable is predicted to reach half of homes, and a government-financed satellite is expected to carry German-language programming. In France, two public and four national commercial stations are expected to be augmented by a government satellite which will offer French-language programs. A second public satellite is scheduled for 1990. In addition, private satellite ventures such as the Astra satellite are contributing to new broadcast possibilities with 16 channels (Nelson and Truell, 1989).

While these reports predict rapid technological growth, others offer less optimistic forecasts. In 1987, 10.2 million or 13 percent of the total households in eight EC countries were wired for cable. At the time, Belgium had the heaviest penetration at 83 percent, with France and the UK the lightest, both at less than one percent (Cable and Satellite Europe, 1987, in Tracy, 1987). In Britain, cable appears destined to have a very slow growth, and if the UK does eventually move onto cable (and/or satellite) it may take well past the year 2000 for it to happen (Tunstall, 1987).

While satellite broadcasting and cable television are available, their implementation to date has not been rapidly widespread. Plans for growth are in place, however their success rests on more than the implementation of hardware.

2) Market

The demand in the EC for new broadcasting services, and the prices viewers are willing to pay for the services, will likely have an impact on the technology's success. Michael Tracy, head of a British independent research firm Broadcasting Research Unit, argues that "...there is no comprehensive, empirically and conceptually adequate model of the TV markets of the future" (1987, p. 78). Instead, we must make judgments as to the success of satellite and cable services based on "scattered clues." Some of the indicators can be found in audience research data, which show that satellite-delivered programs compete very successfully against national broadcasters in homes where they can be received. For example, in Germany, Sat 1 and RTL Plus are on a par with ZDF; Sky Channel does particularly well in Scandinavia, and is the third most widely viewed television in the Netherlands. The Children's Channel seems to do better than

BBC's Breakfast TV and ITV's TV AM combined (Sturgess, 1985, in Tracy, 1987).

While appearing successful, satellite programming has not necessarily been profitable. In seven years of operation, Rupert Murdoch's Sky Channel, which reaches nearly 7.5 million viewers in 18 European countries has yet to turn a profit (Koltai, 1987). Filmnet, the Swedish-owned film channel, lost 8 million pounds in nine months (Tracy, 1987). According to media communications analyst CIT Research, the BBC and other public service broadcasters, not satellite television, will be the key providers of television programs up to the end of the century. CIT also believes that industry revenues will be controlled by existing broadcasters, and that the outlook is bleak for pay television channels (Snoddy, 1989).

In Britain, the cost of basic cable service including five additional entertainment channels runs about $12.60 per month (Tunstall, 1987). In Ireland, viewers' unwillingness to pay for new cable services has become a problem for the cable companies. After upgrading its relay system, Dublin Cablelink introduced new channels as a nine-month marketing experiment to test public reaction. Super-Channel and Sky Channel were included in the new offerings, however these stations provided programming already seen on Ireland's public service station RTE, or Britain's BBC or ITV. The School of Communications, NIHE, conducted a survey in 1987 of cabled households in the Dublin area. The study revealed that less than 15 percent of cable subscribers were willing to pay anything for the new services. The survey also indicated that over half of the subscribers reported they never watched either Sky or Super-Channel, and almost half thought the range of programs on Sky, in particular, poor (Bell and Meehan, 1989).

While research results indicate it may be unpopular in Ireland, Sky Channel enjoys a large audience in Holland. In fact, Holland is the largest national market for the whole Sky Channel operation. There is general agreement, however, that there is not room for more than two such channels in Holland, indicating that the future long-term competitive prospects in satellite television there may not be promising (McQuail, 1987). Along these same lines, a study by the American National Cable Television Association asserted that "...a large portion of consumer demand for cable program services can probably be met by a four or five channel service" (Saeman, 1983, p. 49, in DeGrooff, 1987).

Despite energetic plans for a revolution in European television, lessons may be learned from recent experiences in satellite and cable services. Pricing, program offerings, and consumers' preferences should be considered when assessing the future of these new services.

3) Programming

Will programming on the new satellite and cable channels offer European viewers the fare that will keep them watching and paying for the service? Predictions vary, and they range from a belief that U.S. programming will infiltrate European television, to the notion that pan-European broadcasting will dominate the industry.

A study by Tapio Varis (1984) on the international flow of television programs found that in Western Europe, 30 percent of the programs were imported. Of those, 44 percent were imported from the United States, meaning only about 13 percent of programming on European television was of U.S. origin. The study did not, however, address the audience share attracted by the imported programs, which would offer a more fitting measure of their popularity (Tracy, 1987).

Several U.S. shows rank in the top ten in some European nations, like Spain. But this is not the rule. Most rate no higher than the top 20 to 50. The highest-ranking shows are generally European productions, popular because Europeans prefer their own sitcoms and actions shows which include jokes and situations closer to home (Greenhouse, 1989). One example is a German production, "Schwarzwaldklinik" (Black Forest Clinic). The program was an immediate success when first shown in Germany in October 1985, boasting an audience share of 60 percent. Three months later the show was reaching 28 million viewers per episode, about 65 percent of the audience. According to German sociologist Michael Hoffman, the show's success can be attributed to the German affinity for films about localities and landscapes which evoke a strong feeling of belonging and identification in a large segment of the population (Tracy, 1987).

Another example of a program that draws heavy viewership for similar reasons can be found in the Brazilian production "Roque Santeiro." The show is basically in soap opera form, but differs in its approach. Instead of the good-guy, bad-guy theme, this prime-time production is said to approximate the Brazilian's reality and their social and political problems. It includes rural and urban characters, and is distinctly Brazilian. According to Ignazio Machado (1985), marketing director of IBOPE, the Brazilian equivalent of Nielsen, the show enjoys great success because it really shows Brazilians as they are--not trying to imitate the Europeans or the Americans. "We are just human beings with a lot of nuances. The people in this soap opera really act like us, and it's funny to see ourselves."

Another example of viewer preference for national productions can be found in Britain. A study conducted by Britain's Broadcasting Research Unit in 1986 examined what the British public wanted for the future of television. It found that the majority of viewers would support advertising on the BBC. However, 65 percent of those endorsing commercialization said they would change their minds if it meant more American programming (Tracy, 1987).

While these examples illustrate that audiences have an affinity for programs produced in their own countries, others indicate that international audiences prefer U.S. shows. In Italy, three private networks compete well against RAI, the public service broadcaster. They offer a schedule comprised largely of non-Italian, generally U.S. series, movies, soaps, and shows (Tracy, 1987).

Another example, while less recent, also illustrates this point. In the late 1960s, the government of Viet Nam and its American allies set up a two-channel television system in Viet Nam. One channel offered standard U.S. programming in English for the American troops. The other was produced in Vietnamese by the Vietnamese and featured traditional opera and other indigenous material. In the villages, people watched the Vietnamese channel. But millions of urban Vietnamese turned to the slicker, better produced U.S. programs. Batman became a popular folk hero and won the ratings race (Pool, 1979).

Yet another example illustrating preference of U.S. programming may be found in Al-Oofy's (cited in Boyd, 1988) study of secondary school and college students in Saudi Arabia. When asked about their videocassette viewing habits, the students said they preferred U.S. to other nation's video imports, including popular Egyptian television shows and films.

While these three examples offer some evidence of foreign viewers' predilection for U.S. programming, the evidence is weak. In discussing the Italian case, Tracy (1987) argues that the programs offered by RAI, the Italian public service channel, seemed to be of relatively poor quality compared to other countries' public service broadcasts. And of the Vietnamese example, Ithiel de Sola Pool (1979) argues that the alternatives were not rich enough. A third channel of indigenous yet modernized urban-oriented material would, he believes, have drawn much of the audience away from the foreign product. The Saudi Arabian illustration focused on consumers of videotapes among youth, and perhaps did not adequately represent the larger population's preferences.

Audience research generally suggests that viewers prefer their own audiovisual programming over imported shows. If so, then why should one expect a French audience to accept Italian programming, or Spanish viewers to watch British television?

Critics of the EC television directive argue that a cultural divide exists more prevalently between individual European countries than it does between the United States and Europe. According to Kurt Zulnick, an executive with the West German ARD network,

> Love it or hate it, American television has become a kind of universal language; everybody understands it. The truth is that German audiences, for example, don't much care for French-style television and the French don't like ours. (Kaplan, 1989)

One of the motivators of the EC television directive was to promote European unification. A green paper published by the Commission of the European Communities in 1984 argued:

> Television will play an important part in developing and nurturing awareness of the rich variety of Europe's common cultural and historical heritage. The dissemination of information across national borders can do much to help the peoples of Europe to recognize the common destiny they share in many areas. (p. 28)

The EC Commission's cultural ideal will be tested through the reality of EC audience preferences in coming years.

4) Politics and Regulation

The EC television directive is not law among the 12 countries of the Community. However, it does require each member state to develop, adopt, and implement legislation, regulations, and administrative provisions to comply with the directive by October 3, 1991 (Council of the European Communities, 1988). The directive was approved by ten of the 12 EC countries, however, a smooth passage into law is not guaranteed within individual states, nor is effective regulation of the directive's provisions. Belgium and Denmark voted against the ruling, with Denmark opposing the television directive on political grounds. An economic counselor at the Danish embassy in Paris told U.S. National Public Radio that broadcasters should have a free choice, and not be restricted by state controls, "We do not consider cultural politics as forming a part of the EC treaties. So we're not going to impose any quotas in Denmark, I can assure you" (Terry, 1989). Broadcasting magazine predicts that decisions of the European Commission will inevitably be challenged, and ultimately decided by the European court (1989), indicating that a smooth adoption of the directive into law is unlikely.

In addition to the formal legal aspects of the directive, complications ensuing from its subtleties could result in problems with its interpretation. Consider for example, the directive's language:

> Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time..." (p. 26).

The phrases "where practicable" and "by appropriate means" allow for interpretive flexibility. In addition, "European works" leaves some room for interpretation. As defined in Article 6 of the directive, "European works" basically means works originating from member states of the Community, made by producers established in one of more of those states. But in addition, non-European works,

> ...made mainly with authors and workers residing in one or more Member States, shall be considered to be European works to an extent corresponding to the proportion of the contribution of Community co-producers to the total production costs. (p. 27)

The words "mainly" and "proportion of the contribution" leave this definition wide open, as the following scenario illustrates.

Say, for example, a U.S. production company with a U.S. producer and director shoots part of a popular U.S. television series in English on-location in Madrid. It uses a script written by a U.S. writer and features Hollywood leading actors. The production crew, that is camera persons, production assistants, assistant directors, lighting directors, location scouts, etc. are French, Italian, and Spanish. After location production, the program is edited in London. Say 50 percent of the total production costs are incurred in the EC. Would this production be considered 50 percent European, even though on the surface it appears to be a U.S. program? Such questions are to be hammered out by the EC, perhaps by a European broadcasting authority that will likely be established to monitor compliance with the directive and arbitrate taste (Holusha, 1989).

Joint Ventures: A Compromise

The joint venture is one approach non-Europeans are taking in confronting the programming requirements of the EC Television Without Frontiers directive. Chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, has been a vituperative opponent of European programming quotas. In a speech to a number of European Commission representatives, however, Valenti used a more conciliatory tone, urging member nations to concentrate on "cooperation and joint venture" with the United States and with each other, rather than adopt program restrictions (Dawtrey, 1989). Perhaps the speech served as a harbinger of co-production events to come.

At the time of this writing, Paramount Pictures was striking a deal with one of Britain's leading television production companies, acquiring 49 percent of Zenith Productions, a subsidiary of Carlton Communications P.L.C. of London. This move is considered one of the first "...big deal direct investments by an American studio in a foreign television-production company" (Stevenson, 1989). In addition to profiting from greater demand for programming throughout Europe, the arrangement would benefit Paramount in the event the EC enacted stricter quotas on the importation of U.S. programming.

NBC is actively seeking European production partnerships, according to Patrick Cox, an official of NBC Europe, a London-based unit of General Electric Company. Cox says that Europe represents a market potential that is enormously growing, and that, "The key thing is for the networks to position themselves to participate" (Revzin, 1989).

Several joint ventures now in production include "Jekyll & Hyde," financed by Hearst's King Phoenix Entertainment and London Weekend Television, "Plymouth," a co-production for ABC by the Walt Disney Company and Italy's RAI Television, and "A Season of Giants," co-produced by Consolidated Entertainment, Turner Network Television, and RAI (Fabrikant, 1989). International joint productions often result in uncommonly large budgets. For example, London-based Consolidated Entertainment produced an eight-hour mini-series "The Nightmare Years" for Turner Network Television. Of the $9.5 million in production costs, Turner paid about half, and the balance was divided among Atlantique Productions in France, Channel 7 in Australia, and Italy's RAI-1. The rights to the programs belong to all investors; Turner retains all rights in the United States, the French, Italians, and Australians keep the rights in their countries, and Consolidated holds the rights everywhere else (Fabrikant, 1989).

Will U.S. audiences accept the European-produced fare? Industry executives say Americans are not comfortable with foreign flavor in television series. For example, a show financed by American, British, and French companies was broadcast on ABC in 1988. The comedy-adventure series, "A Fine Romance," featured a British and American star. It received poor ratings in the United States and quickly disappeared (Fabrikant, 1989). However, exactly which elements contributed to its poor acceptance were not made clear.

Concluding Remarks

As argued by the EC, culture and commerce maintain a partnership in the development and implementation of the "Television Without Frontiers" directive. While economic issues have garnered attention in relation to the international trade imbroglio between the United States and the Community, cultural concerns have not disappeared. They may even affect the economics of the EC television industry.

Cultural differences among the populations of the EC member nations could influence acceptance of the Community's programming, as suggested by viewer preference studies. Another cultural aspect lies in the artistic talent of the EC. Will European writers, directors, and producers be capable of meeting the increasing programming needs in future decades? As Jack Valenti asserted in a letter to Congress, "No quota ever made a movie or a television program. Talented people do" (Congressional Record - House, October 23, 1989, H7331).

Effects on public service broadcasting are also at issue when considering the cultural arguments of the EC directive. Are commercialization, program homogenization and degradation, and the demise of the public broadcasting model inevitable with or without U.S. programming in Europe? Reports from European media researchers seem to indicate rough times ahead for public television in the EC.

And finally, if the United States were to impose a ban on EC program imports, what effect would that action have on U.S. public television? Would the action provide U.S. documentary and cultural writers and producers an expanded market for their work, or would concerns over high production costs drive PBS to settle for inferior, less costly programs?

The television industry itself is forging ahead to address difficulties related to the EC directive. Through joint ventures, the U.S. television and film industry could continue to do business with Europe, while the EC maintains a share in the productions. This may solve some of the economic woes connected with "Television Without Frontiers," but may not address the cultural concerns related to the changing face of European television. The market may determine the fate of cultural programming in the Community if member nations do not enact legislation at the national level to safeguard public service broadcasting, and make a commitment to educational programs, resources, and incentives for film and television artists.

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A TERRORIST'S BEST FRIEND?:

International Terrorism and the U.S. Weekly Newsmagazine

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Paper Submitted to the Magazine Division
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Annual Convention
For AEJMC 1990 Annual Convention
Minneapolis, MN
August 1990

The symbiotic relationship between media and terrorists has been a topic since 1968. Because terrorist "success" depends on media coverage, the media are often criticized as being a "terrorist's best friend" if a terrorist incident receives media coverage, even if it is considered newsworthy.[1] While our concern is whether media promote or encourage terrorism by providing favorable coverage of these actions, the basic question addressed here is whether the weekly newsmagazine coverage is favorable to the terrorist; whether it is a "terrorist's best friend."

Terrorism

Wardlaw defines terrorism as "the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetuators."[2] Herman specified two types of terrorism: retail and wholesale. The purpose of wholesale terrorism is to help governments maintain dominance over certain groups (opponents and enemies of the state).[3] Wholesale terrorists keep the media blind to the routine abuses of the state, because they seek control rather than publicity.

Retail terrorism, practiced by small groups of "passionately committed factions who desire recognition of their grievances by the government or politically powerful,"[4] uses violence to gain publicity, legitimacy, recognition, and eventually, power. "Rather than desensitizing their targets to violence, retail terrorists use constant paranoia to create a distinct psychological advantage."[5]

By conducting inherently dramatic, deliberately shocking acts of violence, terrorists expect to draw attention to their causes and projecting themselves as forces to be regarded.[6] Krauthammer states further that media terrorism, developed by the PLO in 1968, requires being interpreted by the media. According to Krauthammer; "The terrorist acts of the PLO were not intended to demoralize the Israelis--the PLO has never really been at war with Israeli to publicize political grievances. And the intended audience was not the immediate victims...or even Israelis, but the entire world."[7]

This process of using violent and threatening acts to attract the attention of the media is referred to as "disruptive access" according to Moloten and Lester:[8]

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[1] Laqueur, "The Futility of Terrorism," Harpers, 1976, 104.

[2] Quoted in Tugwell, "Terrorism and Propaganda: Problem and Response," Contemporary Research on Terrorism, Wilkinson & Stewart (eds), Great Britain: Aberdeen University Press, 409.

[3] Terell & Ross, "Terrorism, censorship and the U.S. press corps," Gazette, Vol. 42, 1988, 45.

[4] Ibid., 45.

[5] Ibid., 47.

[6] Jenkins, "Psychological Implications of Media-Covered Terrorism," The Rand Paper Series, June 1981,1.

[7] Tugwell, 409.

[8] Ibid, 420.

> "In addition to seeking maximum exposure, the media-conscious perpetrator attempts to manipulate the instruments of mass communication to publicize his ideology in a manner that conveys the desirability or inevitability of his ultimate objective. Through such manipulation the terrorist may seek, for example, to: (1) demonstrate the vulnerability and impotence of the government; (2) attract broader public sympathy by the choice of a carefully selected target that may be publicly rationalized; (3) cause a polarization and radicalization among the public; (4) goad the government into repressive action likely to discredit it, or (5) present the violent acts in a manner that makes them appear heroic."[9]

Terrorism is, afterall, newsworthy. Crelinsten wrote: "Two common findings have been that (a) the media tend to be attracted to violent incidents and, in reporting them, tend to ignore their historical antecedents and their social or political contexts, and (b) the primary sources of information for reporting on political life tend to be those who represent authority or who belong to the existing power structure."[10]

Weimann points out that terrorist events "satisfy, or are pre-planned to satisfy, the conditions of unexpectedness, unpredictability, scarcity, negative reference to elite people or elite nations, absolute intensity, unambiguity, and frequency, all of which, according to Galtung and Ruge, conform to the media's needs."[11]

Does Terrorist Coverage Have an Effect?

Many critics of the media say terrorist coverage leads to more terrorist activity, shows the terrorist in a favorable light, and creates an atmosphere of alarm and panic. Y. Alexander suggests that "by providing extensive coverage of incidents the media give the impression that they sympathize with the terrorist cause, thereby creating a climate congenial to further violence...."[12] The idea that media attention encourages terrorism is known as the contagion hypothesis.

As gatekeepers, the media define what is and is not important. Lazarsfeld and Merton call this the "status conferral function:" "The audience of mass media apparently subscribe to the circular belief that if you really matter, you will be at the focus of mass attention and if you are at the focus then surely you must really matter."[13] This is especially true with foreign news, because the media are heavily relied on for information.

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[9] Bassiouni, "Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and the Mass Media: Perspectives, Problems, Proposals," Journalism of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 72, No. 1, 1981, 17.

[10] Crelinsten, "Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Struggle Over Access to the Communication Structure," Contemporary Research on Terrorism, Wilkinson & Stewart (eds), Great Britain: Aberdeen University Press, 420.

[11] Weimann, "The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage," Journal of Communication, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1983, 38.

[12] Paletz, Fozzard and Ayanian, "The IRA, the Red Brigades and the FALN in the New York Times," Journal of Communication, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1982, 162.

[13] Lazarsfeld as quoted in Weimann, 39.

Weimann found, by experiment, that exposure to press coverage of terrorist events slightly enhanced the evaluations of terrorists, because the press tend to label the terrorist movements in a favorable way: "While its actors are 'terrorists,' 'saboteurs,' and 'murderers' in the victim country, they may be 'freedom fighters,' 'liberation movement members,' 'separatists,' or 'nationalists' in the foreign press."[14]

Repetitive coverage of terrorist events is also criticized for creating an exaggerated sense of alarm:

> "Perhaps the most pervasive problem associated with media reporting of terror-violence is the climate of intimidation it engenders, a general fear of victimization that both despoils the quality of life and destabilizes social institutions. Although intimidation is usually a strategic objective of terror-violence, isolated incidents could not produce the ubiquitous psychological impact achieved though the repetitive dissemination of the terror-inspiring act."[15]

But content analysis studies show a high percentage of international terrorism is ignored. Of 158 incidents of international terrorism between 1968 and 1974, *The Times of London* ignored 43% while *The New York Times* ignored 44%. Kidnapings and hostages received the most media attention.[16] Bombs were the least likely to get coverage because they have become routine, unless a large group or the elite are involved. This follows the *amplitude* and *familiar or routine* factors discussed by Galtung and Ruge.[17]

A study by Tan measuring the press coverage of the IRA in *The New York Times, The Times of London*, and *The Irish Times* since 1916 showed an increase in publicity of terrorist violence in all three papers, but *The New York Times* and *The London Times* became more conservative in their coverage, by not "granting front page treatment, not covering terrorist's demands, and publishing fewer stories allowing for individual interpretations about the significance of the event."[18]

Content analyses of terrorist coverage in newspapers also show that newspapers focus on the actual act of violence rather than the social background and motives of the terrorists that lead to the violence.[19] The studies showed that newspapers almost never report about terrorist groups unless there is an act of violence to cover. The media depend on drama and visible results to help determine the newsworthiness of an incident. Crelinsten states:

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[14] Weimann, 44.

[15] Bassiouni, 21.

[16] Jenkins, 4.

[17] Galtung and Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1965: 65-91.

[18] Tan, "Media publicity and insurgent terrorism: A twenty-year balance sheet," Gazette, Vol. 42, 1988, 7.

[19] Jenkins, Paletz et al., Tan.

> "While modern insurgent terrorists can manipulate the media into devoting time and space to their activities and even to their political claims and demands, the media manipulates them in turn, by playing up the violent aspects at the expense of analysis, in order to attract consumers. This, in turn, tends to undermine the terrorist's claim to legitimacy by depicting him as merely violent, and not political."[20]

In a content analysis study of *The New York Times* and its coverage of the IRA, Red Brigades and the F.A.L.N., it was found that 40% of the articles during a two year period from July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1979, had violence as the primary subject, 33% of the articles were about the authoritative response to the terrorist incidents, while only 7% of the articles mentioned background information such as social, economic and political conditions which might have led up to the terrorist action. Seventy percent of the articles did not discuss the terrorists' goals or objectives, and 75% did not use a single terrorist source, while 75% did cite one or more authority holders. Also, 70% of the first referents to the terrorist groups were negative and only 3.2% were positive.[21]

Jenkins remarks: "In the terrorist's view, the media coverage fails to convey the terrorist's message, provokes public backlash, and ultimately deflates the effect of terrorist tactics by making them common place, forcing the terrorists to make greater investments and take greater risks."[22] An example of public backlash is demonstrated by a series of polls conducted in Western European countries between February 1970 and November 1977, a period of growing terrorism, which showed a steady erosion of support for the statement that "our society must be gradually improved by reform," and growing support for the statement, "Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces."[23]

Hypotheses

Daily newspapers and weekly newsmagazines are similar in that they are print media, deal with timely events, and are limited by time and space. But they differ in format, frequency of output, and size. Therefore, the hypotheses about weekly newsmagazine coverage of terrorism can be drawn from previous newspaper studies but should reflect these similarities and differences.

Galtung and Ruge state that the more similar the frequency of the event is to the frequency of the news medium, the more probable that it will be covered by that medium.[24] The violence of terrorism is easily reported in daily newspapers because it is immediately identifiable and fits the structure of the medium. Background information about the economical, social and political factors, which illuminate the situation and the objectives of the terrorist group, requires more time and is suitable to the weekly newsmagazine. However, since it is not as frequent as the newspaper, the newsmagazine cannot cover as many events as the paper, and must be more selective. A newsmagazine is also limited in space compared to the newspaper, and so news items on terrorism may be shorter than those in the paper, and therefore contain less information.

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[20] Crelinsten, 421.

[21] Paletz et al.

[22] Jenkins, 8.

[23] Ibid, 4.

[24] Galtung and Ruge.

Galtung and Ruge also state that a signal should be clear and unambiguous in order to be recorded. This is especially true for newspapers. Because they deal in daily events, newspapers are more willing to report on something that is easily definable and concrete, like a violent act. But a weekly newsmagazine is capable of tackling issues that are not as clear and unambiguous.

Based on content analyses of newspapers and considering the differences between daily newspapers and weekly newsmagazines, these hypotheses have been established for the study of newsmagazine coverage of terrorism:

(1) Overall, the newsmagazine articles on terrorism will be similar to those found in the New York Times studies:

  (A) The articles on terrorism in the newsmagazines will be mostly oriented toward the terrorist incident and government response;
  (B) The articles on terrorism in the newsmagazines will be violence oriented;
  (C) Sources in the articles will be mostly from authority rather than from the perpetrators.

(2) The newsmagazine articles on terrorism will differ slightly from those in the newspaper in the area of discussing background and goals:

  (A) The newsmagazines will have more background about the economical, social and political factors involved;
  (B) The newsmagazine will discuss the objectives of the terrorist group more than the newspaper.

Method

The sample for the study was composed of all of the 1988 issues of *Newsweek*, *Time* and *U.S. News and World Report*. This sample was chosen to describe the most current coverage of terrorist activity of the three major weekly newsmagazines.

The unit of analysis was the individual article pertaining to terrorism or a terrorist group. A terrorist article was selected if it discussed terrorism, a terrorist group, the results of terrorism or a government's reaction to terrorism, as defined by Wardlaw.[25] The group or individual had to use, or threaten to use, violence as an action against the established authority and to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects on a larger group. The action or purpose of the group had to be political or represent a larger political or social concern.

Articles about violence used by governments to repress and terrorize their citizens were not included because this type of terrorism usually does not seek publicity and therefore does not fit the purpose of this study. However, terrorist activities by a government against persons or groups outside of that government's jurisdiction were included as terrorist activity. Also, violence by a group engaged in a civil war or guerrilla warfare with a government was not included unless specific terrorist activities focused on citizens to create fear and anxiety.

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[25] Quoted in Tugwell, 409.

Another set of articles about the PLO and Arafat peace negotiations with Israel and the United Nations were not included because the PLO was not acting as a terrorist group but as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. However, any articles referring to PLO terrorist activities, past or present, were included.

Each article was analyzed according to a coding format that included: the type of story; prominence of story; visual accompaniment and its content; length of the article; mention of "terrorism"; and primary theme.*

The **story type** was divided into three categories: (1) News story, (2) Comment or editorial, and (3) Interview. Prominence of the article was determined according to where the article was situated in the newsmagazine. The **prominence** of each article was coded accordingly: (1) if it was the cover story; (2) if it was situated before the international section but not in the cover story, nor in the notes and current news shorts found at the front part of the magazines; (3) if it was the first story of the international section; and (4) if it was not in any of the first categories or if it was included in the notes or short current stories found at the beginning of the magazine or the end of the international section.

If a picture was included with the story then it was coded as having a **visual**. The picture was then coded as being either violent or nonviolent. The visual is coded as violent if it contains images of any act of destruction or harm to humans and property in action or the results of such destruction. The **length** of the article was measured in square inches. The **mention of terrorism** was determined by the presence of the word terrorism, terrorists or terror.

The **primary theme** of the story was the theme that dominated the story and was usually associated with the title of the story. A theme was considered primary if it was the first theme mentioned and set the direction of the rest of the article, even if most of the space of the article was to another theme. The theme categories were: (1) Incident oriented; (2) Background oriented; (3) Government-response oriented; (4) Up-to-date oriented; (5) Victim oriented; (6) Nonviolent-action oriented; (7) and Other.

After the article was coded, the treatment of each terrorist group within the article was analyzed. Most of the articles only focused on one terrorist group, but a few articles had more than one. Each group was coded according to region, violence, social background, terrorist background, goals, sources and referents. Categories providing overall information about the articles were not repeated.

The **region** category represents the geographical region from where the terrorist group originates; not where the terrorist action occurred. This category was broken up into five geographical regions: (1) Africa, (2) Asia (Eastern and Far Eastern countries), (3) Europe, (4) Latin America, (5) Middle East, and (6) Can't Tell--when the reporter was not able to determine the group responsible for the terrorist act.

Violence, social background, terrorism background and goals were coded as either being present or not present. **Violence** was present if the article identified or associated the group with an act or continuous acts of violence. **Social background** information was present if the article included information about the social, religious, economic and political conditions relevant to the terrorist goals or objectives.**Terrorist background** measured whether the presence of any background information about the terrorist group, such as past terrorist activities, leaders or negotiations, existed in the article.**Goals and objectives** of the terrorist group are present if the article mentions those goals and objectives. These goals usually include objectives such as trying to change or revolutionize their surroundings or liberate fellow prisoners, but do not include demands related to their terrorist activities, such as asking for transportation, money, or fuel.

Sources were split up into two categories: perpetrators--either a member of the group, a prepared statement, or a lawyer representing the group; and authority sources--police, military, government officials, and authoritative figures. The total number of sources were counted for each article. In order to be coded as a source, the person had to be quoted directly. As such, the person's own statements or views are being expressed rather than the reporter's interpretations of those statements and views.

Referents are the labels given to the terrorist group. They were coded as being either positive, neutral, or negative. A negative label includes anything that suggest unacceptable and deviant behavior: terrorist, murderer, kidnaper, hijacker, etc. A neutral label includes any reference to the actual name of the group, such as IRA, or PLO, or their nationality, religious affiliation, etc., without the inclusion of a negative label. For example, "a group of Moslems" would be neutral, but "a group of Moslem hijackers" would be negative. Positive labels include any reference that denotes a force for positive change such as freedom fighters, liberation force, or people's army, but that is separate from the group's actual name.

An intercoder reliability check was done on the coding scheme. Three graduate students, including the researcher, and a professor were involved in the reliability check. An intercoder reliability level of .91 was obtained. After testing the coding scheme, the author did all of the coding for the study.

Results

A total of 110 articles fit the criteria set for determining terrorist articles. Out of these 110 articles, 125 terrorist groups were mentioned. Although the difference is not significant, *U.S. News and World Report* had the highest frequency of terrorist articles with 45, or 41% of all of the articles. *Time* was second with 38 articles and *Newsweek* followed with 27 articles (see Graph 1). On all of the variables, but one, there were no significant differences among the three sources and so the results will be discussed as a whole.

Almost all of the articles (94%) were news articles. There were only three editorial articles and two interviews. Most of the of the articles, 81%, were found to be in the least prominent category--

situated in the international section other than the first story of the section and the notes or the current news shorts (See Graph 2).

The majority of the articles were accompanied by a visual. Pictures were present with 67% of the articles. Pictures were always present (100%) when the articles were found in the first three prominent categories, while only 60% of the those found beyond the first article of the international section were accompanied by photographs. Less than half of the pictures (41%) contained violent content.

The average size of a terrorist article is about 60% of an average full page article. The mean size of an article about terrorism was 27 square inches, compared to an average full page article with photograph of 43 square inches. Short articles, one to fifteen square inches, made up 45% of the sample, medium sized articles, 16 to 53 square inches, made up 46% and the last 9% were articles over 53 square inches. Although not significant, the majority of the *Newsweek* articles (63%) were of medium length, whereas the the short articles made up most of the samples from *Time* and *U.S. News*. This is partially due to the fact that both *Time* and *U.S. News* have formats for short notes about world events, and articles about terrorism are often included in these formats, whereas *Newsweek* does not.

The most frequent theme was government-response oriented, making up 34% of the sample. Incident oriented was also a very frequent theme (31%). Background oriented was the third most frequent theme (See Table 1 for breakdown). In order to compare the differences among the themes concerning violence, social background, terrorist background, and goals, the victim-oriented, update, and nonviolent-action oriented categories had to be collapsed for statistical reasons. These categories are grouped under the label "other" in Table 1.

Overall, 79% of the articles in the sample contained violence. The majority of articles in all themes contained references to violence, but violence in the incident oriented and the background articles was significantly greater (Chi Square $p<.05$). Table 1 shows that more than 90% of the incident-oriented articles and the background articles contained violence compared to 79% of government response articles and 66% of "other" articles.

Social background was found in only 15% of the articles. The study showed 43% of the articles contained background about the terrorists and their activities. Of the articles containing terrorist background, 94% also included violence, which lends support to the idea that the background being discussed is of past violent behavior (Chi Square $p<.001$). The goals and objectives of the terrorist groups were present in only 22% of the sample.

For obvious reasons, the background articles were significantly more likely to give social and terrorist backgrounds than the other types of articles (Chi Square $p<.001$). Table 1 shows that the background category is the only one with more than 50% including social or terrorist background.. Since the background articles tend to focus more on the terrorist background, this helps explain why they are more violent than most of the other types of articles. The background theme articles also were more likely to mention terrorist's goals (56%) than the other theme types (Chi Square $p<.05$).

Terrorist groups from the Middle East dominated the sample. As a region, the Middle East made up 53% of all of the sample (see Graph 3). Europe was second with 23%, followed by Asia with 14%. Africa and Latin America only had two articles apiece and were fairly insignificant. The regional location of 8 articles, or 6% of the total sample, was undetermined. For purposes of comparing these geographical regions, the smaller regional samples of Africa, Latin America and the undetermined were collapsed and labeled "other." See Table 2.

There was no significant difference among the regions and the percentage of articles containing violence: they all had a high percentage of articles with violence (see Table 2). The terrorist groups originating from the Middle East received the least amount of social background information, while the European groups received the most. Ninety-seven percent of the Middle East sample did not include information about the social, political, religious or economical conditions contributing to conflict, while 38% of the European sample did include this information (Chi Square p<.001). The European and Asian samples also had more background information about the terrorists and their activities as well as their goals and objectives than did the Middle East sample (see Tables 2).

Authoritative sources were also more likely to be found in the articles than sources from the terrorist group. Seventy-seven percent of the sample had no terrorist sources who were quoted directly, while authoritative quotes were absent in 55% of the sample. The perpetrator source mean for each terrorist group was .256, while the mean for the authority source was 1.00. So, authority sources were represented four times as much as perpetrator sources in the sample. There was a significant difference between the newsmagazines on the use of perpetrator sources.

Newsweek used more sources than the other magazines. Forty-one percent of *Newsweek* articles used at least one terrorist source (mean=.519), compared to 24% of *Time* articles (mean=.290) and 9% of *U.S. News* articles (mean=.089) (Chi Square p<.05). Seventy-four percent of the *Newsweek* sample also used at least one authority source (mean=1.78) while 58% of the *Time* sample (mean=1.16) and 27% of the *U.S. News* sample (mean=.689) used authority sources (significant <.01). This again can be partially explained by the dominance of the mid sized articles in the Newsweek sample, compared to the heavy use of the short article and note style formats used in much of the *Time* and *U.S. News* sample.

The words terrorism, terrorists or terror were mentioned in 76% of the articles. However, the majority (65%) of the referents toward the terrorist groups were neutral. This means the first reference to the deviant group was either their official name or was a reference that did not associate the group with negative behavior. When the first references were not neutral, they were more likely to be negative than positive. Thirty-six negative labels (29%) were used to describe terrorist groups compared to seven (6%) positive references.

Discussion

The data show articles covering terrorism in weekly newsmagazines tended to be short, focused on either the terrorist incident or the government's response to terrorism, contained violence, almost never provided social background or goals and objectives of the terrorists but were more likely to provide information about the terrorists' past violence. The sources for the articles were four times more likely to be from authority figures than from perpetrators, and the first reference to the terrorist group was usually neutral but almost never positive.

The results from the study support the first hypothesis that the newsmagazine articles on terrorism would be similar to those found in the newspaper studies. Although the Paletz, Fozzard and Ayanian study of *The New York Times* found violence- or incident-oriented articles as the main focus and government-response articles second, the top two themes were the same.[26] The articles in the newsmagazines were violence oriented, with violence mentioned in almost all of the terrorist articles. Authority sources were cited four times more than terrorists in this study which corresponds to the findings of Paletz, Fozzard and Ayanian.

Like the Tan study, most of the terrorist stories were not prominently placed. There were only five cover stories, all in the *U.S. News and World Report*. Actually, only two issues had cover stories about terrorism but each cover story had more than one article. The cover stories dealt with the government's response to terrorism rather than a specific terrorist action.

Negative first referents in the Paletz, Fozzard and Ayanian study were much greater (70% of all referents) than what this study found in the newsmagazines (29%), but both found a very small percentage of positive labels assigned to the terrorists. This refutes Weimann's claim that the press tend to label terrorist movements in a favorable way.

The results only partially supported the second hypothesis. The percentage of newsmagazine articles that mentioned social background in the article was more than double that of the Paletz, Fozzard and Ayanian study, 15% to 7%. But, the percentage of *The New York Times* articles that mentioned the goals of the terrorists (30%) was greater than that of the newsmagazine sample (22%).

No definite comparisons can be made between these two studies since they are ten years apart and use different samples, but they do demonstrate significantly the way in which the press, both newspaper and newsmagazine, cover terrorism.

The differences among the coverage of the regions from where the terrorist groups originated are interesting, but easily explained. Articles about terrorist groups from the Mid East dominated the sample because they were probably responsible for most of the terrorism in 1988. And the audiences of the U.S. newsmagazine associates terrorism with the Middle East, which fulfills one of the newsworthy criteria which Galtung and Ruge say influences Western meida: the more consonant the signal is with the mental image of what one expects to find, the more probable that it will be recorded.[27]

The Asia and Europe articles had more terrorist background and mentioning of goals because they were not in the news as much as the Middle East terrorists and so the newsmagazines needed to familiarize the reader with these groups. The fact that the European terrorist articles were more likely to have social background maybe related to cultural proximity. Galtung and Ruge explain that the

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[26] Paletz et al., 162

[27] Galtung and Ruge.

Western press is more likely to pay attention to events that are familiar.[28] So the U.S. newsmagazines may use more social background in the European articles since it is more familiar to the U.S. reader due to cultural proximity.

Conclusions

Are the U.S. weekly newsmagazines the best friends of terrorists? If the editors of these magazines had to chose who they would want as their best friend it would probably be the reader. The news media do not like to think that they are manipulated or that they pander to any faction's particular interest. Their goal is to be objective and to inform the reader. If the the newsmagazine is a "terrorist's best friend," then it would mean that they give special treatment to terrorism. It is true that they provide a vehicle by which the actions of the terrorists may be known--each of the three weekly newsmagazines in this study averaged three articles about terrorism per month--but the coverage was not prominent nor flattering.

Terrorism has been labeled as "propaganda in deed."[29] But if propaganda is "information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly,"[30] then the coverage of a terrorist's action in a newsmagazine does not meet the criteria. The majority of the stories do not mention the ideas and doctrines of the terrorist, and the only influence the articles might have on the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behavior of the readers of these articles will likely be negative because of the focus on violence and negative labels.

Perhaps terrorism is "publicity by deed." The basic objective of publicity, according to Cutlip, Center and Broom, is to make something or somebody known.[31] This is probably best demonstrated by P.T. Barnum's supposed quote; "As long as they spell my name right." The newsmagazine stories do make the terrorist's name and actions known, but not his purpose or goal. They publicize the who and the what, but not the why. So newsmagazines may help a terrorist group legitimize its existence but not its purpose. In this sense, the terrorist can use the media to reach the goal of intimidating the public and instilling an insecure feeling and lack of confidence toward the authorities, but it would be hard to gain sympathy and support for the cause from the readers of U.S. newsmagazines.

Without the media, terrorists would have almost no access to the public, nor any forum through which it can gain legitimacy and recognition. But, U.S. newsmagazines are not a "terrorist's best friend," unless you consider someone your best friend when they ignore you more times than not, accentuate your negative traits, and are more inclined to listen to your adversary than give you a chance to speak for yourself.

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[28] Galtung and Ruge.

[29] Tugwell, 409.

[30] Ibid, 409.

[31] Cutlip, Center & Broom, Effective Public Relations, 6th Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1985, 356.

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Table 1: Themes

Category	Frequency	Percentage of Sample	Percent of Category with Violence	Percent of Category with Social Background	Percent of Category with Terrorist Backgrounc	Percent of Category with Goals
Incident	31	28.2	93.5	6.5	48.4	29.0
Background	16	14.5	93.8	56.3	87.5	56.3
Government Response	34	30.9	79.4	14.7	38.2	11.8
Other	29	26.4	65.5	3.4	20.7	17.2
	110	100				

Table 2: Regions

Category	Frequency	Percentage of Sample	Percent of Category with Violence	Percent of Category with Social Background	Percent of Category with Terrorist Backgrounc	Percent of Category with Goals
Asia	18	14.4	88.9	16.7	61.1	27.8
Europe	29	23.2	79.3	37.9	48.3	27.6
Middle East	66	52.8	77.3	3.0	37.9	18.2
Other	12	9.6	75.0	25.0	33.3	16.7
	125	100				

Graph 1: Distribution of Newsmagazines in the Sample



Graph 2: Distribution of Articles in the Sample



Graph 3: Distribution of Regions in the Sample



Markham Award Top Three Paper

CONFRONTATION AND CHANGE: REEVALUATING SOVIET MEDIA THEORY

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Presented to
International Communication Division of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
Minneapolis, Minnesota
August, 1990

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I. INTRODUCTION

For decades, Western study of the Soviet media has been rooted in a facile and deceptive theoretical interpretation dating from the early days of the Cold War. The need for reassessment of political stereotypes dating from that period is supported on both sides of the global political spectrum. The leaders of the world's two largest Communist countries have agreed publicly that the time when they could hope to follow "old models" is past.[1] One of the architects of U.S. Cold War policies warns that the West must break out of old mentalities and learn a new way to approach the Soviets. Kennan suggests that both sides have more common than divergent interests.[2] Sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have forced even conservative U.S. leaders to acknowledge that reevaluation is needed.

It is not surprising, then, that media scholars urge the need for a new theoretical concept of the Soviet system, one to replace the traditional polemic offered by *The Four Theories of the Press*, which classified press systems as authoritarian, libertarian, Soviet Communist or social responsibility.[3] The particular danger of typologies, Schillinger notes, is that they are not only "blatantly tautological" but that they also "suggest a rigidity that empirical observation refutes."[4] Other scholars have developed amendments and additions to the Schramm offering, but in amending and adjusting they have not scrapped the underlying ideological basis of the formulation--a static totalitarian model of an authoritarian state press.[5] While critics had been calling for revision, until recently no one had begun the task.[6] Recent events have not only reinforced the validity of their criticism, but also have made the task they have set more challenging.

The very real changes underway in the Soviet media operations are sufficient evidence of the ability of the Soviet media to change. Further, the depth and range of such change suggests that underlying dissatisfaction and system failures were present, ongoing, and building--within the Soviet system--before glasnost and at a time when most Western researchers would have claimed that the "Soviet Communist" authoritarian press model fit. Neither a model nor a theory in reality, it neither allows for nor provides for change except to say: "See, 'we' were right and 'they' are changing to be like us," a naive approach at best. To move beyond "us" and "them" requires a shedding of the ideological mindset inherent in Cold War era Western theorizing. Schillinger suggests the "assumptions resulting from (such) oversimplification and labeling have seriously restricted empirical inquiry and reinforced occicentric interpretation."[7]

While ideology cannot be ignored as a factor inherent in any system, neither can it be allowed to drive an analysis. To relegate understanding of ideology to its proper place in the scheme of things, it may be helpful to look at the press in terms of process, structure, and function. This can be a difficult task, especially when members of the Soviet press and government are not clear on the new new delineation of their own functions. Their very disagreements over those functions, however, begin to sketch the outlines of the underlying structures of a new understanding of the role media are expected to play in Soviet society. The actors themselves may be too close to the process to see the emergent structures clearly. Defining the elements in the process may help develop focus and understanding of the movements within the system. It can only be hoped that is the case, since a theoretical reconstruction of Western models of the Soviet press is necessary to lay a foundation for the development of a body of systematic research on Soviet media. Without that foundation, such research cannot be compared to, and integrated with, research on Western press systems.

Outward changes in Soviet media performance have been striking since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's crusade for perestroika and glasnost,[1] begun in 1985. Initially explained as a needed ingredient of the societal change necessary to bring about economic reconstruction, glasnost has become a component in a complicated process of societal reconstruction. Soviet television cameras have recorded more than just bad news. They have remade the news and helped trigger a remaking of the society they cover. Sociologists use the media to try to empower Soviet public opinion where there was none.[1] And the practitioners of glasnost, those brave enough to go public with criticism, have found themselves launched on fledgling political careers riding groundswells of public support to defeat old guard Communist Party nominees.

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[1] Perestroika is translated as reconstruction, and refers to Gorbachev's campaign to rebuild the Soviet economy. There is no exact English translation for glasnost, which comes from the root word voice and means "giving voice to." In the Soviet context it has previously been used in a legal context in connection with open court proceedings. Openness is generally accepted as the nearest English word to the idea. Waller (1987).

Great debates rage over whether glasnost and perestroika will succeed, or even survive, but the purpose of this research is not to join that discussion. Whether glasnost lasts or not, under its guise Gorbachev has exhorted Soviet journalists to reconsider the bases of their newsworthiness decisions. Media practitioners and intellectuals alike used the opportunity to alter the rules of the Soviet media game and in the process have radically altered the tone of Soviet social debate.

This paper first offers a critical review of the Western literature dealing with Soviet media theory and world press theory. It then reviews the changes in Soviet media performance and the economic, political, and social forces that underlie and prompt those changes. Next, it lays out a framework for the development of the three-level process model, which is then developed as a step in the reconceptualization of the process that governs current Soviet media performance.

While much of the current Western research on the Soviet media charts the types of change wrought by glasnost, those changes have been too swift and extreme to encourage thorough theoretical reconsideration.[9] Theoretical reflections are especially important at such moments, for they provide the larger frameword within which both descriptive and empirical studies can be placed in context and understood.

It must be noted early in this paper that many writers have used the terms "theory" and "model" interchangeably to apply to intellectual exercises that, in reality, do not include either theory construction or model building.[10] The best example is in Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, which will be dealt with at greater length later in the paper (see Theoretical Background). While admirable, the work is not theory--neither normative nor explanatory--and does not resemble a model so much as an ideologically-colored exposition on the subject of world press systems. Since that work has been the stepping-off point for much later research, the result is much existing discussion of "theories" where there are none. Rather than theory, Four Theories and its successors offer typologies of media systems, mixing existing and normative categories.

Such typologies are not only a problem for media scholars. Lewin suggests that influential sovietologists "not at all innocent of the ideological content of the undertaking, tried to make totalitarianism look like an explanatory, theoretical concept that offers the public and the student the tool for understanding the system in question."[11]

By traditional scientific definition, theory is a set of concepts or axioms intended to organize knowledge about a subject, to provide typologies of the things in question, predictions and explanations of past and future events, a sense of understanding of what causes events, and potential for control of those events.[12] The more powerful and elegant the theory, the more applicable it is across time and space. While laws and axioms are far more easily sought and found in hard scientific research, there is little excuse to label as "theory" what are more accurately typologies. What was offered by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm was not only not theory, but a typology firmly rooted in the ideological judgments of their creators--blending observation of "fact" and normative expectation. On the other side, Soviet press "theory" rooted in the works of Marx and Lenin has been no less ideologically-driven nor predictive of current conditions.[13]

This paper lays no claim to be the explication of a new theory of world media systems. Instead, it represents a small effort in a much larger paradigmatic shift away from ideologically-driven media theories. The goal is a step toward the development of media process modeling. In a more advanced form, modeling could be applied across media systems and ideologies, suggesting not only how systems differ, but also where they are similar.

A period of societal flux such as that evident in the Soviet Union today is hardly the best time to attempt to construct a new model for evaluating a nation's press.[1] Given the existing lack of sound theoretical representations of the system, however, there may be no better vantage point from which to gain clearer understanding of how a media system changes. Without such an understanding, research on media content, or any other kind of change, operates in a vacuum and adds little to the field. Thus, flux or no, the time has come to begin to give shape to the a model of the Soviet press system, if only to provide a blueprint which can be amended as changing conditions in the Soviet Union suggest grounds for adjustment.

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[1] For the purposes of this paper, "press" is limited to the information gathering and disseminating functions of print and broadcasting media.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Four Theories of the Press[14] has long been the foundation of American understanding of the Soviet media system. Written at the height of the Cold War, the essay on the Soviet Communist press is very much a product of its time. In so many words, Schramm compares "them" to "us" and finds "them" lacking.[15] The Soviet and U.S. systems, based on responsibility and freedom, respectively, were so unlike, Schramm suggested, it would be almost impossible for people brought up in the two systems to find common ground to discuss them.[16]

Distinguishing the Soviet media from other authoritarian systems, such as the Nazis', Schramm pointed to state ownership of the means of production and the intended role of the Soviet media as agents of change rather than as proponents of the status quo. The bulwarks of the system were its central planning and specialized nature. While American media grew in response to a "law of public demand," the Soviet media were segmented and directed across society according to a central plan.[17]

Whether there was anything particularly good or bad about a specialized print media intended to reach targeted audiences such as youth or labor Schramm did not make clear. But he was otherwise clear on what he thought, making liberal use of quotation marks, italics and exclamation marks to bolster his case. From early Bolshevik changes of direction to evident double standards of truth, Schramm determined that the Soviets had never consolidated their power and that authoritarian control of the press was necessary in order for the Communists to retain control of the uncommitted masses. Only time would tell, he suggested, whether the "kept" Soviet press or the "free" American press was right.[18]

Hopkins might well have been speaking of Schramm when he wrote in *Mass Media in the Soviet Union* that is all too easy to condemn from a distance another system and all too human to imply that the Soviet press is inferior to the American way.[19] While admitting his own preference for a principle underlying the American system, namely that no one man, society or historical era possesses the truth, he suggested that there might in fact be areas is which the American press could learn from both the successes and failures of the the Soviet media system. In particular, American corporate journalism divorced from local markets might consider borrowing from the Soviet experience with reader's councils and special departments to handle reader's requests and complaints. Big business American media inclined toward bolstering the status quo might also witness "the consequences that flow from uniformity and centralization of information, and from the management of information for what presumably or allegedly are overriding national interests."[20]

Hopkins' delineations of the differences in the social roles of the press under Lenin, Stalin and Krushchev[21] would suggest that the Schramm piece labeled as "Soviet Communist" what was inherently "Stalinist." For while Stalin and Krushchev may have added little to press theory per se, their distinct approaches to leadership were reflected in different press roles. Under Stalin the press was built into an empire of "dullness, conformity and pruposefulness," and his scorn for dissent resulted in a "mouthpiece press."[22] By contrast, under the more flexible Krushchev, who implicitly ackowledged that the press was a social force in and of itself, the press became a forum for discussion and its own role in society a subject for debate.[23] Under Breshnev's leadership the entrenched Stalinist machine revived, but it is suggested that it was the experience of the thaw under Krushchev which led journalists to sieze the opportunities offered by Gorbachev and glasnost.

Others following Siebert, Peterson and Schramm have modified and expanded on the Four Theories, toning them down here and adding there the additional "theories" of development and democratic socialism when it was deemed that the original approach left gaping holes in the theoretical coverage of world press systems.[24]

However valuable as a theoretical approach to press systems it might be for analytical purposes, Altschull found Schramm's theory dangerous because its inherently "hostile" nature accentuated differences and overlooked similarities between systems.[25] Both the American and Soviet press are agents for those in power, Altschull suggested, and both seek to serve their audiences. That there are disagreements as to how the audiences are best served should not require that one side or another be "right."[26]

Nord's look at press controls proves useful in identifying the weakness of the Four Theories and provides a conceptual model as a step in laying out a replacement classification typology, focusing on press controls. Picard, Hachten and others expanded the four theories to five and more in attempts to rectify some of the classification problems.[27] In Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, McQuail follows a traditional normative typology and devotes less than two pages to the Soviet media theory.[28] Half that space is devoted to the postulates of the "theory," which no longer apply--prohibitions against private ownership and mandatory media presentation of objective truth in compliance with Marxist-Leninist principles.[29]

Schillinger finds "limited value in describing 'what is' with ever-proliferating categories." She suggests the challenge is to go beyond typologies bound by history and geography, to models which go beyond describing "what is" to "probe into the 'why.'"[30] She takes on that task with the goal of constructing a world press model that is free of ideological coloration. Choosing the nation state as her unit of analysis, she identified ideology as one of three motives driving press system operation, the other two being survival and market.[31]

Altschull suggested that the simplicity of the Schramm position and its overwhelming acceptance in the West caused fundamental misunderstandings of the Soviet press. That may in fact be blaming Schramm for too much, since his work appeared at a time when the prevailing political scientists took similar positions in regard to the nature of the Soviet political system.[32] Altschull's position, however, overlooks another major weakness of the Schramm approach--that it failed to allow for evolution and growth. By the 1970s theorists had begun to account for growth, but tended to diverge into two groups--those who thought the bad Communists would themselves be overthrown and those who thought the evil would wear off and with time and technology "they" would have no choice but to become like "us." Both views can still be found in current literature.[33]

Altschull and Schillinger both warn against oversimplification; political science approaches that attempt to account for complexity may help provide the basis for a more realistic approach.

To best understand political change in the Soviet context, Reshetar suggested the use of a model that identified the parameters of that system.[34] "A model is an effort to represent reality or important aspects of reality even though the complexity of reality cannot be captured and made static." He noted, however, that reliance on any one model alone would be unrealistic and overly deterministic.[35] The validity of his point is brought home by the problems inherent in Western scholarship that roots itself in a dated and narrow understanding of the Soviet system. Reshetar's caution is applicable to media scholarship as well as political science and, it could be argued, suggests the need for a process model like that constructed later in the paper (see Model Framework and Model Construction) which atttempts to break free of ideological labeling.

While no one model may begin to account for the complexity of the Soviet system, Reshetar advises that a comparison of several models "provides an overview of the Soviet polity, and also summarizes and categorizes our knowledge of the system."[36] He advanced six models for consideration: the totalitarian, the authoritarian, the bureaucratic, the oligarchic, the modernization, and the imperial.[37] From the juxtaposition and comparison of a number of models comes their best value. "Together they provide a multi-dimensional image or series of images that depict the Soviet polity with greater accuracy."[38]

Remington viewed the Soviet system essentially as ideologically driven and located communication, especially mass communication, as an instrument of the implementation of that ideology.[39] While accepting that ideology has played a major role in the language and culture of life in Soviet society, Grushin proposed that the success of glasnost and perestroika rests solely on their ability to break out of the language legacy of that ideology. When "friendship of the people" is the context for discussion of the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh, Grushin asserted that only through a new language, which speaks of what it means, can the social restructuring take place.[1] He is not alone in his concern.[40] In the New Yorker, Kramer notes that "many Russian intellectuals believe that restoring the simple meanings to words the commissars have corrupted will cure them of Communism."[41]

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[1] Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of ethnic clashes between Arzerbijiani and Armenian factions.

The radical nature of the changes underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe undermine much of the analysis and theorizing done even recently by Western experts on Soviet studies. Laqueur's 1987 revision of The Fate of the Revolution is a case in point.[42] Reviewing the interpretations of Soviet history from 1917 to the present, he looks as well at the history of Soviet studies in the West and thorny issues central to study of the area--including whether or not it can be said that the day of totalitarianism has passed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although hindsight is always sharper, it is nonetheless almost humorous now to read his conclusion that if domestic pressures had relaxed in the Eastern bloc it was because totalitarianism had succeeded in crushing the opposition and had successfully indoctrinated the populace.[43]

In The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost, Laqueur suggested that glasnost was in effect a cultural revolution, which had little possibility of long-term effectiveness because it was only intended to improve the running of the existing system and would not involve any real structural change in Soviet society.[44] It would not effect Soviet policies abroad or fundamental change at home.[45] History has already disproved the premise on which the book was written. Fundamental change has occurred, both within the Soviet system and in its relations with other states. A valuable catalogue of the events of the early years of glasnost, the book's premise has been invalidated and its implicit and explicit assumptions are therefore suspect.

Predictions of the potential for change made by analysts at other points of the spectrum have proven no more valid, and point again to the need for models that avoid categorical judgments. Cohen suggested that Soviet reform could only come through the vehicle of Marxism-Leninism. He also questioned the idea that the populace might be disillusioned and the bureaucracy of the Party divorced from the realities of day-to-day Soviet life.[46] Mandel stood by the assertion that Soviet workers wwould not be given the right to strike or Soviet voters the chance to vote in a pluralistic system.[47] In light of recent events, there can be little doubt that the populace of the Eastern bloc has not been crushed. Eastern European Party bureaucrats, seemingly so secure in their comforts and privileges, have been vanquished by outraged citizens--a reality which can hardly have gone overlooked by their counterparts in the Soviet Union. Party candidates have lost elections in the Soviet Union to radicals, who have pushed through reforms that would abolish censorship and do away with the Party's political monopoly.

The categorical bases of all the traditional works, whether history, political science or media theory, are gone. Media theorists, like everyone else, must rethink and revise.[48] The basic premises of the "Soviet" system are gone. There are already

300 independent publications in the Soviet Union, and there will be private ownership. Rupert Murdoch has moved into the Hungarian media market and is primed to do the same in the Soviet Union as soon as the Draft Law on the Press is adopted.[49]

Comparative legal analyses of the Soviet system also provide a necessary component of the research for several reasons. One component of the proposed model has its origins in a review of the Soviet copyright system (see Model Framework). The legal analyses are a particularly useful reference both because the Soviet media are not completely independent from the Soviet civil law system and because the legal analysis of comparative scholars offers an alternative way to look at the functioning of the system by examining practice rather than ideology.[50] Civil law is all too frequently overlooked both by political scientists and press scholars alike.

Works dealing specifically with the structure of the Soviet press, such as those by Inkeles, Markham and Hopkins, have become histories whether they were originally intended to serve that purpose or not.[51] To an extent, even more recent works, such as those by Mickiewicz and Remington, also become histories as the pace of glasnost-induced change outstrips their descriptions of Soviet media.[52]

The pace of change and its drastic effects on the type and quality of information now available in the Soviet Union not only dates recent works about the media, but has also quickly dated traditional histories dealing with the country.[53] While some of the Western texts have always been more comprehensive accounts of Soviet history than Soviet texts, glasnost has done away with much of the censorship and has brought with it a wave of Soviet dedication to restoring the country's history intact and in detail.[54]

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the most helpful evaluation of the situation in the Soviet Union, from both a theoretical and content perspective, is provided not by media scholars, political scientists or legal scholars, but rather by a historian attempting to provide a historical interpretation, in The Gorbachev Phenomenon. Lewin begins with an insightful critique of traditional approaches that label the Soviet Union as totalitarian and thus fail "to recognize any mechanism of change," never mind "a shadow of historical process."[55] From there he begins to sketch the complicated historical process that has delivered the Soviet Union from a country of villages to one of megacities. With the complex problems that have resulted from that change lie the social and economic developments at the root of the vast problems facing Gorbachev.

Though he avoids simplistic explanations, Lewin sees patterns that may suggest that a civil society is emerging "from the bosom of a system that was statist par excellence." He defines civil society as "the aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist and act independently of the state or are official organizations capable of developing their own, spontaneous views on national or local issues and then impressing these views on their members, on small groups and, finally, on authorities."[56]

Lewin's analyses quickly suggest implications for the Soviet media, implications seemingly borne out by ongoing events and which have no explanation in traditional analyses. The development of a civil society that can cope with the complexities of modern Soviet life requires that internal politics develop which recognize the need to "use a new language: interplay and bargaining, yielding and conforming, pressuring and compromising, giving and taking."[57] The result would not be a Western-style democracy but rather a new authoritarianism a la russe: an authoritarianism built around negotiations among groups and classes coming into their own as autonomous players in a new game. Following that scenario, it can easily be imagined that the press must certainly become one of the major channels for the communication central to such negotiation and compromise. Lewin's insights offer a rare illumination of ongoing press developments in the Soviet Union, developments that recognize alternatives truths and society's diversity.

III. SOVIET MEDIA IN FLUX

It is especially important now to have a flexible model for study of the Soviet media, precisely because conditions themselves are constantly changing. Descriptive research efforts are quickly outdated as the approaches, methods, and technology of the system change. However temporary, such description is nonetheless valuable if it serves as another marker or milestone along the altered course of the Soviet media. Considering the amount of change that has occurred, it is not surprising that some may be misinterpreted, a point that will be pursued in greater detail later in the paper (see Model Framework). The literature--from scholarly journals to U.S. media trade press to popular news magazines and newspapers--is full of accounts of the impact of glasnost on life in the Soviet Union. The writers' focus ranges from what has not altered to what clearly has, both areas worthy of attention. One of the most striking aspects of glasnost is that similar discussion and debate is also occurring in the Soviet Union--publicly as well as privately.[58]

Though it has never before reached this magnitude, this is not the first time the Soviet Union has seen a thaw in government control of the media, and some of the changes are familiar.[59] In fact, it is frequently suggested that it is precisely those media professionals and intellectuals who experienced the thaw under Khrushchev who are the staunchest defenders of glasnost.[60] The intellectuals themselves suggest that this time their support lies not in optimism--for they refuse to allow themselves to believe that success is assured--but rather in individual commitments not to stand by and thus ensure failure.[61] Letters to the editor criticizing problems in the Soviet society are a staple of the Soviet media and always have been, but during a thaw their tone may change, and the topics are more varied.[62] During a thaw the range of topics journalists and other writers may deal with expands.[63] Censorship is eased and consideration is given to publication of works withheld earlier.

Glasnost shows evidence of all the typical thaw activities. Banned writers are being published, daring plays are being performed, and publishers are having a field day with letters to the editor.[64] There are differences, however. Unlike earlier periods of thaw, glasnost carries with it a concept of openness which goes far beyond those earlier experiences. For instance, the Draft Law on the Press--presented for public discussion late last year and now pending legislative approval--would abolish censorship, an activity the tsars were involved in long before the Revolution.

One area where the changes are the most striking is the government's easing of restraints on information. Soviet leaders argued in public on television before their own country and the world during the recent party congress.[65] The list of news items that can be reported has been expanded to include bad news--riots and disasters--that were never publicly acknowledged before.[66] In a country that has long made pretense to unity, Gorbachev has publicly suggested that there may be no single truth and that truth itself may be best arrived at through discussion.[67]

For journalists, glasnost suggests more than an expanded list of approved topics for letters to the editor. Gorbachev and others now urge journalists to seek timely stories and present them intelligently.[68] Investigative reporting is not new to Soviet journalism, but where exposés once bared only the ills the Party and government wanted exposed, there is the suggestion now that journalists should begin to show bureaucrats the way.[69]

Glasnost has begun to change the content of Soviet broadcast and print media alike. Radio--the first to change--introduced Mayak, a heady mix of rock 'n' roll and timely news bulletins, to the otherwise ponderous programming.[70]

The form and content changes in the print media have generated circulation wars in Moscow. The traditional press have begun losing ground rapidly, routed by the "radical" press which supports societal change. Argumenti i Fakty, a weekly newspaper with a policy of avoiding opinion and providing only the facts and arguments as its name suggests, now has the largest circulation in the world. It circulates to 31 million readers each week, an increase of 54 percent over its 1989 circulation. Perestroika puts each newspaper on a self-financing basis, whereby the costs of new equipment, newsprint and employee bonuses will have to come from year-end "profits."[71] And the new press law would allow private ownership of the press. Rupert Murdoch is poised to enter the market[72] and British press baron

Robert Maxwell already prints the English language edition of the crusading Moscow News.[73]

Soviet journalists, used to self-censorship, openly talk about retraining, and a prominent editor admitted to getting story ideas from his wife, who doesn't have to overcome the legacy of thirty years of self-censorship.[74] A Russian journalist posted in Washington says he and others serving abroad long for domestic postings where they may now pursue investigative pieces.[75]

Soviet television added a short nightly show about efforts to reconstruct the Soviet economy.[76] There are suggestions that over the longer term Soviet television programming will change greatly.[77] One of the most popular shows on Soviet television is the weekly Vzglad, translated as View or Viewpoint. A highly controversial 60-minute current events program run by a team of young journalists, the show routinely tackles taboo topics. Moscow residents excited by new offerings on television offer condolences to emigre friends only able to receive satellite broadcasts of the most staid of the Soviet channels.[78]

Glasnost not only reduces the number of topics off limits to Soviet journalists, it opens the door for foreign correspondents. Regular press conferences are held following meetings of the Politburo. Soviet leaders allow themselves to be interviewed on the sidewalk by Western press crews.[79]

The upshot of such changes is a strange twist on an old game. Reading between the lines of Pravda and Izvestia used to provide Soviet citizens and Western analysts alike with the best clues as to who was in power and what was happening in the inner circle of the Kremlin. Now Western Kremlinologists find Soviet leaders openly discussing such issues and events. And Soviet journalists complain that the Party organs have been relied on for so long to provide that kind of record that they are now constrained from breaking out and going after more exciting stories.[10]

In contrast to Schramm's scenario, Soviet and American media theorists and practitioners would and do find common ground. American and Soviet television audiences have similar profiles and viewing habits--only the more educated prefer educational material, and most watch for entertainment.[11] Messages are not always as convincing as their originators intend them, nor are they always effective in the way they were meant to be. Foreign news has always been of great interest to Soviet audiences, who gleaned what information they could from the news stories and, usually, attempted to ignore the negative messages the stories were intended to carry.

The Soviet journalists might now find common ground in areas Schramm could not have conceived. Soviet journalists do discuss the merits of and means to objectivity.[12] Soviet government officials urge the media to make themselves more credible. Soviet journalism education, in common with the American, grapples with the questions of how best to prepare the Soviet journalists to do their jobs effectively.[13] And one Soviet journalist even went so far as to suggest that Soviet and American journalists share a common enemy--their respective governments' bureaucrats.[14] In the same vein, Soviet and Western bureaucrats may have a common enemy in the journalists, as Party apparatchiks discover that the tame lapdog press they once fed with the truth now turns on them with a painful bite.[15]

Coverage of the ethnic disturbances in Azerbaijan provides a case in point. Unlike their foreign counterparts, Soviet reporters have access to the region but they have been "shot at, beaten and threatened" by crowds who accuse them of distorting the truth. On the other hand, officials who might once have confided crucial information to them on the assumption of tight censorship treat them as warily as they treat foreign reporters. Editors complain that everyone is trying to "sell their stories" and the "truth of what is happening is different to different people."[16]

Much has changed, especially in the realm of who and what may be criticized. Gorbachev did not like aa Argumenti i Fakty poll that showed the radical deputies were more popular that the he was, but his action stopped at complaints and suggestions that editor quit. But while the Argumenti i Fakty editor stayed on the job, later that same week Gorbachev actually got rid of the conservative editor of Pravda, a hold over from the Brezhnev era.[17]

Efforts to restore missing parts of Soviet history, particularly some of the "forgotten" heroes of the revolution, had been limited to those whose ideas bolstered Gorbachev's efforts at reconstruction.[88] But Lenin's legacy has now been called into question and there are even television debates about whether or not Lenin's body should be removed from its mausoleum and buried.[89]

Not all the official media may be as ready as the Moscow press to pursue their new role, and Soviet articles note that such hesitancy on the part of local papers may come from the journalists' feelings of insecurity.[90] One answer, the writers suggest, is the Draft Law on the Press and Information, which would among other things "bridge gaps" in current Soviet legislation and provide the support the media need to get the information they are entitled to--even from bureaucrats "uncomfortable in the light of glasnost."[91]

The course of glasnost has not been without conflict and confusion. Once-staid TASS has attracted world attention with stories of UFOs and alien landings. The opening of the first McDonald's in Moscow attracted more attention than the pending and important Central Committee meeting, and when Gorbachev chewed out the editor of Argumenti i Fakty it was news around the world.[92] Journalists complain that their professional union wwill not back them up and that local party officials stymie them at every turn as they try to do their jobs. Rural journalists went on strike when the local Party Council censored an article by one of the radical legislators. The people brought in to do the work during the strike joined the striking workers after they heard the story. Amid the confusion and the conflict, new parameters and definitions are being tested and set.

Not all of the changes have occurred in the areana of the official press. An estimated three hundred unofficial publications took a jump on the new press law provisions.[93] And, in an interesting twist, four years into glasnost, a respected samizdat journal halted publication because its dissident intellectual publishers wanted to allow the mantle of truth to shift from their shoulders to those of the publishers of the official publications.[94]

IV. MODEL FRAMEWORK

Theories, concepts and facts are of little use without a larger framework within which to locate and understand them. While that framework may alter shape and form over time as research proceeds, it nonetheless begins with some shape. The purpose of the construction of a process model is to make that shape explicit.[4] The model has its roots in two disparate areas: the modeling based on that suggested by Westley and MacLean and a three-level conceptualization of the functioning of Soviet intellectual property issues.[95]

In essence, the model takes the Westley-MacLean conceptual model of mediated communication (see figure 1) as updated by Lacy (see figure 2)[96] and splits it into three levels: practice, policy and philosophy (see figure 3). The concept of layering has its basis in Loeber's three-faceted approach to the workings of Soviet copyright law.[97]

Loeber traced aspects of administrative, labor and civil law to develop a picture of the copyright structure.[98] Administrative aspects of copyright law arose from Party involvement and review, ranging from directives to produce a work, to those providing for censorship. Labor law addressed the contracts, royalty structures and other arrangements that saw work into print and provided rewards for the writer. Civil law, he suggested, addressed the competing individual and social interests in copyright. His analysis classified the civil law aspects of Soviet copyright as those weighing the competing individual and social interests in copyright.[99] Recognizing the interest of the creator in protection of his work from unauthorized use and reward, the Soviet approach nevertheless was concerned with the society's interest in the creation and Soviet intellectual property rights were vested in society and not in the creation. Labor law came into play in the concept that the creator is not rewarded until society uses his creation, the structure of royalties, the contracts and the other arrangements through which a work appears in print.[100]

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[4] A process model strives to describe a process but stops short of suggesting causation. It is a step toward but also a step below causal process modeling.

Limiting a survey of Soviet copyright law to just its civil and labor aspects "ignores reality and falls short of providing a true understanding of how the system works," Loeber suggested.[101] The socialist user organizations that held the monopoly of the means of production are an arm of the state and were instructed by the state--each organization using creative works was subordinated the state organs that were subordinated to higher party organs, and so forth.[102]

He suggested that the administrative aspects of Soviet copyright could be seen as the Party directives and administrative reviews, whether oversight of a play by the local ministry of culture or approval of a work for publication abroad by VAAP, the Soviet copyright office. Other aspects of the administrative system, identified by Loeber included provisions for censorship, state control of publication of all works by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and the monopoly on circulation of all national and international information within the Soviet territory by TASS, the Soviet news agency.[103]

Using Loeber's framework as a basis, earlier research developed a model to suggest how Gorbachev's reconstruction campaign might affect Soviet intellectual property rights provisions.[104] It was suggested that, in that context, change would come to each aspect of the model at a different time. The administrative aspects of the system would be the most quickly and easily affected by change, driven as they are by the central party directives from Moscow. The least likely and slowest aspect of the three to change would be the civil. Because they carry the weight of the system's fundamental philosophical concepts, civil law concepts would be likely to change only over the long term.[105]

Between administrative and civil aspects of the system lie the labor law concepts, which would be open to change less quickly than administrative aspects, and almost as the result of societal acceptance of the permanence of administrative change. Translated into concrete terms--as the system stood at that time, were the general secretary to decide that society would gain from offering creators more incentive to produce, he could effectively produce directives that would set such change in motion. Censorship could be eased, publications could be encouraged to seek more creative authors, and restrictions could be eased on what films, plays and other works were released.

If such an atmosphere persisted, eventually it would begin to influence labor law decisions because the desire to reward artists and creators would translate into higher royalties and better contract arrangements. Over a longer term, the drive to create incentives would spread to planning and control issues, and the media and artistic sectors might be allowed more control over their own business.

Perceived as a better way to ensure the system's survival and success, the changes at both the administrative and labor level need not affect the civil level. The bedrock philosophy of the system remains unchanged. The means to the end may be changed as needed, but the end may not be perceived as having been altered. What is at stake is still the good of the system, and the control of the means still rests at the center.

It is possible to apply the same three-tiered approach to assess the conceivable effects of change beyond intellectual property rights issues. The model adapts well to the mass media issues because intellectual property and media issues in the Soviet Union share common roots. By setting that approach into the context of the Westley-MacLean model as revised by Lacy, it may be possible to develop a model of communication that adapts to the Soviet system and provides a vehicle for addressing the implications of change.[106] The result would be a multi-dimensional model from which to begin to fashion an explanatory system.

The Westley-MacLean model sought to bring together the results of diverse research in a model that would provide a picture of the process as a larger whole (see Model Construction).[107] Lacy extended the model, incorporating in it the progress made by communication researchers in the thirty years since its conception.[108] Both the original and the adaptation diagram the process of communication as a series of relationships between the subjects of communications, the communicators, and the receivers of the messages. Lacy's enhancements introduce the mediation process as a separate force and note the impact on the process of organizational and societal environments (see tables 1 and 2). It is an inherently open system, meaning that factors outside affect the process and the factors represented in the model influence other processes outside.

Lacy's additional adaptations of the model offer initial suggestions of how and where to look for changes taking place in the system, but it is not enough to look at it on one level. Soviet social scientists are the first to acknowledge that glasnost operates on several levels and the surface is distinct from what lies under it.[109] Mandel also suggests that in the final analysis the underlying structures of Soviet society will determine the shape and longevity of glasnost, not independent change at a more surface level.[110] The combination of the process flow approach and the three-level conception of the system structure may bring together the elements necessary to envision change as a larger process and better understand its potential as well as its parameters.

Pinpointing areas where change is occurring and viewing those changes as part of a larger process may begin to help explain that process itself. However, understanding a process as it has functioned--no matter how recently--cannot be taken as grounds for prediction.

Achieving adequate perspective on the system as it changes is especially important when it is understood that the very attention focused on media performance as a symbol of glasnost means that such performance can never be isolated from the importance it is given as a symbol of the larger endeavor for societal change. For instance, a groundbreaking media discussion of an issue, or the corresponding failure of the media to discuss an issue, cannot be understood in isolation as an issue of media performance. In the Soviet context, it could also be seen as a litmus test of the relative strength of the pro- and anti-change forces. As Grushin explains it, glasnost is not only a matter of more open societal discussion, but also one of creating the language in which that discussion is possible.

Extrapolating from the Loeber and Westley-MacLean analytical structures, then, the model conceptualizes the Soviet media system as a process model operating on three distinct levels, labeled here as practice, policy and philosophy (see figure 3). It is possible to view the levels from either perspective--from practice down to the foundation of philosophy or from practice up to the elevations of philosophy. For the purpose of this work, however, the first perspective will be employed. The level of practice will then be seen superimposed on policy, and policy itself imposed on philosophy. It is possible then to think of the three levels as partial templates--their patterns distinct, but related. The surface level is the practice of mass communication on a day-to-day basis. The second policy level deals with less immediate issues such as mid-term economics, regulations, labor and technological issues. Finally at the base, lies the level of philosophy, concerned with societal matters of ideology and culture.

The three levels, corresponding to Loeber's, are particularly useful in a model applied to press systems because they offer a useful device for separating out issues that frequently confuse cross-cultural press research. For instance, many countries' constitutions mandate a "free press," but the underlying philosophical context for understanding that phrase and the day-to-day translation of it in practice mean very different things in different countries.

Therefore viewing the process model as a system of layers makes it possible to locate research more precisely within a larger map of press system operation. This is important because it allows differentiation of the effects of change on distinct levels of the system, but also because it makes possible development of a more precise understanding of what aspect of the media system is actually being studied. Such an understanding is critical if research results are not to be generalized beyond reasonable limits. This may be a step toward alleviating the valid Soviet concerns that Western observers are frequently ready to jump on events at the practice level as symptoms of change in Soviet philosophy, not understanding that administrative directive can produce change on the surface which never is reflected in policy-level regulatory change or, even more important, in the philosophical perceptions of the media's role in society.[111] In misunderstanding the system, the same observers frequently overlook or underestimate evidence of fundamental change at a philosophical level because they are looking for practice-level evidence and overlooking global-sized shifts of an ideological nature.[112]

In time, changes at each level must influence the relationships of the elements of the others, but one of the most pressing reasons for the layering of the model is the perception that the levels operate at different times and with different speeds. To distinguish temporary change from that of a more permanent nature, it is necessary to look not only at the surface changes--which can be the result of directive alone--but also at the lower levels to see to what extent those changes are reflected or not in systemic and or philosophical level shifts.

V. MODEL CONSTRUCTION

To construct the model it is necessary first to describe the Westley-MacLean and Lacy offerings.[113] The elements identified by Lacy will then be adapted and split over the three levels of the model, accompanied by concrete examples of the elements in question.

In the Westley-MacLean conception (see figure 1) the three major components of the model are the communicators who play advocacy roles, represented by A, the communicators who play channel roles, represented by C, and people or groups who seek information, represented by B.[114] In this process, C serves as an agent for B, and its role is to select and pass on information that B needs and wants. In essence, in the Westley-MacLean vision A, B and C represent the people acting in those roles.

In Lacy's adaptation (see figure 2), the symbols A, B and C represent organizations or systems, and within those organizations different types of people interact.[115] In A, organizations that serve as the source of information, there are two types of actors, managers and other people, such as workers or public relations practitioners. Within C, the media organizations that act as information channels, there are now distinctions between managers, reporters and editors. And within B, the audience as a larger whole, there are interactions. Lacy also notes that it must not be overlooked that, for the purpose of his model, actors are seen in the roles they play and it cannot be overlooked that individual people may play several roles, serving in different capacities as sources, media practitioners and audience members. For instance, one person may serve at work as a newspaper editor, but on and off the job be involved in a professional association, and at home be a media consumer.[116]

In both the Lacy and Westley-MacLean configurations, the Xs represent objects of orientation--events, objects or people.[117] There are two ways information about the events enters the process. As the presence of the arrows indicates, advocates pass that information to the media, which channel it to the audience; or, the media observe directly and pass on the information. The Lacy adaptation, however, adds an additional arrow, which is especially important in the Soviet context. The events and objects reported in the media may also be observed directly by members of the audience.[118]

While both models reflect feedback loops between B and A, C and A, B and C, Lacy adds both interpersonal and mediated interaction effects between members of A, B and C, represented by hatched lines.[119] These interactions are important because they not only affect content selection and representation decision-making processes, but also because they affect interpretation of the mediated message.

Another important Lacy addition to the model is the environmental box, within which the rest of the process operates (see figure 2). The elements of the environment affect members in some or all of the boxes and include economic, regulatory, social, cultural and technological forces. None of the boxes in the model are closed systems. In the context of the environmental factors, he notes, this means that the reactions and behavior of individuals within the boxes and organizations they represent also influence the environment.[120] Again, in the Soviet context, this is a particularly important observation to keep in mind, since the media are vehicles, advocates and expressions of glasnost, which itself is a standard bearer for perestroika. In their exploration of new societal parameters, Soviet media are major contributors to new definitions of the societal factors themselves.

The Westley-MacLean model was developed on the basis of the body of mass media research at the time of its development. Likewise, Lacy's adaptations took into account the fruits of an additional thirty years' worth of research exploration in the field.[121] That body of Western research does not, however, include much that has been applied to the Soviet system--in part because the ideological bases of earlier theoretical assumptions denied scope for such research. Thus, the model extrapolates from Lacy's to suggest where research may head.

Perhaps the simplest way to envision the three levels of the model (see figure 3) is to think of them as templates.[5] Since the three levels are elements of a larger common system, it can then be taken as a given that the larger environment for each must be the same. Thus, if the environment is represented by a dashed box as in Lacy's model, the same box appliers to all three levels. While the environment is the same for all, that does not suggest that the impact of one factor or another may not be greater or lesser depending on the level in question. Economics, for instance, might play a larger role in prompting change at the practice and policy level than it would at the philosophical level, while cultural and social shifts might have deeper impact on philosophical issues than policy.

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[5] Webster's Dictionary defines a template as "a pattern, usually in the form of a thin metal, wooden, or paper plate, for forming an accurate copy of an object or shape."

In the same way, the large elements of the model, the advocates, channels and audience, show up on each of the three levels, as do the objects of attention. However, while the boxes are all represented, they might conceivably change sizes and relationships to each other on the various levels. In the same way, the distinctions between the actors within the elements may change from level to level, and perhaps even disappear. For instance, at the practice level there are clearly distinct patterns of relationship between individual audience members or channel operators. At the policy level, such actors would be recognized as roles only and not as individuals. Finally, at the philosophical level, the issues concerning the channel, the audience and the advocate deal with the elements themselves and not with the individual actors.

On a practice level, for instance, research might deal with how working reporters handle the new demands made on them since the advent of glasnost. At a policy level, research might look at the changing legal concepts of the role of the journalist in Soviet society from Lenin's Press Decree to the Draft Law on the Press. Finally, at a philosophical level, scholarship might deal with the changing concepts of truth and objectivity in Soviet society.

It may be through the exploration of changes in these relationships between elements of the model that the ongoing events in the Soviet Union can best be understood. It is also in sorting out the confused relationships of the elements from layer to layer that the failures of the ideological explanations of the press can be most clearly explained. Both Schramm and the Marxist-Leninists approached the practical level of media operations with simplistic ideological explanations that might better belong on a philosophical level alone. And the failure of both ideologically-driven approaches to mirror reality lies in the simplistic concepts of the elements of the models which have no relationship to reality at the practice level.

For instance, at the policy level of the system the channel would long have been considered an element of the advocate, either directly joined or even incorporated into the other block. The audience might also have assumed less prominence, or the feedback loops might rather have been eliminated. The importance of the independence of the levels shows up here. It is suggested that, with glasnost, the A, B, and C elements of the model have taken on different roles and relationships. The channel has broken free of the advocate and the audience has assumed more importance both as media consumers with a choice and as the generators of feedback.

Sweeping changes on the level of practice may not show up quickly on the policy level, but there is little question that the element configurations are being changed on the philosophical level, hence the importance of breaking the three levels apart. As Grushin suggested, to advance at all in a practical sense glasnost must change the philosophy of the system, and it is only after there are changes in the philosophy of the system that the policy change can be effected. The evidence of the nature of recent events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suggests that ideological change may come very rapidly, in fact far too rapidly for the policy level of the system to adapt. It then becomes necessary to operate on the practical level, to seek definitions for the philosophical level, and, somewhere between the two, to recreate the policy level in between.

Soviet intellectuals and reformers are not unaware or the magnitude of the problem facing them. For glasnost and perestroika to succeed, they will have to be implemented in the form of new laws and amendments to the country's constitution. But since the Soviet legal system has not been independent of the administrative system, there is little reason to suggest that a change in law will be enough to produce a change in social conditions.[122] Instead, to implement the new laws a change must be generated in the society's concept of law, justice and the legal system. So new laws must be adopted, at the same time the legal system must be reformed and legal philosophy expanded and altered. In short, the reformers seek the creation of the "Society of Law."[123] The legal and media reform efforts have bearing on each other and it is not by chance that the issues facing reformers of both have distinct parallels.[124]

It can be argued that the long-term success of reconstruction efforts will rest on how successfully that middle level can be reformed, how well the three levels can be coordinated, and how long that process takes. Understanding that the time and environmental factors that influence activity on the different levels are distinct provides an opportunity to better understand the system's operation generally.

While by definition the same Xs must exist on all three planes, they may take on different relationships to the other elements from level to level as perceptions of news and newsworthiness change. This is a critical concept for a model attempting to describe change in Soviet media functioning. Its importance rests on the perception of some observers that it is the difference in the perceptions of Xs that has brought the old order crashing down around the ears of the Soviet and East European bureaucrats. Since reality is observed by people independent of channels, the argument goes, the channels' failures to accurately convey information about Xs of which the people are already aware has undermined their confidence in information about Xs of which they were not aware. At the same time, information available from Western media or other external sources cast even graver doubt on the validity of the information available.

Glasnost has done much to alter this picture on the practical level, especially. Bad news is reported. Disasters, both man-made and natural, are covered for the first time. Formerly taboo topics are now fair game. Competition gives rise to media concerns about content validity. And audiences exposed to coverage of the realities they are familiar with are awakening to new possibilities and demanding more of the system and the media. With exposure, media practitioners in the Soviet Union are faced with the unheard-of dilemma of balancing the different truths that come with the varied perceptions of events. The importance of such change cannot be overestimated if one considers that the Soviet system had traditionally been a state where, at the policy level, there was still an inherent concept of a Party line.

There are those who have argued that it is the discrepancies between the packaged accounts of reality according to Party line and the audience observations of Xs or interpersonal accounts of Xs that forced the introduction of glasnost.[125] At the same time, readers of official papers papers had read not for content, but rather for what they could deduct from reading between the lines. The existence of such observations and interaction effects

FIGURE 4

Map of previous research efforts on three-level model


Mickiewicz
Nord
Remington
Schillinger
Economic, Social, Cultural and Technological Environment
A
C
B
X1
X2
X3
X4
Xn
r
Practice
Policy
Philosophy

ENDNOTES

1. National Public Radio report of meeting between Gorbachev and Chinese leaders, Beijing, May 23, 1989.

2. Two-part interview with George Kennan, MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, 30 December 1988; Labedz (1988).

3. Altschull (1984); Picard (1983); Smith (1982).

4. Schillinger (1989):1.

5. Martin and Chaudhary (1983); Picard (1983).

6. Schillinger (1989).

7. Schillinger (1989):2.

8. Grushin and Popov (1989).

9. Mickiewicz (1988); Remington (1988).

10. Nord (1977):9-10.

11. Lewin (1988):3.

12. Reynolds (1971):4.

13. Lenin (1972):147-151, 185-189, 198-201.

14. Siebert, Peterson, Schramm (1956):105-146.

15. Schramm (1956):144-146.

16. Schramm (1956):144-145.

17. Schramm (1956:130).

18. Schramm (1956):146.

19. Hopkins (1970):viii.

20. Hopkins (1970):viii.

21. Hopkins (1970):53.

22. Hopkins (1970):53.

23. Hopkins (1970):54.

24. Picard (1982):25-26, 83.

25. Altschull (1984):109.

26. Altschull (1984):108.

27. Picard (1982, 1985); Hachten (1981, 1987).

28. McQuail (1983):92-94.

29. McQuail (1983):93.

30. Schillinger (1989):3.

31. Schillinger (1989).

32. Laqueur (1987):238.

33. Dizard (1987); Malik (1984).

34. Reshetar (1972):337.

35. Reshetar (1972):337.

36. Reshetar (1972):336.

37. Reshetar (1972):337.

38. Reshetar (1972):337.

39. Remington (1988).

40. Grushin and Popov (1989).

41. Kramer (1990):78.

42. Laqueur (1987).

43. Laqueur (1987):244-245.

44. Laqueur (1989).

45. Laqueur (1989):xv.

46. Cohen (1985):132.

47. Mandel (1989):xiii, 185.

48. McQuail (1983):92-94.

49. Paroyatnikova (1990).

50. Glendon (1982); Loeber (1985).

51. Inkeles (1968); Markham (1967); Hopkins (1970).

52. Remington (1988); Mickiewicz (1988).

53. Labedz (1987); Powell (1987).

54. Moscow News, Literary Gazette, Argumenti i Fakty, and other Soviet media regularly run pieces on the nation's history which ammend, contradict or supplant the much-edited offical histories. In the spring of 1989, college level history matriculation exams were cancelled because it was felt the history text the students had been using had been so innaccurate no purpose was served by testing until new textbooks could be released.

55. Lewin (1988):3.

56. Lewin (1988):80.

57. Lewin (1988):152.

58. Lewin (1988).

59. Hopkins (1970):104-108.

60. MAkele (1988); Grushin (1989); Paroyatnikova (1990).

61. Grushin and Popov (1989); Paroyatnikova (1990).

62. Hopkins (1970):302-304.

63. Hopkins (1970):128-130.

64. Sommer (1987).

65. Taubman (1988).

66. Sommer (1987).

67. Jakubowicz (1987).

68. Schillinger (1988); Jones and Woodbury (1986).

69. Jones and Woodbury (1986); Shears (1988).

70. Mickiewicz (1987):135.

71. Shelledy (1988).

72. Paroyatnikova (1990).

73. Kramer (1990):82.

74. Makele (1988).

75. Fitzgerald (1988).

76. Guider (1987b).

77. Guider (1987a).

78. Comments of Russian emigres reacting to Soviet television broadcasts, M.S.U., 1988.

79. Rather (1988).

80. Shelledy (1988).

81. Mickiewicz (1981).

82. Schillinger (1988).

83. Runnion (1988); Schillinger (1988).

84. Fitzgerald (1988).

85. New York Times News Service (1990).

86. New York Times News Service (1990).

87. Keller (1989b).

88. Wiley (1988).

89. Paroyatnikova (1990).

90. Fedotov (1987); Ivanov (1987).

91. Fedotov (1987):17.

92. Keller (1989).

93. Paroyatnikova (1990).

94. Kramer (1990):80.

95. Lacy (1989); Westley and McLean (1957); Cassara (1988).

96. Lacy (1989).

97. Loeber (1985).

98. Loeber (1985):298.

99. Loeber (1985):297-303.

100. Loeber (1985):303-308.

101. Loeber (1985):308.

102. Loeber (1985:308).

103. Loeber (1985:312).

104. Cassara (1988).

105. Glendon (1982):374-381.

106. Lacy (1989).

107. Westley and MacLean (1957).

108. Lacy (1989).

109. Grushin (1989).

110. Mandel (1989).

111. Paroyatnikova (1990).

112. Paroyatnikova (1990).

113. Westley and MacLean (1957); Lacy (1989).

114. Westley and MacLean (1957).

115. Lacy (1989).

116. Lacy (1989).

117. Westley and MacLean (1957); Lacy (1989).

118. Lacy (1989).

119. Lacy (1989).

120. Lacy (1989).

121. Westley and MacLean (1957); Lacy (1989).

122. Madigan (1990).

123. Madigan (1990).

124. Paroyatnikova (1990).

125. Sommer (1987).

126. Dizard and Swensrud (1987).

127. Boyd (1988); Dizard (1988).

128. Kramer (1990):80.

129. Kramer (1990):81; Bohlen (1990).

130. Nord (1977):11.

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Polish Media in the Age of Solidarity

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Autumn Quarter 1989
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Polish Media in the Age of Solidarity

Introduction

Over the past decade Solidarity has sought a rebirth for Poland. Mass communications, which was under the monolithic, central control of the Communist government, was one area Solidarity wanted to change. It was also an area where the Communist Party, despite promises and efforts at openness, wanted to retain power. This paper looks at the primary issues facing the media in Poland during the start of Solidarity, the struggle over the media that ensued as the Solidarity movement became an opposition force in Poland, and the restructuring of the media that has been taking place as Poland moves from a totalitarian Communist Party regime to a more pluralistic government.

Background

Poland was placed under Soviet authority in 1945 when the Yalta Agreement signed the country over to Joseph Stalin. Poles resented having the Soviet government and Russian values foisted on them. This cultural mismatch caused Stalin to remark in frustration that creating a communist government in Poland was like putting a saddle on a cow. In particular, the strict Marxist-Leninist model of mass communications was difficult to maintain because of the Poles' historical mistrust of the imposed Communist government and because of their almost innate desire for more independent expression.

In the post-Stalin thaw, the government tried to make communism fit Poland by responding in a limited way to the request for a more open press. By the early 1960s, although the Polish media was not free by Western standards, it was more independent than that in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the German Democratic Republic, or Czechoslovakia (Paulu, 271). In contrast to the deadly repercussions felt in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland's departures from hard-line communism have never led to a Soviet military invasion. Fear of local authorities and the threat of Soviet retaliation kept a temporary lid on dissent.

Had the Polish United Workers Party (the Communist officials in Poland) been able to establish an efficient operation and a prosperous economy, it would have been hard to predict how tolerant Poles would have been of the communist media approach, whereby news is selected and interpreted to emphasize the correctness of communist ideology. As it turned out, stubborn efforts to present an optimistic front as social and economic conditions deteriorated were not only futile, but counterproductive.

Over the past 25 years the Polish government became increasingly inefficient in managing the affairs of state. The controlled economy was not working. In the 1970s, Edward Gierek came into power and began reckless industrial expansion. Ten years of similar mismanagement bankrupt Poland. The country faced shortages of food and other commodities. When waves of labor unrest swept the country, Gierek was removed from office. During strikes in 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Solidarity emerged, calling itself a self-governing, independent trade union. Yet its demands went beyond usual labor requests. It challenged basic government structures, including the way the state-controlled media handled news and information.

The government, first under Stanisław Kania and then under General Wojciech Jaruzelski, tried to reach accords with the Solidarity union. A limited amount of official media access was granted, censorship of some publications was eased, and new independent publications were tolerated. While appearing to be loosening the reigns on the media and other areas, the government actually hoped to smooth over the situation to keep the opposition from gaining ground. Realizing that not enough progress was being made on this and other issues, some Solidarity members further defied the authorities. The sovereignty of the Communist government, not to mention the peace of the nation, was at stake. Pushed far enough, Jaruzelski declared martial law on December 13, 1981, and suspended most media operations. Martial law was lifted in July of 1983.

Meantime, Solidarity had regrouped and was existing alongside official Poland as a parallel culture with its own extensive underground media. The government was unable to stop them (Soley et al, 215). The Communist government, which had lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the people, continued simply from inertia (Niemczyk). Finally, as the country tottered on collapse, the Communist Party met with Solidarity for a round-table discussion in February of 1989. Negotiations led to changes in the way elections were held and Solidarity was given permission to published and openly distribute its journal, *Tygodnik Solidarność*. Within weeks the Communist government lifted many other restrictions on the media. The 1989 summer elections created a Solidarity-led government, which was a coalition among the Democratic Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and Solidarity.

The Soviet Union, itself in an era of glasnost and perestroika, accepted the recent political upheaval. As of this writing, Poland remains a member of the Warsaw Pact and

COMECON. In describing the changes in Poland, the Soviet press emphasized the role the Communist Party played in bringing about the current restructuring (Toporkov, 4).

The new leadership is charged with the task of restoring the economy and public faith in government. The government is not entirely non-Communist, as the Communist Party controls defense and security. The mass media, including broadcast, is now under the direction of the Solidarity-led government. With one eye on Moscow and the other on the possible problems that could arise when a new, fragile government allows more pluralism in its country's media, the Solidarity-led government is adapting some existing structures, building on the changes made by the Communist government over the past couple of years, and instituting its own approaches to the nation's mass communications. To understand its present strategy, we need to look at the evolution of press control in Poland as it emerged from Communist domination.

Legal Structure

The Polish Constitution, adopted in July of 1952, put the means of communication under "the special care and protection by the states and by all citizens" (qtd. in Paulu, 272). The constitution does not explicitly deny or guarantee freedom of speech or freedom of the press, but it does forbid citizens from joining or participating in organizations that might undermine the political, social, or legal system. The Polish Communist government often interpreted this article as restricting unofficial publishing and broadcasting (Paulu, 272). Poland also has laws prohibiting the mass media from criticizing the government, revealing military and state secrets, ruining international relations, inciting disturbances of law and order, and publishing inaccurate information. Andrzej Gwiadza, a Solidarity negotiator, said in 1980, "On paper our laws are splendid, but the practice is far removed from them" (qtd. in Ash, 60).

The previous government interpreted the constitutional imperative to give state protection to the media in a characteristically communist way. It regulated all mass communications from the top down. The Minister of Communications was a member of the chief governing body of Poland, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Until recently, the Politburo of the Polish United Workers Party filled both councils. The Council of Ministers appointed the Committee for Radio and Television, and the Sejm (Parliament) approved program and budget plans (Paulu, 273). The committee handled domestic and internal broadcasts, with the exception of transmitters and lines, which were under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Communications. The Main Office of the Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances oversaw publishing, the print media and live performances.

Under these offices branched an extensive bureaucracy which wrote and enforced regulations on the content, ownership, distribution, and circulation of the mass media (Kowalski, 184). The means to produce media (ink, presses, typewriters, copy machines) were also carefully allocated. The government appointed dependable people to important positions on newspapers and at broadcast stations. They were expected to "conform to policy and to carry out directives" (Paulu, 273).

During the 1970s, the Politburo stepped up its efforts to regulate the mass media to avoid having its failings exposed (Kowalski, 184). Paradoxically, as the government created stricter regulations and employed more people to supervise journalists, its effectiveness in swaying public opinion weakened. The media lost credibility with its audience as readers read and heard items that belied what they could observe first-hand (Pomorski, 11). The multitude of regulations gagged loyal party journalists. Not only were they unable to describe the state of society to the public, they were unable uncover problems and report confidentially to government leaders. The government became ignorant of much of what was happening in the country (Curry, 5).

The striking shipyard workers in Gdansk in 1980 addressed the problem of mutual mistrust between the government and the governed, and noted that lack of complete and accurate information exacerbated these feelings. The Communist government recognized that "the public not only hungered for information, they demanded it" (Curry, 420). The government signed an accord allowing a more open media in August 1980, but thereafter battled Solidarity over the legal limits.

The government's promises were tested when official and unofficial media began reporting on previously taboo topics. The declaration of martial law, in which most newspapers were suspended and television and radio were put on limited operations, "was the final demonstration of the threat a freer press held for the rulers of Poland" (Curry, 430).

Martial law was not as harsh in its treatment of wayward journalists as has been reported in the Western press. As usual, the government was too inefficient and corrupt to enforce its stringent regulations (Niemczyk). With the exception of well-known agitators, who were arrested and imprisoned (among them former journalist and current Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki), most underground journalists were only harassed and intimidated, rather than prosecuted, for publishing illegally. The penalties for infractions were minor, and some people openly flauted the law by handing out periodicals under the noses of the ZOMOS (state militia) (Niemczyk). The ineptitude of martial law — rather than its strictness— further eroded the party's diminishing power over the press and the people (Niemczyk).

Soon after agreeing to open elections, the Communist government passed a law lifting many restrictions on the media (FBIS, May 31, 1989, 26). This law reduced censorship and permitted independent publishers to operate legally and to sell publications at newsstands.

Despite this and other bids for public support of a reformed communism, a Solidarity-led government was elected. Solidarity inherited the high ranking political structure which oversees the mass media, and while some new people have been appointed to fill positions, Solidarity has not yet restructured these governing bodies. Like the Communist Party, the Solidarity government can skirt freer press laws by appointing trusted people to editorships. For example, Prime Minister Mazowiecki selected the editor of the supposedly independent *Tygodnik Solidarność*.

Censorship

Solidarity's earliest coup was forcing the Communist government to publicly admit censorship existed. Until 1980, the Communist government denied censoring the state-owned media, saying it was unnecessary since editors and journalists were loyal to the regime. Meanwhile, censors deleted any references to censorship (Curry, 420).

The extent of censorship of the official press was revealed to the Western world in 1977, when a former censor smuggled more than 700 pages of classified guidelines into Sweden. The documents were published in London and copies were smuggled back into Poland, where they circulated via the underground. The Black Book, as it was called, was evidence that the government had to strong-arm their presumably reliable writers and editors. Petty details show "the absurd lengths to which the Gierek leadership went to foster the so-called 'propaganda of success'" (Curry, vi).

The government had decided that, "no matter what disasters befell Poland and its economy, the government would claim success, and by so doing, would convince the population that it was successful" (Curry, 19). Censors were required to delete unflattering references to living standards, the cost of living, education, health, environmental pollution, emigration, transportation, foreign trade, productivity, consumer goods, and agriculture. Glowing media reports of day-to-day life deviated so far from reality that the public was infuriated, rather than convinced.

Political scientist Jane Leftwich Curry (415), who studies the interrelationships between the government and the media in Poland, wrote, "In the end, the leadership's investment in developing a massive bureaucracy of censors carefully directed by trusted party men to deny all failures in the system was one of the things that cost Gierek and his men their power and left his successors with so little authority that they could not stop Solidarity or be equal partners with them."

Although the fledgling Solidarity union considered demanding access to broadcast and freedom of speech, print and publication, presenting such a proposal would have been dangerous in the era before Mikhail Gorbachev (Ash, 44). Instead, Solidarity strikers asked for legal restrictions on, not abolishment of, censorship and requested a public statement of what was and was not permissible. Since the country had no laws on censorship, current practices were, they said, "were the arbitrary exercise of power by censors following secret instructions (on the authority of an open ended decree from 1946)" (Ash, 60). The government agreed Solidarity's proposal was reasonable, then vacillated. A great deal more freedom was permitted in minor publications with small readership than in the media the government considered more important, such as television news and the major dailies (Curry, 421).

Inspired by Solidarity's example, official journalists (The Association of Professional Journalists) met in November of 1980 to re-think their position. They suggested new structures that would protect their work from too much interference so they could be "partner in politics, guiding and reflecting both the population and the leadership views" (Curry, 426). Their proposal was rejected. After martial law was lifted, the Association's leaders wrote a letter outlining the government's failure to meet promises made to Solidarity on media policy. When official papers refused to publish it, the opposition paper, *Tygodnik Solidarnośc*, did.

Unofficial papers tolerated above ground after the lifting of martial law, such as the Catholic independent *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Tygodnik Solidarnośc* still had to face the censors. A power struggle ensued. *Tygodnik Powszechny* indicated deletions with asterisks. Solidarity barred Polish television from its meetings. Official journalists defied the government news machine in more subtle ways. Writers used veiled language and symbols to give their audiences an inkling of what was happening. Most readers, for example, knew that "anti-czarist" meant "anti-Soviet"(Niemczyk). Another technique was to discuss an historical event to clue readers that a similar situation was brewing (Grudzinska-Gross, 11).

Beginning in the mid-1980s, writers could be somewhat more direct as censors eased up. Jaruzelski had changed his stance in the hopes of earning a broader base of support from Solidarity and the Roman Catholic Church for an austerity program to strengthen Poland's economy (Diehl, "Solidarity," A 23). Censors became less vehement in denying the publication of certain items. After censors forbid *Reporter* from printing an interview in autumn of 1988 with Lech Walesa describing ideas on how to revive Poland, the editors of *Konfrontacje* got permission to run the piece. Analysts saw the editors' victory, as "more than an isolated case. The permission is part of the upheaval designed to open the press to all but the most strident voices" (Taglibue, "Warsaw," 3).

Yet, when the government legalized independent publishing and proposed ending all censorship in April of 1989, Solidarity refused the latter offer. They said independent publishers needed a protective censorship to keep the government from suddenly deciding they didn't like what was written, indicting publishers for violating state secrecy, and destroying them financially (Erickson, 6).

Censorship, both self-imposed and government-imposed, is operating in the current Polish government. Many items must first pass the eye of the censor before they can be printed. Criticism of the army, police and secret services is forbidden (Husarska, 29) and the press is circumspect in talking about the Soviet Union and Germany (Staniszkis). For example, an item entitled "*Pravda* is Not Truthful" in the Sept. 22-24, 1989, *Gazeta Wyborza* contains censor's marks in references to *Pravda's* editor. Nevertheless censorship restraints are loosening to keep pace with a rapidly changing Eastern Europe, where several former bloc nations are now outstripping Poland in dismantling communist binds. In addition to protecting sensitive political issues, the government is exercising caution in not permitting total leeway for the media because it has not yet set up an independent judiciary or specific laws covering such areas as libel (Staniszkis). Today's press coverage reflects the new government's, instead of the Communist's, standards of appropriateness. Artists, authors and social critics, for example, whose names had been cut out of the papers under the Communist regime, are now featured in the media and their works are being published by the state (Husarska, 29).

A free-market economy and a marketplace of ideas do not necessarily go hand in hand. Publishers have grown accustomed to the face of the Communist censor, but not to that faceless but menacing entity, the censorship of the market place. A non-subsidized magazine, for example, that could intelligently discuss the economy probably wouldn't survive in Poland because it would not have enough readership or advertising support (Staniszkis). Western foundations willing to finance a dissident press under the Communist regime may no longer be willing to pay for that press in a freer nation (Husarska, 31).

Telling all may be as counterproductive in Poland as hiding everything. The government-owned radio stations broadcast the Sejm proceedings in their entirety.

Listeners are bored because the unimportant is not sorted out from the important, according to Polish sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis.

"People are tired of words, censored or uncensored. They want to see positive action in Poland," Staniszkis said.

The types of critical writing now found in the Polish press rarely resemble the U.S. style. In contrast to the U.S. press practice of scrutinizing the policies and procedures of government and the actions of individual leaders, the Polish critic looks at government ideals. The differences of opinion voiced in the press nowadays take the form of rhetorical debates on abstract notions. On August 11, *Gazeta Pomorska* ran an interview with former Solidarity counselor and member of the Christian Socialist Party Władysław Sila-Nowicki, who was highly critical of Solidarity because it was "moving away from democracy" (FBIS, 31 Aug. 1989, 38). The piece did not document specifically how Solidarity was becoming undemocratic. (Of note: the item carried a cryptic editorial annotation saying the interview was "unauthorized".) The Aug. 18, 1989, issue of *Tygodnik Solidarność* contains a commentary on the various forms of democracy. The press may be reflecting the uncertainty among Poland's leaders about what democracy means and how a democratic system functions in practical day-to-day operations.

When the government moves from this nebulous discussion stage toward actual implementation of new policies, it will be interesting to see what latitude will be granted to the press in criticizing government activities. The government's move toward a free market will cause additional economic dislocation as bureaucrats lose their unproductive jobs and workers are dismissed from unprofitable factories. Already some disgruntled workers allege that Solidarity was co-opted by the Communists and accuse the new government of being unsympathetic to the worker's plight (Selbourne, 18). As under the previous regime, the government-owned press is running persuasive pieces, such as the Aug. 28 item in *Rzeczpospolita* entitled "A Measure of Civic Responsibility," which asks readers to be loyal to their government and to their new leaders (FBIS, 31 Aug. 1988, 44). The social situation is potentially explosive, and the months ahead will test the new government's commitment to an almost unbridled press if its economic plans are hindered by harsh media criticism. However, as of the summer of 1990, leading journalists continue to be protective of the year-old government and critical of attempts to undermine it, while displaying particular acrimony toward Lech Walesa, the leader of the Solidarity movement who currently has no official government role. Journalists such as historian Adam Michnik are editorially resisting the attempts of factions to destabilize the transitional government in the midst of growing rifts between the installed government and Walesa's camp of the Solidarity union. Quarrels are arising over the nature and pace of reforms. Walesa views the new government as moving too slowly toward change and not informing the public adequately about its programs (Bering-Jensen, p. 29).

Print Media Ownership

In spring of 1989 the Communist government allowed new publications to open simply by registering with authorities, and encouraged publishers to get Western backing for their enterprises (Wattenberg, 5). The Mazowiecki administration is discouraging the independent press from relying on state printing facilities. To break the state monopoly on the printing industry, the government wants people to establish small, private corporations (Husarska, 31).

The push, spearheaded by the Communist regime, toward private ownership and private financing of some newspapers is a radical change from a year ago, when Poland's 97 official newspapers (46 of them weeklies) were financed and published by the Communist Party on state-owned presses. Government figures claimed that the number of newspapers increased (there were 81 in 1970) and that the total per issue circulation for these papers grew from 85 million in 1970 to 103 million in 1987 (Sadowski, 483). (Poland has a population of 37.7 million). The government reported that the number of magazines rose from 2669 titles to 2986 (681 monthlies) in the same period (Sadowski, 483). The Communist government blanketed newsstands with a variety of special interest publications—women's magazines, sports magazines, and so forth—to reach diverse audiences (Curry, 26). Periodicals were also published by Communist Party groups such as youth organizations, academic societies, and trade unions

When the Communist Party was in charge of the nation, for several decades it tolerated a few independent publications, mostly run by religious groups. Jewish journals, including a Yiddish-Polish weekly, were allowed to published with limited censorship since the government did not want to raise issues of anti-Semitism (Curry, 280). Moreover, the government did not feel threatened by these small circulation journals. Catholic presses, though technically illegal, were allowed to exist because the Communist government realized it was in its own best interest to get along with this powerful force in Polish life. The Catholic Church claims 94 percent of the population as communicants. The Catholic weeklies, including *Tygodnik Powszechny* and *Więz*, have always published above ground. Copies were available by subscription only and circulation was limited by the government. Each issue had to undergo pre-publication censorship. For many years the Catholic Church has also run a Communist newspaper and publishing house, Pax. The

Polish Communist government legalized the Catholic Church in Spring of 1989, and let it increase its publishing operations (Diehl, "Church", A27).

While the Communist government no longer controls the state presses, the party continues to publish its own newspapers. Warsaw's *Tribuna Ludu* is the Communist Party's largest newspaper, with a daily circulation of more than one million. The Communist Party also publishes the major national weeklies, *Polityka*, a social and political journal, and *Kultura*, a commentary on the arts, and several other journals. The Polish government's daily newspaper, *Rzeczpospolita* , is headed by a pro-Solidarity editor, Dariuz Fikus, who was appointed by Prime Minister Mazowiecki in mid-October. The state-owned and operated *Rzeczpospolita* is expected to reflect government views accurately (Taglibue, "Shevardnadze", A6). *Tygodnik Solidarność*, which was legalized in early 1989, is ostensibly an independent organ of the Solidarity union, though it continues close ties to the new government (Staniszkis). Mazowiecki was its founding editor. A new daily, *Gazeta Wyborza*, is independently managed but printed on state presses. Its editor-in chief, Adam Michnik, was installed by Lech Walesa. Most of its writers were formerly with the underground opposition press, *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Husarska, 29). The flag of *Gazeta Wyborza* contains the Solidarity logo along with the words, "There would be no freedom without Solidarity." Because of the newspaper's current pro-Mazowiecki, anti-Walesa stance, the union leader no longer wants the paper to carry the Solidarity logo (Bering-Jensen, 28).

All presses — state, independent, and church-owned — are facing shortages of supplies and equipment. Ink, paper, and glue are rare commodities, as is gasoline for transporting and distributing printed materials (Husarska, 29). To get much needed printing equipment, entrepreneurs are attempting to set up joint operating agreements with foreign publishing houses. The foreigners would purchase and own the presses and the supplies, while the Poles, who work at lower wages, would print at reduced cost (Husarska, 31). It would be difficult to say, at this stage in the government changeover, how many independent publishers will be able to start up and survive in the dismal economic climate, or how much diversity of news and opinion will emerge as a result of independent ownership.

The Underground Press

The opportunity to operate above ground poses a quandary for Poland's samizdat publishers (Erickson, 6). For years many have fought for more openness of expression, and now the movement many argued for —the opposition — is now the establishment. Some Solidarity underground publications are questioning what their new mission should be (Husarska, 1).

While some see legalizing their operations as the goal for which they had been striving, others foresee several disadvantages to giving up their status as *bezdebitowy* (publishers without rights to circulate). First, their writing would be subjected to censorship, and second, until the country becomes more efficient and less bureaucratic, publications could be stalled in red tape, complicated tax accounting, and inefficient distribution. Third, it is easier to get supplies, equipment and manpower on the black market than it is to obtain them legally (Husarska, 31).

Clandestine publishing reached such an extensive scale during the oppressions of the 1970s and 1980s that underground publisher Grzegorz Boguta referred to it as "the only branch of the economy that has blossomed amid the general decay of the last years" (qtd. in Husarska, 31). In 1976, the Workers Defense Committee, or KOR, began publishing bulletins, periodicals, books and brochures. Other independent political, literary, student, worker and youth organizations followed their example. The most well-known of the secret publishing houses is NOWA, which started in 1976 and moved several times around the country. By 1980, 35 similar houses were founded. Workers in every large industrial plant began producing their own periodical and soon there were more than 160 illegal but active publishing and print shops (Kaminska, 513). Probably the largest collection of their publications are the confiscated editions stored in the archives of the Ministry of the Interior (Kaminska, 514).

Underground publishers prided themselves on outwitting and even co-opting the secret police in their production and distribution methods. Some people were jailed, but enforcement of bans against private publishing were, in general, lax. A few bold distributors went knocking door to door (Kaufman, "Knock", 2). Punishment usually consisted of confiscation of copies, detention of offenders, or seizure of business cars (Kaufman, "Crackdown", 7).

Unable to receive useful information from the Communist government media, the public was eager to support illicit publications. Although presses were able to produce only a small number of copies, readership rates were expanded by people passing one copy among their friends and neighbors. Children were kept informed of the brewing dissent through juvenile samizdat (See Attachment A). Underground publishing peaked in 1982, when an estimated 766 titles of periodicals were being printed regularly (Kaminska, 517). Clandestine publishing was so pervasive that in the 1980s it became the artistic and information vehicle for the parallel culture and leadership that co-existed alongside the official government, whose warnings and messages were increasingly ignored. Eventually the original KOR plan was realized: an evolution, not a revolution, of a grass roots political power to counterbalance the party-state and thereby achieve greater freedom and pluralism (Soley, et al, 203).

Clandestine Radio Broadcasts

Historian Timothy Ash (285) said, "Solidarity's operational strength was the ability to communicate rapidly nationwide." During martial law, when mail, telex, and phone services were stopped, and most of the national commissioners of Solidarity were arrested, two activists who avoided arrest, a physicist and an electrician, masterminded a clandestine radio station, Radio Solidarity, to carry news and information (Soley et al, 205).

The ability to predict and circumvent police behavior enabled the station to coordinate resistance throughout martial law, despite several seizures of transmitters (Soley et al 206). The operators used tape recorders and timers to avoid being present when the signal was traced. They also collaborated with the clandestine press to announce sign-on times and channels. Since this also notified the authorities, announcements were given quickly before the signal was jammed. The broadcasters avoided continuous jamming by moving from city to city.

The government's broadcasts of black stations pretending to be Radio Solidarity did not fool listeners. Many listeners had taped the announcers' voices during the original broadcast to compare with later broadcasts. The clear signal and the absence of jamming were also tip offs. The government was unable to thwart the large demonstrations Radio Solidarity organized. Most useful during martial law, Radio Solidarity operated until 1985. By then, Solidarity was communicating and organizing illegally but above ground.

Soley (215) noted that, "Radio Solidarity was able to succeed because the government's repressions were half-hearted." Members of the underground were aware that arrests had few serious consequences and were willing to risk imprisonment. Sentences were mild and many of the detained were granted amnesty. Some prisoners were beaten, but they were not tortured, put to hard labor, or executed (Soley, 215). Several people involved with Radio Solidarity were captured and tried, and the harshest sentence (two years in prison) went to the electrician because, it was felt, without him the announcers wouldn't have had the technical knowledge to create the station, which was often run off a car battery (Soley, 209).

Foreign Services Radio Broadcasting into Poland

Radio Free Europe (RFE), the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) Foreign Services, and Radio Moscow were the primary sources of outside radio broadcasts received in Poland before, during, and after martial law. Polish programming on Radio Moscow supported communist ideology. The Western broadcasters, while following their own political agenda, have for several decades provided Poles with information unavailable from the government-run media. The increasing discrepancies between Western and Communist news made Poles wonder what the real situation was in Poland (Short, 74).

Radio Free Europe, which was previously covertly funded and supervised by the CIA and which since 1973 has been openly financed primarily through U.S. federal funds, encourages resistance to communist governments. It began broadcasting into Poland from a rhombic antenna in West Germany on August 4, 1950 (Michelson, 30). Radio Free Europe receives its information about Poland from several sources. Among them is a unit in Munich devoted to monitoring and analyzing Polish samizdat (Kaminska, 555). The service also interviews emigres and travelers leaving Poland. In addition, it relays information released by confidential sources to Western news correspondents back into the country, sometimes within minutes (Michelson, 212).

Listening to the Polish Services of BBC and Radio Free Europe gave Poles information about their own country that the Communist government did not want the public to have. Moreover, Polish opposition forces, denied access to internal media, gave their reports to these external services to broadcast into Poland. When a strike was called in one major factory, workers in other industrial strongholds would hear about it on the BBC or RFE and would often follow suit (Short, 74). Whenever telephone connections between cities were cut, as frequently happened during strikes, the Solidarity activists organized people throughout the country by giving their plans and recommendations to these radio stations (Ash, 50). The intelligencia and the Catholic Church used these stations to voice their support for strikers (Ash, 51). RFE and BBC, in turn, carried CIA, NATO and Swedish intelligence in December of 1980 to alert the Poles that East German, Czechoslovakian, and Soviet military troops were mobilized on their borders (Ash, 99). At the same time TASS reported that strikers in Kielce were confronting authorities and disarming guards. To diffuse the threat Solidarity issued a statement saying there were no strikes in Poland and none planned. Radio broadcasts from vying external powers induced psychological warfare inside Poland, but no actual battles ensued (Ash, 99).

Martial law, which shut down phones and mail and restricted border travel, hampered but did not destroy RFE and BBC's information gathering. RFE responded to the crisis by taping and broadcasting personal calls from Poles outside the country so they could give messages to their friends and relatives (Michelson, 212). After phone service was restored, callers picking up the receiver were warned that conversations were being monitored. This did not stop informants and Solidarity activists, aware that the government had neither the staffing nor equipment to check every phone call, from calling the BBC and RFE with their reports (Niemczyk).

From their inception, RFE and BBC radio transmissions into Poland have been subjected to jamming attempts by the Soviets and the Polish government. This did not cease until January 1988, when, at the urging of the United States government, jamming was finally halted (King, 5).

Television

Because of its cost, technological complexity, and size of transmitters, television, unlike radio and print media, which the average clandestine opposition group can produce, has been exclusively under government control in Poland. As in many Western European countries, licensing fees, and a small amount of advertising, support broadcasts (Paulu, 273).

With the exception of broadcasts from Denmark and Sweden, in languages most Poles can't understand, spillover broadcasts along the Polish border have been from other Communist countries. Poland, which is about the size of New Mexico, is in a geographical half-nelson with East Germany and the Soviet Union, whose signals come in over the open plains, and with Czechoslovakia, whose signals are interrupted by the Tatra Mountains separating the two countries. By the late 1980s, some Poles had installed home satellite dishes to pick up non-Communist news broadcasts, a move some say further weakened the influence of the state on the people (Diehl, "Satellite," A25).

Poland has made extensive use of television for the education of children and employed adults (Paulu, 290). There are locally produced situation comedies, soap operas and other light entertainment. To soften up their reputation as stodgy Communists, the government leaders imported television situation comedies and action-packed dramas from the United States (Paulu, 293). These programs, they felt, did not undermine communism and in fact often made the United States look ridiculous (Niemczyk). To defy the Catholic Church, the government scheduled the most popular show, Kojak, on Sunday mornings. The churches simply scheduled services for the afternoon and evening (Niemczyk).

The Communist party always kept a tight control over its newscasts, even during the print media carnival that followed the 1980 signing of the Gdansk accords. Solidarity spokesmen could read their news if it fit with the government's goal to disband Solidarity; for example, whenever the trade union wanted to call off a planned strike. Most newscasts during the period were long speeches denouncing Solidarity (Ash, 140).

Ash (140) observed, "With every major crisis in 1981 the news was to get worse until, in the autumn, Poland's walls were covered with the simple words, 'T.V. Lies' and just 16 percent of those asked by the TV Public Opinion Research Center (OBOP) believed TV reports."

In the fall of 1988, the Communist government tried to gain Solidarity's cooperation in its economic reforms. As part of this effort, the government invited Walesa to debate their top leaders on the issues facing Poland. Skeptics thought it was a tactic done in the hope that television would magnify Walesa's foibles (Weschler, 62).

Although they themselves were unable to use the power of television to maintain political sovereignty, the Communist party was reluctant to turn control of television over to Solidarity at the conclusion of the elections. Like the military and the security, they felt it should remain in their domain (Staniszkis). Television, they knew, had power to intimidate. During martial law television announcers wore military uniforms and ran old footage of the Soviet military suppression of other Eastern bloc states to create a "war psychosis" (Ash, 264). The Solidarity negotiators, on the other hand, felt television was vital to their reform efforts. Broadcast now has a new director from the Solidarity government and the most hated television journalists were replaced.

According to Staniszkis, who is about to publish a paper on the influence of the Polish media on public opinion, "Having the opposition take over the leadership role has led to a real confusion about how to handle the freedom. Even if they can say something different, they don't know what to say. This creates a feeling that the differences between the Party and the new government are not very high." She added that Solidarity is not sophisticated in the use of television, the broadcasts are of poor quality, and television announcers are not well-regarded. Television broadcasts are improving slowly, she noted, as TV reporters learn who to push to get information. In addition, the BBC is negotiating to build a television tower in Poland for an eight hour service program that would provide news in a broader context. External views on the world, Staniszkis thinks, would be accepted.

The Foreign Press

Poland maintains a press service, Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP) and a foreign radio service, Radio Polania, which broadcasts in Polish, English, German and French. Polish foreign correspondents work for Interpress Agency, with offices in several major cities around the world, including the press bureau at the Polish Embassy in Washington D.C.

In dealing with the foreign press, the Communists would have preferred to avoid the interference of Western propaganda on the internal affairs of the state (Odelski, 159). In the 1980s, the government channeled much of its communication with the world press through its spokesman, Jerzy Urban. Shortly after its formation, Solidarity formed its own press agency, Agencja Solidarnosc, which dealt independently with the foreign press. Much to the chagrin of the government, the Western press gave considerable coverage to church heads, opposition leaders, and dissenters, all of whom were people the socialist press did not view as newsworthy (Pisarek, 117). Despite this difference of opinion on what constitutes news, and despite the occasional summons to the Passport Office (Ash, 85), the government did not expel foreign correspondents, even during martial law. Most Poles inside the country were isolated from Western television newscasts (until home satellite dishes arrived) and Western newspapers were scarce. Short wave radio news was the main source of the Western perspective on their plight.

The former and present regimes are both adept at manipulating the foreign press (Staniszkis; Niemczyk). Government leaders use such tactics as delaying information, dissuading reporters from writing on certain topics, timing the release of information to suit foreign policy objectives, and creating controversy where none exists to play one group against another and gain the sympathy of outsiders (as in the case of the Auschwitz convent incident). Jerzy Urban's replacement directs reporters to emotional and sensational stories (Staniszkis). Examples were the soup line stories timed to coincide with the U.S. government's debate on aid to Poland.

The new government is not entirely at fault for the press sticking to its old patterns. Having followed U.S. television news coverage of Poland over the decade, and recently in looking through newspaper indices, I noticed a drop in press coverage from 1984 to 1987. Gone was the mass mobilization of a country to strike and march, gone was the tension of martial law and its anti-climactic suspension, and the media was not as interested in covering the subtle interactions between Jaruzelski, Solidarity, and the Church as they jockeyed for position to move the country out of inertia. Most reporters covering the round-table discussions and the elections conveyed little understanding of what had gone on to prompt these dramatic changes (Staniszkis; Niemczyk).

Many reporters receive filtered information because they depend on government translators (Niemczyk). Pack journalism is evident: on Oct. 23, 1989, for example, the wire services, the *New York Times* and ABC network news each ran a similar feature story on hunger in Poland. Reporters do not try to find independent sources or observe events first-hand, partly because of the language barrier but partly because some reporters aren't accustomed to the idea that Poles, while reticent about going on record, are more willing to speak their minds (Niemczyk).

The Future of Polish Media

Poles are entering the decade disillusioned with their mass media. Having grown up learning to distrust the media's messages, it's little wonder that their hope and enthusiasm for a freer, more open press is tempered (Staniszkis). After all, television, radio, and many of the newspapers are still government owned and operated, and even some emerging independent newspapers have ties to people now in power.

With the new government seeking to prevent fragmentation and polarization, extreme dissent is seen as dangerous, so official announcements calling for a freer press and private ownership of newspapers are greeted with skepticism. This is not to deny that the media has now been allowed freer reign than at any other time in the country's history. Still, even independent editors feel pressure to conform to the new Government's position on many matters (Staniszkis). Direct censorship continues to be practiced, though it is not as harsh or petty as under the Communist regime (Husarska, 1).

As the country moves towards free enterprise, the independent press will need to adjust to censorship of the market economy. Other economic restraints on independent publishing include the shortage of paper and other supplies. Since capital is scarce within the country, the viability of many independent presses will depend on how successful they are in gaining foreign support for start-up and initial operation.

The invitation to come above ground may not be enough to persuade all of Poland's clandestine publishers to operate legally. Censorship, the bureaucracy, the fear of being forced to conform, and the greater ease in getting supplies through the black market than through proper channels may keep some underground for a while longer. Many will have to rethink their mission: are they still an opposition voice to government or do they support it? If they support it, can they still be considered an underground press? Since the need for samizdat presses diminishes as restraints on the above ground press are loosened, underground publishing in the 1990s will probably not be as extensive as it was in the 1980s.

Unlike the press, television and radio remain exclusively in government hands. It's impossible to predict which direction Polish television will take. Television programs, especially newscasts, are facing a tough audience who have watched the media abused by the Communists and who have seen little indication that the current administration will do better. The new government, which has no sophistication with this technology, will have to devise plans to turn television service around or risk losing public credibility in this area of media policy. It will also have to determine the role of television, if any, in supporting the Polish economy. Discussions with BBC on installing a tower may be a two edged sword: Poland may learn suitable techniques for their own management and programming from BBC or they may simply import British news and other productions.

While Poland is exercising diplomatic caution with regards to the Soviet Union in developing its new media policies, for the time being it does not seem as though the Soviet Union will squelch many of Poland's new goals in mass communication The Soviet Union itself is struggling with some of the same problems in revamping its own mass communications, and Gorbachev has repeatedly said that he does not plan to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland as long as Soviet security is not threatened (Keller, A1).

The ability of Poland to achieve a long-wished for freer press will depend, essentially, on publishers' skills in managing in a free market economy, the willingness of Poles and outside investors to support financially a variety of viewpoints, and the economy improving to the point were supplies and equipment are more readily obtainable. Moreover, the fragile new government will have to develop enough strength and public support to withstand criticism without having to resort to gagging the press. At this point, Poland has made inroads toward achieving its dream of a more democratic nation with a pluralism of viewpoints expressed in its media. Yet, as is the case with many opposition groups after they come into power, Poland's new government retains, at least for the time being, some of the controls and restrictions characteristic of the previous regime. This may account for the fact that, as dissent widens between the new government and the Solidarity union that spawned it, the Polish press is predominantly on the side of the present administration.

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Attachment A: Samizdat for Children, Feb. 1987

numer 6

o konfliktach

– Chcę wyjść na dwór, bo umówiłem się w ważnej sprawie z chłopakami, a mama chce, żebym najpierw odrobił lekcje – to jest konflikt między mną a mamą.

– Pani chce, żebyśmy pisali dziś klasówkę z matmy, a my nie chcemy, bo wczoraj była klasówka z polskiego i my już mamy dość tych klasówek – to jest konflikt między nami a panią.

– Oni chcą ciągle tylko kopać piłkę, a ja bym chciał, żeby się bawić w podchody i mówię jak można to fajnie zorganizować, ale oni nie słuchają tylko wrzeszczą – to jest konflikt między mną i nimi.

luty 87

OKIENKO

niezależne pismo dziecięce

– Reagan chce zrobić parasol przeciwatomowy, żeby nikt nie mógł wypuścić atomowej rakiety na USA, a Gorbaczow nie chce, żeby Reagan zrobił ten parasol, bo boi się, że Ameryka będzie wtedy silniejsza od ZSRR – to jest konflikt między dwoma mocarstwami.





– Jaruzelski chce, żeby wszyscy należeli do Pronu i jednego Związku Zawodowego, a ludzie chcą, żeby były różne Związki zakładane przez nich samych i żeby była "Solidarność" – to jest konflikt między władzą i społeczeństwem.

Są konflikty, w których tylko jedna ze stron ma rację. Są takie w których trochę racji ma jedna a trochę druga strona. Są i takie, że jedna ze stron, chociaż nie ma racji, ma siłę i może zmusić wszystkich, żeby było tak, jak ona chce.

Konflikty mogą prowadzić do kłótni a gdy powstaną między państwami, to nawet do wojny. Mogą jednak także zakończyć się porozumieniem wzajemnymi ustępstwami a w końcu zgodą.

– Mama chce, żeby tata spędzał popołudnia w domu, a tata ma ważne sprawy poza domem i nie chce z nich zrezygnować – to jest konflikt pomiędzy mamą a tatą.

Rodzice, szkoła i my

Mama i tata mówią: "co z ciebie wyrośnie, będziesz zamiatał ulice, kopał rowy, bo do szkoły średniej na pewno cię nie przyjmą z takimi stopniami."

Pani mówi: "nic go nie interesuje, jest znudzony wszystkim, nic mu się nie chce, same trójczyny."

A ja nie rozumiem, o co chodzi. Robię to, co wszyscy, tak samo, jak wszyscy. Ani nie jestem gorszy, ani lepszy niż inni. Czym się mam interesować ? Ci, co mają dobre stopnie, w ogóle się niczym nie interesują – tylko stopniami. Chcą być lepsi niż inni i dlatego nikt ich nie lubi. Czasem sobie myślę, że tę szkołę to wymyślili tylko po to, żeby męczyć dzieci i denerwować rodziców, żeby wszyscy do wszystkich mieli pretensje. Ale bez szkoły też nie byłoby dobrze. Bo co robić przez cały dzień, w szkole przynajmniej są koledzy, można pogadać i powygłupiać się.

My naprawdę niczym się nie interesujemy, ale skąd mamy wiedzieć czym można się zainteresować. Przecież oni chcą tylko, żebyśmy się interesowali stopniami. A czy te stopnie to coś ciekawego. Czy można już w piątej klasie myśleć tylko o tym, czy przyjmą, czy nie przyjmą do liceum. W końcu wszystkich gdzieś przyjmą, a ja jestem taki, jak wszyscy: ani lepszy ani gorszy.

AN ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL VALUES IN PRINT ADVERTISING IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

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March 20, 1990

AN ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL VALUES IN PRINT ADVERTISING IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN

ABSTRACT

The age of the global corporation has dawned and the prevailing strategy behind global marketing and advertising is to treat the entire world as if it were one homogeneous market. However, by treating the world as one homogeneous market global advertisers may not tke into account the subtle cultural differences between people. This research attempts to shed some light on the debate over cultural imperialism by comparing the cultural values in print advertising from two superficially similar countries -- the U.S. and Great Britain.

INTRODUCTION

George Bernard Shaw described America and Great Britain as two great nations divided by a common language. Shaw's subtle pronouncement frames the context of this paper. While the United States and Great Britain are superficially similar in that they are both urbanized, industrial, politically stable, and English-speaking, there are underlying ideological, cultural and communication differences between these two countries. They share a common cultural heritage which only began to diverge two hundred years ago. This recent divergence has resulted in the emergence of different cultural and ideological forms, more or less effectively masked by the shared language.

The differences between British and North American culture should be evident in their cultural products--including advertising. This research takes a historical view of cultural values and examines manifestation of these values in print advertising from these two countries.

BACKGROUND

An analysis of previous research studies comparing advertising across cultures reveals an increasing interest in this area of study. In a seminal work on the subject, Ricks (1983) described some of the blunders made by multinational marketers and advertisers who did not take into account differing cultural contexts. Marquez (1975) compared the cultural content of advertisements from the U.S. and the Philippines and noted that Philippine advertisements reflected Western culture. Unwin (1974) examined the influence of culture on advertising expression and communication style in American and British advertisements and found that American advertisements were more apt to stress direct benefits while British ads appeared to want the audience to draw their own conclusions about the product features and benefits. Weinberger and Spotts (1989) found that British advertisements use more humor than do American.

Mueller (1987) compared advertising appeals in Japanese and American print advertising and concluded that the themes used in the two countries are surprisingly similar while the advertisements remain sensitive to the unique culture in each country. Choe, Wilcox and Hardy (1986) compared facial expressions in magazine advertising across cultures and noted distinct cultural differences between the way Korean and American models were presented.

A number of studies have compared levels of information in advertisements across cultures (Harmon, Razzouk and Stern 1983; Stern, Krugman and Resnik, 1981; Dowling, 1980; Hong, Muderrisoglu and Zinkman, 1987; Madden, Caballero and Masukubo, 1986) using the Resnick and Stern classification system. Rice and Lu (1988) compared levels of information in Chinese and American print advertising and discovered that magazines ads in China are characterized by relatively higher levels of information. Okechuku and Wang (1988) looked at the effectiveness of Chinese print advertising in North America and noted distinct stylistic differences between American and Chinese advertising while Pollay (1989) analyzed the attitudes of mainland Chinese to indigenous and foreign advertising and found that the Chinese generally preferred Western style advertising.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN CULTURAL VALUES

While previous research has examined stylistic and informational differences between advertising across cultures, the research described in this study attempts to take a historical perspective by examining how traditional cultural values are expressed in advertisements. In effect, this research looks at how culture affects advertising. James Carey (1989) has said that studies of mass communication "...generally overlook the fact that communication is first of all a set of practices, conventions and forms and that in studying mass communication these phenomena are assumed to exist but never are investigated" (p. 41). This research attempts to reveal any "overlooked" communication phenomena in U.S. advertising through means of a comparative study of the cultural values manifest in print advertising in two superficially similar countries, Britain and the U.S. In particular, this research compares the expression of four core American values:

1. individualism
2. egalitarianism
3. direct speech
4. respect for authority

in a sample of print advertisements from comparable consumer magazines in Great Britain and the U.S.

To explore the subtle and not-so-subtle differences between the ideologies and values of the U.S. and Great Britain requires a historical perspective and certainly greater scope and depth than this paper would allow. But to generalize, the British are European in the strictest sense. They share with many other

European countries a monarchical tradition, a great respect for their history and a strong sense of class consciousness.

The British have been described as deferential (elitist) and ascriptive (class-conscious) by Lipset.

> Britain has come to accept the values of achievement in its economic and educational system, and to some extent in its political system but retains a substantial degree of elitism (the assumption that those who hold high position be given generalized deference) and ascription (that those born to high places should retain it).
>
> (Lipset, 1963 p. 215)

One might carry this thought farther by theorizing that the acceptance of class structure and respect for the monarchy in Britain has produced among the English a greater respect for authority than is generally found in the U.S. Edward Shils (1956) states that in America, "The atmosphere of distrust of aristocracy and of the pretensions to aristocracy in which the American Republic spent its formative years has persisted in many forms" (p. 35). Geoffrey Gorer, author of The American People agrees with Shils and states that the typical American attitude toward authority has not changed substantially since the framers of the American Constitution devised that "the survival of the state makes it inevitable that some individuals be endowed with authority but this authority must be as circumscribed and limited as legal ingenuity can devise" (p.32). In fact, Gorer believes that the birth of the American republic was signalized by the rejection of authority, "This throwing off of the English allegiance was the rejection of the only embodied authority which was generally recognized" (p.28).

In addition to being generally suspicious of authority, Americans have also been described as egalitarian and individualistic. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United States in the 1830's he noted the American penchant for egalitarianism and individualism. More recently, modern social scientists have confirmed these shared American cultural values (Rokeach, 1973; Shiffman and Kanuk, 1978; Bellah, 1985). Individualism, in particular, has been identified as a driving force in America. In their book, Habits of the Heart, Bellah et al. state that:

> Individualism lies at the very core of American culture... Modern individualism emerged out of the struggle against monarchical and aristocratic authority that seemed arbitrary and oppressive to citizens prepared to assert their right to govern themselves.
>
> (Bellah, 1985, p. 142)

While individualism certainly exists in Great Britain, it is not as highly developed a national ethos as it is in the U.S.

And finally, to return to Shaw's observation that America and Great Britain are two great nations divided by a common language, one is reminded of the subtle differences between the ways people communicate within these two cultures. Americans are known for their directness in speech while in England, "To ask for specific information, to ask for a definite judgment, is, in England, bad manners..." (Brogan, 1943, p.281). This indirectness characterizes not only interpersonal speech but also institutional communication (Leech, 1986). In a recent article in the New York Times Magazine, Rothenberg (1989) described the difference between British and American advertising styles by noting that British advertising tends to employ, "implication, understatement, subtle humor and indirect references," while American advertising tries to "bully the audience into acceptance" (p.19). Claudia Burli-Storz (1980) in a linguistic study of British advertising concluded that the British use of subtleties and humor was linked to historical tradition. She states, "The Anglo-Saxon attitude towards language and the enjoyment derived from double-meanings, ambiguities and plays on words is a centuries old tradition quite distinct from that found on the Continent" (p.9).

Building on these four differing cultural values, the authors developed the following hypotheses about British and American advertising:

1. That, since individualism is an important American cultural value, American advertisements would more frequently feature single individuals while British advertisements would more often feature people in a group context.
2. That respect for authority in England could be manifested by British advertisers using company representatives (authority figures) as spokesmen in their advertising more frequently than would American advertisers.
3. That Americans being egalitarian, their advertising would more often feature a homogeneous, idealized upper class consumer while the British would be stratified by social class.
4. That, since directness of speech is an American cultural value, headlines which used direct rhetorical devices would be found more frequently in American advertising.

METHODOLOGY

The method used in this study was content analysis assisted by semiotics. Content analysis is frequently used to measure the level of information in print advertisements (Harmon, Razzouk and Stern, 1983) and has been used in the study of cross cultural materials (Rice and Lu, 1988; Hong, Muderrisoglu and Zinkman, 1987). Content analysis has been used less frequently to study cultural values (Leiss, Kline and Jhally, 1986; Frith and Frith, 1989). Recent European research techniques employing semiotics in combination with content analysis have added greatly to our understanding of the cultural messages in advertisements (Williamson, 1987; Dyer, 1982; Leiss, Kline and Jhally, 1986). Semiotics allows the researcher to study subtle visual and textual messages. It is a particularly appropriate method for analyzing the cross cultural messages in advertisements because as Leiss states:

> "Decoding" what is happening in these more complicated message structures requires the use of a method such as semiotics which is sensitive to nuances.
>
> (Leiss et al, 1986. p. 151)

Semiotics, in combination with content analysis, allows the researcher to extract not only the surface meaning of an advertisement but also social themes or second messages which content analysis alone might not decipher. While content analysis predominated in this research, semiotics was employed to distinguish social class in the sample of ads.

The advertisements were analyzed according to the following criteria:

Source

- Is the advertisement from an American or British publication?

Type of Product

- Is the general product category High Involvement, Middle Involvement or Low Involvement?

Number of people in Ad

- What is the actual number of people shown in the ad?

Company Representatives

- Are any of the models acting as company representatives?

Status

- Was at least one of the people in the ad identifiable by social class?
- Was the social class idealized upper class (white collar, professionals)?
- Was the social class depicted as working class (blue collar, secretary or housewife).

Headline

- Does the headline use a direct rhetorical device such as:
  - An imperative
  - News or straight information about the product
  - A label (The Marlboro Man)
- Does the headline use an indirect rhetorical device such as:
  - Tells a story
  - Asks a question
  - Is poetic, philosophic, euphemistic or historical
  - Uses simile or metaphor
  - Uses humor, pun or double meaning
  - No headline

A total of 372 print advertisements were gathered from mass circulation magazines of two types. One type was general interest weeklies and the other was women's monthlies. In order to maintain comparability, the magazines were matched by format, audience demographics and circulation. Professional media planners in Great Britain suggested that the Sunday magazine supplements of the major newspapers serve as the general interest weekly magazines, therefore, The London Sunday Times Magazine was selected as the general interest weekly magazines from

Britain. From the United States, The New York Times Magazine was selected as being the most comparable. The British women's magazine selected was Harper's and Queen and the comparable American women's magazine was Town and Country.

The units of analysis were restricted to full-page, four-color advertisements containing people. Product categories were kept consistent among the four publications. Previous studies (Mueller, 1987; Weinberger and Spotts, 1989) have indicated the importance of controlling for product categories when conducting cross-cultural research. Therefore, the Foote Cone and Belding matrix was used to classify products into High Involvement, Middle Involvement and Low Involvement categories. High Involvement products generally tend to be higher priced and require information seeking on the part of the consumer. Middle Involvement products are priced in the mid-range and require moderate search activities. Low Involvement products tend to be low priced and tend to be purchased frequently. In this study, nine product categories were compared, three from each involvement level. High Involvement products included autos, financial services and jewelry. Middle Involvement products included cameras, TV's and watches. Low Involvement products included food products, hair care products and beer/wine.

All full-page, four-color ads containing people, which ran in the selected magazines during the one year period between September 1, 1987 to August 31, 1988, were collected and used as the data sources for this study. Of the 372 ads collected, 186 were from American publications and 186 were from British.

The print ads were coded independently by two pairs of judges. One pair were Americans and one pair were British citizens. Discrepancies in coding within coder pairs were resolved by a third judge. A training period was conducted during which time the judges coded a pre-test sample of ads (50 British and 50 American). During this time regular meetings were held between coders and one of the authors to identify disagreement between coders of the test ads. When disagreement occurred the ads were examined carefully by coders and the author to determine the cause of disagreement. This eventually led to consensus and helped the judges become experienced coders.

Intercoder reliabilities were computed as percentage of agreement between the English and American coders. They ranged from .97 for individualism to .79 for social class. Reliability coefficients for other measures were: .97 for company representatives and .85 for direct and indirect headline style. Thus, intercoder reliability was predominately within the limit suggested by Kassarjian (1977).

The major problem in coding for this study resulted from the apparent disagreement between coders on the variables of headline styles and social class. This is expected, because of differences between cultures in interpreting humor in the first case, and in decoding the symbols of class structure in the second. To accommodate these intercultural differences, the conservative measure was taken of restricting analysis to only those values for each ad which were agreed upon by both sets of coders. Otherwise, the results of the headline comparisons might have proved more dramatic had the British interpretation of

British headline content been used, without reference to the American interpretation.

RESULTS

This sample of ads yielded a significantly higher proportion of American ads for high-involvement products. Since product involvement has been cited in previous research as being a significant influence on ad style and content, this variable has been controlled in this study. Differences in product involvement categories between national samples was controlled in the following analysis by weighting high-involvement British ads, and American medium- and low-involvement ads. Because the data in this study are nominal, mathematical weighting is not possible, thus frequency weighting was used. The method employed was to double the set of cases of American medium and low involvement ads, and to double every other English high-involvement ad. This procedure made the two national samples comparable without introducing any systematic bias. Results from the study are reported for both unweighted and weighted data for the purpose of clarifying the effect of product involvement category on the study variables. See Table 1.

Table 1
PRODUCT CATEGORIES BY COUNTRY

	UnWeighted p = .000		Weighted p = .601	
	Britain n = 186	America n = 186	Britain n = 231	America n = 239
High	48% (89)	71% (132)	58% (134)	71% (132)
Medium	31% (57)	16% (29)	25% (57)	24% (58)
Low	21% (40)	13% (25)	17% (40)	21% (50)

Hypothesis 1 - Individualism

Since individualism has been cited as an important cultural value to Americans, the authors hypothesized that the American advertisements would more frequently contain single individuals than would the British ads. Inspection of Table 2 shows that this hypothesis was supported for the unweighted data and is in the hypothesized direction for the weighted data.

Table 2

Use of a Single Individual in Advertisements

	(Unweighted)		(Weighted)	
	British (n=187)	American (n=186)	British (n=231)	American (n=239)
Ads with one person	45%	57%	47%	56%
Ads with > one person	55%	43%	53%	44%
	X^2= 5.12	p.= .024	X^2= 3.78	p.= .052

Hypothesis 2 - Respect for Authority

As the British are considered to be more deferential to authority than are Americans, it was hypothesized that advertisers in Great Britain would use company representatives (authority figures) more frequently than would American advertisers. As noted in Table 3, there was no significant difference between the use of company representatives in the two countries.

Table 3

A Comparison of the Use of Company Representative in British and American ads.

	(Unweighted)		(Weighted)	
	British (n=187)	American (n=186)	British (n=231)	American (n=239)
Ads with a company rep.	12%	14%	13%	14%
Ads with only consumers	88%	86%	87%	86%

In this study, the authors operationalized "respect for authority" to mean the use of authority figures or company representatives in the advertising. Perhaps this definition was too narrow. Future researchers might operationalize this cultural value more broadly to include authority appeals rather than just authority figures. On the other hand, the rejection of authority was important at a certain point in American history, it may, however, be an outmoded concept. Perhaps, today, the two countries are quite similar in regard to this cultural value.

Hypothesis 3 - Egalitarianism vs. Class Consciousness

Since egalitarianism has been espoused as a core American cultural value it was hypothesized that American advertisements would feature the same, general "ideal" upper class, while advertisements from Great Britain, a more class-conscious society, were expected to show a more diffuse representation of class. This hypothesis was supported by the data as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

A Comparison of Class in British and American Ads

	(Unweighted)		(Weighted)	
	British (n=187)	American (n=186)	British (n=231)	American (n=239)
Percent of persons identifiable by social class	90%	94%	90%	94%
Ads depicting the idealized upper class consumer	66%	93%	63%	92%
Ads depicting the working classes	24%	1%	27%	3%
	X^2 = 39	p.=.000	X^2= 56	p.= .000

Hypothesis 4 - Direct Speech vs. Indirect Speech

Because direct speech is more highly valued in the United States than in Great Britain, it was hypothesized that the headlines on American advertisements would use direct rhetorical devices while the British ads would state their case in a more oblique fashion. This hypothesis was supported by the data as shown in the table below.

Table 5

A Comparison of Headlines in British and American Advertisements

	(Unweighted)		(Weighted)	
	British (n=187)	American (n=186)	British (n=231)	American (n=239)
Heads using direct rhetorical devices	21%	39%	21%	39%
Heads using indirect rhetorical devices	79%	61%	79%	61%
	$X^2 = 9.71$	$p = .001$	$X^2 = 13$	$p. = .001$

The principle systematic finding in this portion of the analysis is the difference in headline styles employed in the ads. These results of the study are amplified in Table 6.

Table 6

PERCENT DIFFERENCES IN USE OF HEADLINE TYPES BY COUNTRIES AND PRODUCT TYPE

(Unweighted and Weighted for All Products)
(Weighting has no effect by Product Category)

ALL PRODUCTS (p = .000)

	Britain			America	
	Unweight n = 186	Weight n = 231		Unweight n = 186	Weight n = 239
Humor	35	37	News	19	21
Story	23	24	Humor	18	18
News	14	15	Story	15	15
Question	8	7	Question	15	12
			Label	10	9
			Poetic	7	7
			Command	6	7
LESS THAN 5%					
Command			Simile		
Label					
Poetic					
Simile					

HIGH INVOLVEMENT (p = .000)

	Unweight n = 89		Unweight n = 131
Humor	35	Question	20
Story	29	News	18
News	21	Story	17
		Humor	15
		Label	12
LESS THAN 5%			
Command		Command	
Simile		Simile	
Poetic		Poetic	
Label			
Question			

MEDIUM INVOLVEMENT (p = .076)

	Unweight n = 57		Unweight n = 29
Humor	43	Humor	33
Question	19	News	17
Poetic	7	Story	17
		Poetic	17
LESS THAN 5%			
Command		Command	
Label		Label	
Story		Question	
News, Simile		Simile	

Table 7

SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES BY PRODUCT TYPE

	Unweighted			Weighted		
	Britain n = 186	America n = 186		Britain n = 231	America n = 239	
INDIVIDUALISM -- One Person Only in Ad						
All	45%	57%	.024	47%	56%	(.052)
High	52	60	NS	52	60	NS
Med	41	54	NS	41	54	NS
Low	39	48	NS	39	48	NS
COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE -- Used in Ad						
All	12%	14%	NS	13%	14%	NS
High	15	12	NS	15	12	NS
Med	0	28	.000	0	28	.000
Low	23	4	.044	23	4	.007
SOCIAL CLASS -- Upper Class Model						
All	66%	93%	.000	63%	92%	.000
High	50	94	.000	50	94	.000
Med	83	80	.022	83	80	.038
Low	70	100	.048	70	100	.003
HEADLINE STYLE -- See Headline Chart						
All			.000			.000
High			.000			.000
Med			(.076)			.004
Low			.029			.001
HEADLINE -- Direct Type Used						
All	21%	39%	.001	21%	39%	.001
High	27	39	.033	22	39	.010
Med	16	21	NS	16	21	NS
Low	25	57	.028	25	57	.012

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this paper, as stated at the outset, was to begin to examine how cultural values are manifested in advertisements. The findings of this study are that there are differences between the way cultural values are manifest in British and American advertising. Speicifically, the values of individualism, egalitarianism and direct speech were found to be significantly different between the two samples. Thus, this research performs a useful service in extending the conceptualization of advertising to include its role beyond being simply a marketing tool to that of a cultural artifact whose sales message is often overlaid on a cultural message.

A comparative study was deliberately employed to add dimension to the cultural variables within U.S. advertising. This preliminary study outlines a method of discovering to what extent advertising reflects culture. The results of the study could also be read as a question as to the efficacy of globalized advertising strategies. One possible implication of these results is that British consumers are more responsive to indirect sales messages delivered to audiences clearly stratified by social class than their U.S. counterparts. If this is so, global ads based on the less direct, and less class-sensitive American model may-tend to miss all but the British elite, and fail to motivate adequately even this small market segment.

Clearly, the methods used in this preliminary study to elucidate the complex of subtle differences between U.S. and British ads, and to dimension the cultural content of advertising need refinement. In general, however, this research provides a positive direction for researchers interested in studying the impact of culture on advertising and vice versa.

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Creative Strategies in American and Japanese Television Commercials
A Comparison

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Paper accepted by the Advertising Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication for presentation at the National Convention, Minneapolis, MN, August 1990.

Introduction

Advertising content consists of two major elements: strategy (variously known as advertising/creative/message/copy strategy/platform) and tactics (also known as execution). Attempts to enumerate the various strategies and/or tactics, to exemplify their suitability for particular advertising situations, and to ascertain their communication effects reach back several years and still continue. Similarly longstanding and perennial is the debate on whether advertising should be globally standardized or tailored to the specific culture of individual countries. However, few cross-culturally comparative studies have been done on creative strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to fill this lacuna. The paper first discusses typologies of creative strategy and the "standardization-localization" debate. It then compares American and Japanese commercials, particularly with regard to the use and format of creative strategies.

Creative Strategy Defined

Creative strategy comprises the "what is said" in an advertisement rather than the "how it is said" which is an executional question. Frazer's[1] definition is particularly lucid: "Creative strategy is a policy or guiding principle which specifies the general nature and character of messages to be designed." Strategic thinking at all levels "separates the sound advertising campaign from the weak one."[2] A sound creative strategy generally ensures success; good executions give advertising the added punch, but lack advertising value if they are not backed by strategy. Even studies which have dealt primarily with executional factors underscore strategy's importance. In a replication of an earlier[3] study, Stewart and Koslow[4] conclude that:

> Both studies point to the importance of having something unique and differentiating to say about the advertised product....

> These empirical findings are quite consistent with the best creative wisdom, which has long advocated creating unique selling propositions, distinctive brand images, and making the product the 'hero' of the commercial.

Attempts to formulate a typology of creative strategies have spawned dichotomous to multiple categories, have included situational variables, and have confused strategy with execution. The dichotomy of informational and emotional appeals is common; several explications of this dichotomy--variously named by different authors--are available in the literature.[5]

Vaughn[6] considers the feeling/thinking dichotomy as a situational variable and combines it with another situational variable, level of involvement, to propose a model of four basic creative strategies; he suggests that the match between strategy and the particular situation (the quadrant defined by the two variables) will maximize internalization of the message. Similarly, Simon's[7] classification of creative strategies into multiple categories was undertaken with the purpose of providing "useful instructions for choosing the most effective types of advertisements for various market and product-brand situations." Simon's classification system however does not derive from a single classification principle. Apart from strategy, the classification is also based on some executional and sales promotions criteria.

Starting afresh, Frazer[8] developed a list of creative strategy alternatives culled from "advertising literature and trade press, from conversations with advertising people, and analysis of commercials." This list consisted of the following strategies: generic, preemptive, unique selling proposition, brand image, positioning, resonance, and affective.

Laskey[9] however encountered the problem of low inter-coder reliability for some categories when he tried to use Frazer's typology. Consequently, he developed a new typology, based on Frazer's framework; this typology involved a two-step procedure of first coding an ad into the informational/rational or the image/emotional category and then into a specific strategy within that category. The informational/rational category included the following specific strategies: comparative, unique selling proposition, preemptive, hyperbole, generic-Thinking, and other-Thinking. The image/emotional category included user-image, brand-image, use occasion, generic-Emotional, and Other-Emotional strategies. Later,[10] the nomenclature was changed to informational and transformational respectively for the first-stage categories and the "other" category was dropped from the listing of specific strategies. Using the latter coding scheme, Laskey, Day, and Crask[11] coded 900 commercials and achieved a satisfactory intercoder reliability coefficient.

These strategies are however indigenous to the United States. At the global level, two questions arise. Does the advertising of other countries use these creative strategies? And, if it does, what are the similarities or differences in use (amount and situation) and format?

The "Standardization-Localization" Debate in Advertising

While the debate on "globalization" has largely stayed at the macro level of marketing and advertising rather than concerned itself with specific strategies and executional structures, it does provide a backdrop to the micro-level comparison undertaken in this paper.

Hornik[12] argues that "when advertising strategy itself is geared toward international appeal...to achieve world-wide corporate image or the appeal itself has a common international connotation..., standardization might be employed." On the other hand, research evidence suggests that differences do exist in purchase and consumption patterns, in psychosocial characteristics and in cultural criteria. This would indicate indigenizing advertising even for products which are universal.[13]

In a study to see if advertisements could be used interchangeably among countries, Marquez[14] suggests that an advertiser would have to check for similarity in cultural variables between his home-country advertising and the advertising of the target country, and further (in view of the effects of colonization) determine whether the target country's cultural variables reflect its indigenous culture. Although few advertisers might use standardized advertising,[15] when an advertiser does choose to ignore cultural variables, it usually results in international blunders.[16]

Japanese Advertising

If advertising is culturally specific, then what are the salient features of Japanese advertising? The "logic of emotion" is basic to marketing in Japan; "...while Western advertising tends to be more verbal, direct message, and logical, Japanese advertising is emotional, suggestive, and indirect."[17] The appeals used are "soft music, beautiful scenery, and soft voices."[18] For some products, the imagery used is "highly evocative to those rooted in the culture" in an attempt to "make people 'feel good' about the product."[19]

The extensive use of mood in Japanese advertising "reflects the cultural characteristic of avoiding confrontation."[20] Hard sell appeals are rare in Japan. In fact, the sales pitch is so soft that sometimes "the brand name is not mentioned in the copy,"[21] and even the product comes as a surprise at the end of the commercial.[22]

Aside from such popular observations, little information is available on foreign advertising because cross-culturally comparative studies are few and far between. However, recently studies comparing Japanese and American advertising have become available.

Comparative Studies

Madden, Caballero, and Matsukubo[23] found Japanese advertisements to be more informative than American advertising. Another study[24] found that Japanese advertising used more emotional and informational cues than American advertising.

Mueller[25] used a different approach and included high, medium, and low involvement products. She found that while Japanese advertising did use some traditional appeals like soft sell, it also used some modern and Westernized appeals reflecting some common advertising approaches between the two countries. Further, the type of appeal used differed based on product involvement level. Ramaprasad and Hasegawa[26] found that more Japanese commercials used the emotional appeal than the informational appeal, and this was true for all levels of product involvement. Also, while Western influence on Japanese advertising was apparent, it was mainly confined to the trappings (characters and language).

None of the above studies used a typology of advertising strategies in their comparison. One study (not specifically comparing Japanese with other commercials) that did,[27] used Simon's classification scheme to compare strategies of Clio-winning domestic television commercials with similar international commercials. The study found only limited support for cross-cultural differences in creative strategies. A limiting factor in this study was that (for administrative reasons) all international commercials were grouped together rather than separated out by nation.

The present study also uses a typology of advertising strategies to make a comparison between Japanese and American commercials.

Methodology

The study used the method of content analysis.

The channels, dates and times were picked randomly for the months of March and April 1989. ABC, CBS, and NBC were the networks used for the American sample. The Japanese channels included in the study were all four commercial channels available in the region in Japan where the recording was done. For each day, one channel was picked randomly for each country. The dates included all seven days of the week and were picked by the "constructed week" method for both months so that the sample included one of each day (Monday, Tuesday, and so on) for each month studied to make a total sample of 14 days for each country. The same sample dates were used for the American and Japanese samples. The time for each day was picked randomly in one hour slots starting at 7 p.m. for both the American and Japanese samples and ending with 9 p.m. for the American sample and 10 p.m. for the Japanese sample; these times are considered "prime" time in the respective countries.

The sample therefore consisted of commercials within 14 hours of programs in each country, representing three and four different commercial channels and three and four different time periods for the United States and Japan respectively, and all different days of a week for two months.[28]

All commercials were coded for several variables: product category (for example, food), involvement level of the product (high, medium, low), length, number of camera shots (visual changing on the television screen), informational cues present (for example, price), number of informational cues, overall strategy (for example, informational) and the specific strategy (for example, unique selling proposition).

For this study, involvement was considered to be a function of the attributes of a product.[29] The more complex the product in terms of use and other values, the greater the involvement. High involvement products are usually more expensive in terms of money and risk involved and are infrequently purchased (examples include cars and major appliances). Low involvement products are often low cost items that are purchased regularly without substantial planning or thought (examples include soaps, shampoos, and food items). Medium involvement products lie in between these two.

The 14 informational cues identified and operationalized by Resnick and Stern[30] were used (multiple coding of these cues per commercial was done).

The measure of overall strategy and the specific strategy was largely based on the Laskey, Day and Crask typology. This typology first classifies ads into informational or transformational, concepts that are borrowed from Puto and Wells.[31] Informational advertising presents factual information. This definition resides partly in the consumers' perception too; the ad should have data which the consumer accepts as being verifiable. Transformational advertising, on the other hand, is affect-based and endows (in a tight association) the use of the advertised brand with a particular positive experience.

Next, the typology classifies ads into specific strategies within the informational/transformational categories. It is within these categories that the measure used in this paper deviates. Recall that these categories include comparative, unique selling proposition, preemptive (commercial has an objectively verifiable fact(s), but the fact(s) is not the basis for comparison with another brand nor is it pointed out as being unique), hyperbole (commercials which have the general appearance of being factually based, but are not so) and generic (commercials about a product category rather than brand) for informational ads, and use occasion, user image, brand image, and generic for transformational ads.

Categories in content analysis, apart from being mutually exclusive and exhaustive, also have to derive from a single classification principle.[32] Laskey, Day and Crask's specific strategy categories do not meet the final criterion. Their "generic" category for both informational and transformational ads are product-based classifications, while the other categories are message- or content-based. It is entirely possible to have a product (i.e., category as different from brand) advertisement (such as for milk or cheese) which uses one of the message strategies such as USP. The "generic" strategy was therefore dropped from the measurement of specific strategies in this study.

Earlier, the indigenous nature of the measures of strategy (including the one used in this study) was mentioned. To the extent that this typology is culture specific, its use in the classification of Japanese commercials may be an ill-suited imposition of structure on content, and therefore limiting. Ideally, if resources allow, strategies within cultures should be identified first, qualitative comparisons undertaken next, and if warranted specific comparisons done last. The typology used herein does not emanate from within Japan. Recognizing this limitation, the sample American and Japanese commercials were coded using the modified Laskey, Day and Crask typology. At the same time, it is possible that countries might not differ as much in the creative strategies they employ as in their use (amount and situation) and format.

Intercoder reliability tests using Holsti's[33] formula were done on a randomly selected subsample of 10 percent. Agreement was 100% for product category and length, 95% for involvement, 91% for number of shots, and 90% for strategy, and ranged from 92% to 100% for the various information cues. For each variable, averages were calculated across countries. The lowest reliability figure for a variable within a single country was 87%.

Findings

Description of the sample: The total number of commercials was 382 for the Japanese sample and 451 for the American sample; the latter included 140 commercials for television stations/programs (Table 1a; Table 1b gives distribution by strategy). In fact, TV station/program was the modal "product" category for the American commercials, while the Japanese sample had only nine such commercials. For Japanese commercials, the modal product category was food. For both American and Japanese samples, most of the products advertised were low involvement. However, the Japanese also advertised a relatively large number of medium involvement products.

The modal length was 30 seconds for American commercials and 15 seconds for Japanese commercials. Japanese commercials used few other lengths, while American commercials used quite a few 10-second, 20-second and other miscellaneous size commercials which were mostly for TV station/program promotions.

Packaging information (measured to also include visual of the product) was the most common in both American and Japanese commercials. Information on content and performance was also highly used in both countries' commercials. American commercials also used availability cues in a large number of commercials. However, for the American sample, a large number of the content and availability cues were accounted for by TV station/program commercials.

Two was the modal number of information cues in both American and Japanese commercials.

An analysis of the association between country, on the one hand, and product category, product involvement level, and length, on the other, was done. TV station/program commercials were removed from these analyses.

Significantly more American than Japanese commercials advertised car/parts and retail establishments, while more Japanese than American commercials advertised appliances/furniture, image improvement products, alcohol/cigarettes and food (χ^2 = 131.71, p = .00). Also, more Japanese than American commercials advertised medium involvement products (χ^2 = 35.44, p. = 00). Finally, more Japanese than American commercials were 15-second, while more American than Japanese commercials were 30-second (χ^2 = 66.14, p. = .00).

The interest of this paper however lies in a comparison of strategies between the two countries.

Comparison between American and Japanese Commercials: Use of Strategies

For this comparative analysis too, TV station/program commercials were removed from the sample because the category does not represent general consumer products.

In terms of number of commercials, no significant association was found between country and overall strategy. That is, one country did not use either the informational or transformational strategy significantly more often than the other country did.

The relationship between the particular *informational* strategy used and country was significant however (χ^2 = 25.31, p. = .00) (Table 2). More American commercials used the comparative and hyperbolic strategies, while more Japanese commercials used the unique selling proposition and preemptive strategies. An association between country and particular *transformational* strategies did not exist.

Comparision between Countries for Strategy by Product Involvement Level: To find out if there was an association between country and strategy at different levels of product involvement, the level of involvement was held constant and the relationship between country and strategy was tested.

For overall strategy, no association was found at any level of involvement. That is, given products of a certain involvement level, one country's commercials for them did not favor either the informational or transformational strategy more than the other country's commercials. When the association was tested for particular informational and transformational strategies, a significant relationship (χ^2 = 11.23, p. = .01) was observed only in the case of low involvement product, informational commercials (Table 3). For low involvement products, more American than Japanese commercials used the comparative and hyperbolic strategies and more Japanese than American commercials used the unique selling proposition and preemptive strategy.

Comparison between American and Japanese Commercials: Format of Strategies

Apart from comparing the use of strategies across countries, this study also compared the format (length and number of shots) of strategies across countries.

Comparison between Countries for Strategy by Length: An analysis was conducted to test the relationship between strategy and country at the 15 and 30 second commercial lengths. These lengths accounted for the majority of the commercials; most of the other lengths were used in commercials for TV stations/programs (these have already been removed from this analysis).

For both lengths, while there was no relationship between country and overall strategy, particular informational strategies were used more by one country than another. More American than Japanese commercials used the comparative and hyperbolic strategies and more Japanese than American commercials used the preemptive and unique selling proposition strategies (for 15-second commercials: χ^2 = 11.42, p. = .01, Table 4a; and for 30-second commercials: χ^2 = 16.70, p. = .00, Table 4b).

Within 15-second, transformational commercials, more Japanese than American commercials used the brand image strategy, while more American than Japanese commercials used the use occasion and user image strategies (χ^2 = 6.31, p. = .04) (Table 4c). There was no relationship between particular transformational strategies and country for 30 second commercials.

Comparison between Countries for Strategy by Number of Shots: The four informational strategies are hyperbolic, preemptive, unique selling proposition, and comparative. These strategies, while not perfectly ordered, do have an increasing amount of specificity in terms of the information they provide. The three transformational strategies are use occasion, user image and brand image which appear to have a decreasing amount of specificity in general. These strategies were used as levels, and analysis of variance was done to find out whether the country, the strategy and the country by strategy interaction explained differences in the number of shots used in the commercials.

American commercials used a larger number of camera shots than Japanese commercials, but there was no difference in the number of shots used by informational and transformational commercials (Table 5a). The significant interaction effect indicated that while for the American sample it was the transformational commercials which used more shots, for the Japanese sample it was the informational commercials that did so (Table 5a).

Within informational commercials, American commercials used more shots than Japanese commercials (Table 5b). In the analysis of particular strategies, linear, quadratic, and cubic trends were assessed; as indicated earlier specific strategies were considered to be ordered in terms of amount of specificity of information. A significant linear trend was observed in the informational strategies. The number of shots used increased from the hyperbolic to the comparative strategies. For number of shots, the quadratic effect was also significant indicating that the number of shots increased up to a point (in this case, the unique selling proposition commercials) and then decreased. The significant cubic trend indicated an S-shaped movement in the number of shots, with a small change from the hyperbolic to preemptive, an increase from the preemptive to unique selling proposition, and a decrease from the unique selling proposition to comparative. Further, the quadratic and cubic interaction effects were also significant indicating that the increase in number of shots differed between the two countries and so did the decrease; the changes in the number of shots were a lot larger for American commercials than for Japanese commercials.

For transformational strategies, again the American commercials used more shots than Japanese commercials (Table 5c). Also, the linear trend was significant; the number of shots increased from the use occasion to the brand image strategy. The significant linear interaction further indicated that this increase was larger for American than Japanese commercials.

Comparison between Countries for Strategy by Number of Information Cues: While number of information cues is not strictly a format variable, an ANOVA was run on it to see if differences between the two countries existed with regard to their use of information cues. Interestingly, Japanese commercials used more information cues than American commercials (Table 6a). As would be expected, informational commercials used more information cues than transformational commercials. There was no significant interaction effect.

For informational commercials, there were no significant main effects, but there was a significant interaction (Table 6b). Japanese commercials used more cues for comparative, hyperbolic, and unique selling proposition commercials and American commercials used more cues for preemptive commercials. For transformational commercials there were no significant main or interaction effects.

Discussion

Japanese television advertised certain medium involvement products more than American television. These products included alcohol (liquor advertising is permitted in Japan), toys, and clothing (image improvement). Also, Japanese advertisers used more 15-second commercials, while American advertisers used more 30-second commercials. The Japanese focus on the compact yet efficient product is known; this same thinking might inform the production of television commercials too.

Information on packaging was used in a large majority of the commercials from both countries. A possible explanation could be that the visual display of the package helps recognition, and recognition is an important objective with low involvement products identified at the point of purchase[34] (a majority of the products in the sample commercials were low involvement). Both countries' commercials used very few safety, guarantee, or research cues. It is possible that low involvement products do not call for such cues. Also, according to a recent Newsweek[35] article, even for a high involvement product like cars, such cues did not sell in the United States. On the other hand, in Japan, consumers are very particular about product safety and guarantees;[36] a possible explanation for the relative lack of use then of such cues in Japanese commercials could be that consumers assume the presence of these features in products and therefore do not expect the commercial to point them out.

Most previous research on Japanese advertising has pointed to its "emotional" nature. This study found no difference in the overall strategy (transformational and informational) used by the two countries. Part of the explanation might reside in the difference in the two measures, transformational and emotional (the latter possibly being more of an executional element). At the same time, the implications of the use of American strategies and their definitions to classify Japanese commercials should not be overlooked. Japanese commercials were not quite as unambiguous in nature by the American typology as were American commercials. A good example to demonstrate the point is Japanese comparative advertising. The Japanese use comparative advertising rarely because they do not want competitors' to "lose face;" when they do use such advertising, the consumer is often asked to "please compare."[37] As a result, comparative commercials would often include some other appeal that was transformational in nature, such as use occasion. Further, even when Japanese commercials use such informational strategies as unique selling proposition and hyperbole, their executions were rather emotional in nature. This highlights the need for an indigenous development of a typology of strategies for Japanese advertising which might require finer discriminations.

While the amount of use of overall strategies did not differ across countries, the amount of use of particular strategies was different. For particular informational strategies, the findings were in keeping with the Japanese reticence to use comparative advertising; American commercials used comparative advertising more than Japanese commercials. The Japanese commercials used unique selling proposition and preemptive strategies more possibly because given the attitude toward comparative advertising, these two strategies presented opportunities for making the product stand out and grab attention.

The findings on the respective use of informational strategies did not change much depending on situation, i.e., product involvement level and commercial length, particularly as far as the larger use of the comparative strategy by American commercials and the larger use of the unique selling proposition strategy by the Japanese commercials were concerned. That is, the pattern of use of these strategies by country did not change much for different product involvement levels or different commercial lengths.

In terms of amount of use of particular transformational strategies, both countries used them evenly. In terms of the situational variables, it was only for 15-second commercials that differences were found: American advertising used use occasion and user image commercials more and Japanese advertising used brand image commercials more. In view of the decrease in specificity from use occasion to brand image, brand image commercials might provide a larger opportunity for the Japanese display of affect.

This study did not specifically look into format variables and their association with content variables. One of the format variables it studied, number of camera shots, while not related to overall strategy was related to the specific strategies used.

American commercials, on the whole and within both informational and transformational commercials, used more camera shots than Japanese commercials. Ray and Batra[38] suggest that mere affect also works; in the case of Japanese consumers, it not only works but seems imperative. Japanese consumers have to be made to "feel good" while watching a commercial; they have to like the commercial before they like the product advertised in the commercial. That is, they transfer the affect towards the commercial to the product advertised (and in their case advertising recall might be as important as product recall). Japanese consumers do not like "busy-ness." As already pointed out, Japanese consumers are made to feel good through the use of nature symbols which are serene. This might partly explain the smaller number of different camera shots that are used in Japanese commercials. Also (and in support of the argument), Japanese commercials used more shots for informational commercials than for transformational commercials, while American commercials used more shots for transformational commercials. Is it possible that the particular positive experience that transformational commercials endow on American consumers is more dependent on the use of excitement, and one way of creating this exciting positive experience is through the use of several different camera shots?

For both countries, as the specificity of information increased, i.e., from hyperbolic to comparative strategies, the number of shots increased. The increase however was cubic; that is, the number of shots was the largest at a strategy before comparative, which in this case would be unique selling proposition. The cubic effect however was different for the two countries, with the changes in number of shots being much smaller for Japanese commercials than for American commercials. For transformational commercials, the number of shots increased with a decrease in specificity, from use occasion to brand image, but again this increase was a lot more dramatic for American commercials.

Japanese commercials exhibited a more even pattern in the use of camera shots across strategies; in American commercials, the changes across strategies were in some cases rather dramatic. While cultural factors might provide the explanation, the pattern might also be an indicator of an ill-fit between the American typology of strategies and Japanese advertising.

Finally, Japanese commercials used a larger number of informational cues than American commercials. This finding is consistent with findings of other similar studies.

On the whole, in the use of strategy and number of information cues, Japanese advertising exhibited more differnces from American advertising for informational than transformational commercials.

Conclusion

In sum, Japanese advertising uses more 15-second commercials and fewer camera shots in its commercials. It also uses fewer comparative and hyperbolic commercials and, for 15-second formats, more brand image commercials than American advertising.

These differences might be explained by cultural characteristics; Japanese commercials are imbued with the Japanese character. And this character is enigmatic, explaining apparent contradictions such as the use of a large number of information cues but also of mood in advertising. As Moore explains, "The two most fundamental characteristics of the Japanese thought-tradition and of Japanese culture ... may be summed up in the expressions 'direct ... experience'... and ... 'irrationalism'....[39]

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Even where similarities exist in strategy or other variables, the underlying reasons for these similarities could differ. Further, an indigenous development of the strategy typology might have discovered other differences too.

This study suggests that the differences that exist between Japanese and American advertising should give pause to practitioners who advocate global advertising in terms of use of strategies and format. But equally important, and precisely because of the differences in culture and their impact on advertising, is the need for academics who do cross-culturally comparative studies to consider the transferability across cultures of concepts used in the comparison.

Table 1a

Distribution of Commercials by Category within Variable, by Country

	American Commercials	Japanese Commercials
TOTAL	451	382
Product		
Auto/Parts	51 (11.3%)	30 (07.9%)
Appliances/Furniture	6 (01.3%)	26 (06.8%)
Service	21 (04.7%)	24 (06.3%)
Image Improvement	8 (01.8%)	24 (06.3%)
Entertainment/Toys	9 (02.0%)	21 (05.5%)
Alcohol/Cigarette	7 (01.6%)	43 (11.3%)
Household Supplies	46 (10.2%)	57 (14.9%)
Medicine	24 (05.3%)	24 (06.3%)
Food	61 (13.5%)	115 (30.1%)
Retail	62 (13.7%)	5 (01.3%)
Public Service Announcement	13 (02.9%)	0
TV Station/Program	140 (31.0%)	9 (02.4%)
Other	3 (00.7%)	4 (01.0%)
Involvement		
High	57 (12.6%)	61 (16.0%)
Middle	12 (02.7%)	72 (18.8%)
Low	367 (81.4%)/228*	247 (64.7%)/238
Length		
3	6 (01.3%)/0	0
4	1 (00.2%)/0	0
5	12 (02.7%)/2	2 (00.5%)/1
6	1 (00.2%)/0	0
7	4 (00.9%)/1	0
8	1 (00.2%)/0	0
10	65 (14.4%)/9	0
13	2 (00.4%)/0	0
14	2 (00.4%)/0	0
15	108 (23.9%)/91	239 (62.6%)/234
20	23 (05.1%)/3	1 (00.3%)
25	1 (00.2%)	0
27	1 (00.2%)/0	0
30	218 (48.3%)/197	137 (35.9%)/134
35	1 (00.2%)/0	0
45	1 (00.2%)	1 (00.3%)
55	1 (00.2%)	0
60	3 (00.7%)	2 (00.5%)

Table 1: Continued

	American Commercials	Japanese Commercials
Information Cues (multiple coding per commercial)		
Price/Value	83	84
Taste	45	83
Content	190/77	116/112
Performance	133/131	148
Quality	59/56	83/82
Package	236/235	315
Availability	181/55	69/65
Offer	8	27
Nutrition	9	13
Independent research	11	2
Company research	7	11
Idea	0	8
Safety	7	5
Guarantee	15	0
Number of Information Cues		
0	30 (06.7%)/19	25 (06.5%)/21
1	66 (14.6%)/53	57 (14.9%)/56
2	227 (50.3%)/111	113 (29.6%)/109
3	73 (16.2%)/73	102 (26.7%)
4	34 (07.5%)/34	57 (14.9%)
5	17 (03.8%)/17	22 (05.8%)
6	4 (00.9%)/4	5 (01.3%)
7	0	1 (00.3%)

Note: 1. * refers to frequencies if TV station/program commercials are removed.

2. The numbers do not always add up to the total because of "hard to code" commercials for certain variables.

Table 1b

Distribution of Commercials (excluding TV station/program) by Strategy, by Country

	American Commercials	Japanese Commercials
Informational Strategy		
Hyperbolic	34 (29.1%)	20 (14.8%)
Preemptive	48 (41.0%)	67 (49.6%)
USP	9 (07.7%)	35 (25.9%)
Comparative	26 (22.2%)	13 (09.6%)
Total	117	135
Transformational Strategy		
Use Occasion	47 (24.2%)	60 (25.2%)
Use Image	29 (14.9%)	23 (09.7%)
Brand Image	118 (60.8%)	115 (65.1%)
Total	194	238

Table 2

Distribution of Commercials by Country, by Informational Strategy

	Informational Strategy				
	Hyberbolic	Preemptive	Unique Sell Proposition	Comparative	Total
Country					
America	34 (29.1%)	48 (41%)	9 (7.7%)	26 (22.2%)	117 (46.4%)
Japan	20 (14.8%)	67 (49.6%)	35 (25.9%)	13 (9.6%)	135 (53.6%)
Total	54 (21.4%)	115 (45.6%)	44 (17.5%)	39 (15.5%)	252 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 25.31$; p. = .00.

Table 3

Distribution of Low Involvement Product Commercials by Country, by Informational Strategy

	Informational Strategy				
	Hyberbolic	Preemptive	Unique Sell Proposition	Comparative	Total
Country					
America	25 (28.1%)	35 (39.3%)	9 (10.1%)	20 (22.5%)	89 (51.1%)
Japan	15 (17.6%)	41 (48.2%)	20 (23.5%)	93 (10.6%)	85 (48.9%)
Total	40 (23%)	76 (43.7%)	29 (16.7%)	29 (16.7%)	174 (100%)

$x^2 = 11.23$; $p. = .01$.

Table 4a
Distribution of 15-Second Commercials by Country, by Informational Strategy

	Informational Strategy				
Country	Hyberbolic	Preemptive	Unique Sell Proposition	Comparative	Total
America	9 (31%)	11 (37.9%)	3 (10.3%)	6 (20.7%)	29 (26.1%)
Japan	18 (22%)	39 (47.6%)	22 (26.8%)	3 (3.7%)	82 (73.9%)
Total	27 (24.3%)	50 (45%)	25 (22.5%)	9 (8.1%)	111 (100%)

χ^2 = 11.42; p. = .00.

Table 4b
Distribution of 30-Second Commercials by Country, by Informational Strategy

	Informational Strategy				
Country	Hyberbolic	Preemptive	Unique Sell Proposition	Comparative	Total
America	20 (25.3%)	35 (44.3%)	5 (6.3%)	19 (24.1%)	79 (60.8%)
Japan	2 (3.9%)	28 (54.9%)	12 (23.5%)	9 (17.6%)	51 (39.2%)
Total	22 (16.9%)	63 (48.5%)	17 (13.1%)	28 (21.5%)	130 (100%)

χ^2 = 16.70; p. = .00.

Table 4c
Distribution of 15-Sec. Commercials by Country, by Transformational Strategy

	Transformational Strategy			
Country	Use Occasion	User Image	Brand Image	Total
America	24 (38.7%)	10 (16.1%)	28 (45.2%)	62 (29%)
Japan	39 (25.7%)	16 (10.5%)	97 (63.8%)	152 (71%)
Total	63 (29.4%)	26 (12.1%)	125 (58.4%)	214 (100%)

χ^2 = 6.31, p. = .04.

Table 5a

Main and Interaction Effects for Country and Overall Strategy for Number of Shots

Main Effect: Country

Number of Shots			
America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
12.85	8.72	20.07	.00

Interaction Effect: Country by Overall Strategy

	Number of Shots			
	America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
Informational	10.83	9.04	5.23	.02
Transformational	14.06	8.53		

Table 5b

Main and Interaction Effects for Country and Informational Strategy for Number of Shots

Main Effect: Country

Number of Shots			
America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
10.83	9.04	14.70	.00

Main Effect: Informational Strategy

	Number of Shots					
	Hyper.	Preemp.	USP	Comp.	F Value	PR>F
Linear	8.94	9.09	12.75	10.21	5.29	.02
Quadratic					9.97	.00
Cubic					18.34	.00

Interaction Effect: Country by Informational Strategy

	Number of Shots			
	America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
Hyberbolic	10.00	7.15	4.65 (quadratic)	.03
Preemptive	9.19	9.01	17.53 (cubic)	.00
USP	23.56	9.97		
Comparative	10.54	9.54		

Table 5c

Main and Interaction Effects for Country and Transformational Strategy for Number of Shots

Main Effect: Country

Number of Shots			
America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
14.06	8.53	10.76	.00

Main Effect: Transformational Strategy

	Number of Shots				
	Use Occ.	Use Im.	Brand Im.	F Value	PR>F
Linear	8.07	13.5	11.7	10.95	.00

Interaction Effect: Country by Transformational Strategy

	Number of Shots			
	America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
Use Occasion	7.21	8.75	13.48 (linear)	.00
User Image	16.55	9.65		
Brand Image	16.18	8.28		

Table 6a

ANOVA: Main and Interaction Effects for Country and Overall Strategy for Number of Information Cues

Main Effect: Country

Number of Informa. Cues			
America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
2.38	2.56	4.46	.04

Main Effect: Overall Strategy

Number of Information Cues			
Informational	Transformational	F Value	PR>F
3.09	2.12	101.59	.00

Table 6b

ANOVA: Interaction Effects for Country and Informational Strategy for Number of Information Cues

Interaction Effect: Country by Informational Strategy

	Number of Informa. Cues			
	America	Japan	F Value	PR>F
Hyberbolic	2.91	3.25	2.66	.049
Preemptive	3.23	3.10		
USP	2.56	3.11		
Comparative	2.69	3.85		

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"MASS LINE": THE "LIVING SOUL" OF "MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT" AS THE FOUNDATION OF CHINA'S INTERNAL MEDIA POLICY

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Submitted To
The International Communication Division
Open Paper Competition
AEJMC Annual Convention
Minneapolis, Minnesota
August, 1990

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Introduction

China's media policy is characterized by its emphases on Communist Party control, class struggle and "mass line." Of these guidelines, the mass line, the least familiar to Westerners, has had the most prevailing influence on China's media policies and practices.

Often referred to by the Chinese as the "living soul" of "Mao Zedong Thought,"[1] the mass line is officially interpreted as "everything for the masses, reliance on the masses in everything and 'from the masses, to the masses.'"[2] When used in media policy statements mass line means "various realistic connections between all kinds of mass media and the people, and the media reflection of the lives, struggles and fundamental interests of the broad masses."[3]

The concept of mass line has attracted some limited attention of Western communications researchers. For instance, Ithiel de Sola Pool commented:

> Probably no regime in history has relied as heavily on mass mobilization to achieve its goals as did Mao's regime in China. The Cultural Revolution was almost an experimental test of how far agitation and propaganda could successfully transform human nature throughout a whole nation.

And William E. Griffith, in a discussion of communist propaganda, wrote: "The populist characteristics of Chinese

Communism are reflected in Mao's emphasis on the 'mass line'--on keeping in constant close touch with and drawing inspiration from the Chinese masses."[5]

In spite of such comments, no substantial studies have been conducted on the mass line. This study will try to begin filling that vacancy and increase understanding, especially by Westerners, of China's media practices.

The study will examine the evolution and development of the mass line in Chinese mass media, review the policies and practice of the mass line during different periods, analyze its unique characteristics and examine the reasons for its existence.

The paper will be composed of five parts: (1) What is mass line and how was it formed? (2) Mass line in revolution; (3) Mass line in ideological transformation; (4) Mass line in national development; and (5) Summary and discussion: unique characteristics of mass line.

What Is Mass Line and How Was it Formed?

As noted already, the mass line in China's media policy refers to connections between mass media and the people -- and implies that media reflect the lives, struggles and fundamental interests of the broad masses. A wide variety of media, some not traditional in the West, are employed in the mass line process, including newspapers, books, pamphlets, cartoons, posters, slogans, "wall" newspapers, meetings, "reading groups," drama troupes, discussion, "people's letter box," campaigns and deeds.[6]

What specifically distinguishes mass line from other nations' internal propaganda is not only its insistence that propagandists empathize with the citizens they are trying to convince, but also that these citizens play active, influential parts in creating such propaganda. In other words, there is a deliberate, highly creative blurring of roles, an interplay in which the actors (the propagandists) and those acted upon (the target audiences) exchange ideas and places in a cooperative, constantly refined endeavor.

An examination of the formation and development of the mass line will indicate that it is the product of the Chinese revolution in a unique Chinese situation.

The revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party actually is the continuation of the 1911 Revolution led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Although Dr. Sun's revolution overthrew the long-standing feudalism in China, it failed to mobilize the vast masses of the people. Consequently, the revolution failed to produce a strong democratic republic. When the Chinese Communist Party came to the fore of the revolution, it already had a fairly good idea of what should be its top priority. Strongly influenced by Lenin's idea of using the propaganda machine to "agitate, mobilize and organize" the masses to join the revolution, the Chinese Communist Party at its first congress on July 1, 1921, decided that its core task was "to propagate Marxism among the masses of workers through such means as publication of popular reading materials."[7]

The individual who almost single-handedly developed the mass line was Mao Zedong. Mao was the first to realize that in such a large, agrarian country as China, a revolution was impossible without mobilizing the vast masses of peasants and workers. As early as 1925, in one of his first classics, the "Report on the Investigation of the Peasants' Movement in Hunan," he concluded that political propaganda was indispensable to a revolution in the countryside:

> Simple slogans, cartoons and speeches have produced such a wide-spread and speedy effect among the peasants that every one of them seems to have been through a political school. . . . From now on care should be taken to use every opportunity gradually to enrich the content and clarify the meaning of those simple slogans. [8]

But in 1925 Mao's influence in the Party was very limited and his ideas were not accepted. The Party general-secretary then, Chen Duxiu, insisted on revolution in the cities, relying on petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals. The failure to mobilize in the countryside contributed to the defeat of the first Great Revolution in 1927.

In August, 1927, the Chinese Communist Party took up arms against the Guomindang (Kuomintang). Mao led a peasant army and took it to the Jinggang Mountains on the borders of the provinces of Hunan and Jiangxi, where the Communist forces converged and the Red Army came into being. During the years of struggles in the Jinggang Mountains area, Mao became increasingly convinced of the importance of propaganda in mobilizing the masses. At a 1929 Party congress, he stressed that propaganda was the "first and foremost important job of the Red Army." He said:

> Only with the fulfillment of this propaganda task can the general task be realized of organizing and arming up the masses, establishing government, wiping out reactionary forces and bringing in the revolutionary surge.[9]

Mao pointed out that propaganda should fit the "mood" of the masses' struggles; i. e., slogans should relate to people's daily lives and target audiences should include such potential revolutionary forces as poor citizens, small business people, students, women, youth and vagrants.[10] He also urged propaganda efforts to win over opponents. Mao suggested that each army brigade should have a propaganda team. He gave detailed instructions as how to improve such revolutionary propaganda forms as leaflets, bulletins, manifestos, wall newspapers, songs, ballads, cartoons, paintings, drama troupes, clubs, word-of-mouth and mass meetings. He also emphasized that the Red Army's deeds, such as repairing houses and bundling hay for the peasants, were a good way of engendering good will for the army.

In 1934 Mao again stressed the importance of identifying with the masses through communications to mobilize support. He told Party members, "We should help the masses to realize that we represent their interests, that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs."[11] He called on Party members to be concerned with the masses' well-being, to work earnestly through word and deed to solve problems of everyday life: the problems of salt, rice, housing, clothing, childbirth, etc. [12]

Partly due to the effectiveness of the Red Army's propaganda, especially its deeds, the revolutionary government was able to survive the first four "encirclement and extermination" campaigns of the Guomindang troops during 1931 and 1933, but failed to break the fifth encirclement in 1933-34 and had to move out of its base area and start the famous "Long March." Not long after the start of the march, Mao was elected chairman of the Party and began implementing his ideas about mass propaganda. The success of the Long March was, in large part, the success of Mao's ideology of political propaganda and agitation. As Mao proclaimed later, the Long March was "a manifesto," "a propaganda force" and "a seeding machine" for the revolution.[13]

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July, 1937, led to an uneasy armed truce between the Guomingdang and the Chinese Communists; a United Front was established. The Communist Party plunged into the hard struggle against the Japanese invaders and its influence expanded greatly. It became increasingly important for the propaganda workers to mobilize the masses. In 1942 Mao delivered his speech, "Talks at the Yanan Forum on Art and Literature," which was to become the basic guide for the Party's cultural and press relations. The speech detailed the role to be played by all media: to serve the "millions and tens of millions of working people." He said that:

> our literature and art are first for the workers, the class that leads the revolution. Secondly, they are for the peasants, the most numerous and most steadfast of our allies in the revolution. Thirdly, they are for the armed workers and peasants, namely, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the other armed units of the people. . . . Fourthly, they are for the

> laboring masses of the urban petty bourgeoisie and for the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, both of whom are also our allies in the revolution and capable of long-term cooperation with us.[14]

Mao argued that to serve the masses, writers and artists should understand the people well. He emphasized that a "mass style" meant that "the thoughts and feelings of our writers and artists should be fused with those of the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers."[15]

Mao's press theories, especially his ideas about the mass line in media policy, are epitomized in his talk to the editorial staff of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily in 1948. In the talk, he repeatedly spoke of the importance of media serving the masses. He said:

> A basic principle of Marxism-Leninism is to enable the masses to know their own interests and unite to fight for their own interests. The role and power of the newspapers consist in their ability to bring the Party programme, the Party line, the Party's general and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work before the masses in the quickest and most extensive way.[16]

While emphasizing the role of newspaper people in educating the masses, Mao again encouraged media workers to learn from the masses. He said that newspaper employees "should constantly study the material coming from below, gradually enrich their practical knowledge and become experienced."[17]

In this same talk, Mao spoke of the masses "running" newspapers: "With our newspapers, too, we must rely on everybody, on the masses of the people, on the whole Party to run them, not merely on a few persons working behind closed doors."[18]

It is clear then that the mass line in China's media policy originated and developed along with the revolution. It is a summary of revolutionary experiences. And though the mass line has been altered from time to time according to the needs of differing situations, these have been relatively minor adjustments to the original ideas of Mao's formulated more than 40 years ago.

This study will now examine how mass line policies have been carried out to support Party tasks during different periods of China's revolution and development.

Mass Line in Revolution

From the its founding in 1921 until its rise to power in 1949 the Chinese Communist Party engaged in a protracted, arduous revolution. It went through the failure of the "Great Revolution;" survived the 10-year, bitter suppression of the Guomindang; expanded during the war of Japanese invasion; and finally overthrew the Guomindang government. During these long years of struggle the Chinese Communist Party had no legitimate position in the country, nor did it have modern weaponry. The Communists' chief asset was the people and the mobilization work became the top priority of the Party. To convince tens of millions of a mostly illiterate population to join the revolution, the Party, without access to modern mass media, conducted large scale mass line propaganda, turning Party members and citizens into propagandists employing whatever propaganda devices were available, including word-of-mouth, rallies, demonstrations, and "struggle meetings" (where peasants voiced complaints about landlords), revolutionary songs and dances, and "propaganda through deeds."

Word-of-Mouth

During the early period of the Chinese revolution, it was extremely difficult to mobilize the population, especially the peasants, who, as serfs for centuries and illiterate, had resigned themselves to their fate and were reluctant to change. As a result, indirect, formal propaganda was ineffective in addressing the majority of the population. The Communist Party therefore employed interpersonal communication, word-of-mouth, such as "heart-to-heart" talks with its target audiences. Usually the Party would send its members door-to-door in villages to visit peasants, starting with the poorest families, and discuss their sufferings. The Party members helped the peasants to think about why they were poor and suggested what they could do to change their situation. This work was done secretly. Peasants who were won over in turn spoke with other peasants. This highly personal sort of mobilization propaganda constituted the major task of the Party in the early period of the revolution.

Rallies, Demonstrations and Struggle Meetings

In places where the revolution was more open, effective ways of mobilizing the masses included rallies, struggle meetings and demonstrations. Rallies were usually held in cities with the participation of intellectuals, students, business people and urban citizens in general. Pamphlets were distributed to the relatively literate audiences at the rallies, which often ended up with peaceful demonstration marches through the streets.

Demonstrations were frequently employed during the revolution. In his "Report on the Investigation of the Hunan Peasants' Movement," Mao Zedong praised the effectiveness of demonstrations.[19] During the war against the Guomindang government, the Communists used demonstrations as a major means of winning over the people. The main task of many underground Communists in the Guomindang-ruled areas was to organize demonstrations to expose the crimes and corruption of the Guomindang government.

A unique means of propaganda employed by the Party during the revolution was struggle meetings. Most popular during the land reform movement, these were usually large meetings of villagers gathered together to "settle old accounts" with landlords. The peasants denounced crimes of the landlords, asked them to confess and demanded compensation.

Revolutionary Songs and Dances

Revolutionary songs were mostly children's songs. During the revolution children acted as messengers and spied on suspicious intruders in Communist-ruled areas. Children's songs usually dealt with social injustice and called on the people to fight back. One such children's song went like this:

Down with the landlords,

Distribute the land.
We want to be masters
And be happy and gay.[20]

Children's songs, selected for their popularity, also were included in textbooks.

In addition, the Party utilized drama and operas with local settings as consciousness-raising devices. During the "War of Resistance Against Japan" plays were staged exposing the crimes of the Japanese and reflecting the patriotism of people vying to join the army to fight the invaders. In the land reform movement several plays staged by numerous propaganda teams throughout the country became very popular. One was Liu Hulan, a play about a Chinese heroine who died a martyr to save the people of her village from the persecution of landlords. Another was the White-Hair Girl, which told a true story of how a slave-girl, no longer tolerant of her landlord master's abuse, escaped and hid herself in the mountains for three years, living on wild fruits and tree leaves. Because of lack of proper nutrition, her hair turned white. It was only when the Liberation Army found her that she returned to human society.

Such plays were effective in arousing the peasants, who often went to "settle old accounts" with their landlords immediately after the plays.

Propaganda Through Deeds

Realizing that deeds were the most effective means of propaganda, the Chinese Communist Party paid special attention to its members' deeds, especially those of its army. Soon after the founding of the Red Army, the Party formulated "Three Major Disciplines and Eight Points of Attention" for its military.[21] Among these rules, more than half dealt with relations between the army and the people. Soldiers were required to help the people: not to take "even a needle or thread" from them, to return what they borrowed, respect women and not mistreat war prisoners. Any behavior that might harm the image of the Red Army led to severe punishment or even the death penalty. Wherever the troops went they tried not to disturb the people, sleeping in the streets, for example, rather than commandeering homes. They carried water, cleaned yards, cut rice. These deeds played a key role in winning support for the Communists.

During the revolution, because of the lack of communication facilities such as newspapers and radio, the Communist Party's mass line policy consisted mainly of intense personal efforts to mobilize the population. Every soldier and officer became a propagandist. Direct, personal, convincing and emotional, this kind of propaganda played a significant role in the final victory of the Communists in the Chinese revolution.

Mass Line in Ideological Transformation

After long years of hard struggle the Communist Party overthrew the Guomindang in 1949 and established its own government. The Party worked to restore the war-stricken economy and finish land reform. By 1956 the Communist Party completed the transformation of the economy from private to public ownership. The "violent revolution" was over, the Party said, and the socialist revolution, based upon a new economic foundation, was ushered in. Although the socialist revolution did not involve armed struggle, the tasks facing the Chinese Communist Party were still extraordinarily difficult. The nation was a society built upon a 2000-year-old feudalistic structure. Ignorance, superstition and ancient ideology ruled. In order to build socialism, the whole culture had to be transformed along the lines of socialist ideology.

At the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work in March, 1957, Chairman Mao Zedong began implementing this enormous, complex task of ideological transformation by setting the basic media policy guidelines for the new era. Mao said that to achieve the ultimate consolidation of a socialist system, it was necessary not only to bring about socialist industrialization and economic change, but also to "carry on constant and arduous socialist revolutionary struggles and socialist education on the political and ideological fronts."[22]

This speech of Mao set the pattern for what China was to undergo for the next two decades -- a series of political movements intended to change the ideology of the whole people, culminating in the Cultural Revolution. In this long endeavor focusing upon ideological transformation the Communist Party used mass media to achieve its goals, pushing the mass line policy to its extremes.

Chinese mass media workers faced a dual challenge in carrying out the huge assignment of ideological reform: they needed to remold themselves, as well as use their communication skills to transform the ideology of an entire population. As early as 1942 Mao Zedong had provided directions in this regard. He encouraged the writers and artists to go among the masses and to learn from them.

Following Mao's instructions, large numbers of Chinese writers and artists went to factories, villages and army barracks to learn from workers, peasants and soldiers. Writers lived and worked with such citizens for several years each to obtain "life experience." Actors and playwrights were told: "When the peasants are busy, work with them. When they have spare time, perform for them."[23] Thus, theatrical people could be seen helping in the harvest, carrying water, chopping vegetables, doing household chores, mending pig sties.[24]

By living with workers, peasants and soldiers, writers and artists acquired not only source material, but also "feedback." To accurately portray the lives of the workers, peasants and soldiers, the media workers asked for the opinions of their audiences and made revisions accordingly. One revolutionary opera about the Liberation Army, Shajiabang, was revised 14 times.[25]

Under the principle of serving the workers, peasants and soldiers, the Chinese writers and artists produced large numbers of novels, short stories, movies and plays reflecting the lives and wishes of ordinary people.

For the majority of the Chinese masses, ideological transformation mainly meant the elimination of old ideas and instigation of new, socialist ideas. To create a breed of socialist Chinese, the Chinese government utilized all forms of mass media, both traditional and modern, to change people's ideology. In addition to newspapers, magazines, radio and television, such forms as children's songs, Lian Huan Hua (picture books with serious themes), short stories, drama and opera were all employed. In addition, there were small study groups in which Marxist-Leninist and Mao's works were read and discussed. Group members also engaged in criticism and self-criticism; the results were often carried as small commentaries on blackboard and wall newspapers.

Mass Line in National Development

At the same time Mao Zedong put forward the task of socialist revolution, he also set forth the task of rebuilding the country into a modern, socialist nation. To mobilize the whole people, especially the vast number of peasants, to take part in the reconstruction of the country, the Chinese government continued mass line through forms of communication within traditional mass media systems to raise the people's educational level, teach them scientific skills, and encourage their participation in the decision-making process.

Loudspeakers

To make sure that the Party's policies and government development programs reached citizens promptly the Chinese government launched a full-reaching campaign of installing loudspeakers throughout the country in the 1950s and 1960s. By the early 1980s there were 95 million loudspeakers in the nation.[26] They could be found in offices, dormitories, village squares, rice paddies, factories, schools and households, as well as atop trees and telephone poles.

Today loudspeakers permeate the countryside. In each commune (now called "township") there is a radio station and in each household a loudspeaker. Through the loudspeakers, peasants hear national, world and local news. The loudspeakers also broadcast information about new agricultural technologies and techniques. Peasants are encouraged to write articles and small commentaries for the township station to broadcast.

People's Letters

Another way of involving the whole people in the decision-making process of national development through mass media is the people's letters. Addressed to the editor of a newspaper, magazine or radio station, these letters include suggestions and demands of the ordinary people. They also include criticisms exposing the wrong-doing and shortcomings of government officials and business executives. For China's media people's letters have become a means of keeping in touch with the masses.

Following Mao's instruction of "paying attention to people's letters," almost all Chinese media organizations have a department dealing with people's letters.[27] The media not only devote unusual amounts of time and space to these letters, but also often follow up to help solve problems cited in this mail.

For example, the People's Daily began handling people's letters in the early 1950s. Since then it has handled millions of people's letters. In 1980, to take one year, the paper received 780,000 such letters, averaging 2,135 a day. It then devoted a total of 48 pages plus 44 special columns to print more than 1,300 of them.[28] The paper relayed many of the letters to relevant government departments, enterprises and institutions, requesting answers and actions in response.

On December 8, 1984, for instance, the People's Daily published a letter from a middle-school teacher in Anshan City, northeast China, proposing to set a day aside to honor the teachers in the country. This letter received an enthusiastic response from readers and came to the attention of national leaders. In the following year the National People's Congress decided to set aside September 10 each year as China's Teachers' Day.[29]

Summary and Discussion: Unique Characteristics of Mass Line

Obviously the Chinese concept of mass line relates closely to the Western idea of "public opinion" in that both are concerned with shaping ideology and mobilizing citizens to support and take part in a public cause. However, mass line has its unique characteristics.

The mass line in China's mass media is a mixture of the Marxist-Leninist propaganda tradition and the influences of a specific history and culture. Mass line was mostly developed by Mao Zedong, based on Lenin's ideas about propaganda and on his own revolutionary experiences. Mass line reflects the personality of Mao Zedong, especially in terms of his strong belief in the power of mass movements and radical social change, -- and his distrust of intellectuals. Closely connected with the Chinese revolution, the mass line is characterized by agitating, mobilizing and organizing vast numbers of people, all the while emphasizing mass propaganda and thought reform through persuasion and mass participation. Under this system, everyone is both a propagandist and the target of propaganda. This mass propaganda is explicitly intended to change the individual and collective personality of the Chinese in order to eradicate the old, feudal ideologies and to form a single, unified, socialist ideology, instead of multiple, individual, varied ideologies.

These characteristics of the mass line were shaped by the needs of the Chinese revolution and national development. For centuries China had been under the influence of Confucianism and feudalism. Confucian doctrines, such as obedience to older people and superiors, filial piety to family, moderateness and emphasis on human relations, dominated Chinese thinking. Long years of feudal suppression also had made the people, especially the vast number of peasants, passively resigned to their fate and reluctant to change. But revolution and national development in China required participation of the whole people.

In order to initiate such participation, as Godwin C. Chu wrote, two conditions must be met. The first is change in the major social institutions to remove old barriers blocking mass mobilization. This requires social structural change. The second is a transformation of traditional values and beliefs holding the Chinese back from fully utilizing and organizing their own resources. This requires a change of cultural ethos and personality; in short, the creation of the New Chinese Man and Woman.[30]

These changes would be immense tasks in any society, especially in a China so populous and dominated by ancient ideologies. In such a situation, mass line policy became particularly important. This policy created a means of nationwide communication in which, as Chu put it, there were

> not just a few leaders talking to the populace through mass media about what they should do, but almost everyone talking to everyone else, horizontally as well as vertically, upward as well as downward, . . . It involves a high intensity of interpersonal communication at the grassroots level, as well as mass media communication at the national level. It represents an integrated use of the media, the schools, the cadres, and above all, the local small groups.[31]

Mass line, born in China's revolution, and employed in various forms as communication needs changed during subsequent periods of development, is characterized by its emphases on raising people's consciousness, agitating, and organizing the people, as well as on mass participation in propaganda. Through "thick and thin," the mass line has been the means to convey the Party's policies to the people and to mobilize them to carry out these policies.

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FOOTNOTES

N. D. All of the following sources cited that were published in China, with the exception of those published by the Foreign Languages Press, are written in Chinese.

1. The phrase has become a special term in the Chinese Communist ideology. It is defined as "Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China; it constitutes a correct theory, a body of correct principles and a summary of the experiences that have been confirmed in the practice of the Chinese revolution, a crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party."("On Questions of Party History," *Beijing Review*, vol.24, July 6, 1981, p.29).

2.*Ibid.*, p. 33.

3. *Handbook for Journalistic Work*, Xinhua News Agency, (Beijing, New China Publishing House, 1985), p. 585.

4. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Communication in Totalitarian Societies," in Ithiel de Sola Pool and Wilbur Schramm, eds. *Handbook of Communication* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1973), as quoted by Chin-Chuan Lee in "China's Media Policies: A Comparative Analysis," in *The Asian Messenger*," Autumn 1979/Spring 1980, p. 58.

5. William E. Griffith, "Communist Propaganda," in *Propaganda and Communication in World History*, vol. 2, Harold D. Lasswell *et al*. eds., (Honolulu, East-West Center, The University Press of Hawaii, 1980), p. 249.

6. "Wall" newspapers are mostly big character newspapers put up on walls. They usually carry news, small commentaries and stories, and are put out irregularly. "Reading groups" are small groups of people organized mostly on basis of work unit for purposes of study. They meet regularly to study government documents, read newspapers and discuss reading material together. "People's letter box" is usually a section in a newspaper where ordinary citizens' letters to editors or commentaries are carried.

7. Kao-tao Chang, *Autobiography: The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1927*, vol. 1, (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1971), p. 151.

8. Mao Zedong, "Investigation of Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 48.

9. Mao, Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Journalistic Work, (Beijing, Xinhua Publishing House, 1983), p. 15.

10. "Vagrants" were the large number of unemployed and homeless people who moved from place to place. They were the lowest and poorest in social and economic status, the most undisciplined. Mao thought once they were organized, they could become an important force for the revolution.

11. Mao, "Be Concerned With the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work," Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, (Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1971), p. 54.

12. Ibid.

13. "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, p. 160.

14. Mao, "Talks at the Yenan Forum of Literature and Art," Selected Readings, p. 260.

15. Ibid.

16. Mao, "A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Daily," Selected Readings, p. 354.

17. Ibid., p. 357.

18. Ibid.

19. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, p. 48.

20. One of the co-authors remembers this song from childhood.

21. Mao, "On Issues of Red Army Propaganda," Selected Works of Mao Zedong, p. 22.

22. Mao, "Speech at CPC National Conference on Propaganda Work," Selected Readings, p. 481.

23. Godwin C. Chu, Popular Media in China: Shaping New Culture Patterns, ed, (Honolulu, East-West Center, The University of Hawaii Press, 1978), p. 87.

24. Chu Ping, "The Cultural Hussars Active in the Mountainous Villages," Qu Yi (April, 1965): 63, as quoted by Godwin C. Chu, Popular Media in China, p. 87.

25. Acrobatic Team of Peking's Chinese Opera Troupe, "Strive to Create a Model of a Revolutionary Hero," *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), June 2, 1965, as quoted by Chu in *Popular Media*, p. 90. The play told a story of peasants in the place named Shajiabang providing refuges for wounded soldiers.

26. Kang Ying, "History of the New Chinese People's Broadcasting Undertaking," *China Journalism Yearbook 1982* (Beijing: China Social Science Publishing House, 1982), p. 19, as quoted by Won Ho Chang in *Media in China: the History and the Future*, (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1989), p. 106.

27. Mao, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Journalistic Work*, p. 173.

28. Won Ho Chang, *Media in China*, p. 106.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

30. Godwin C. Chu, *Radical Changes Through Communication in Mao's China*, (Honolulu, East-West Center, The University Press of Hawaii, 1977), pp. 2-3.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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March 21,1991